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For Steve,
'God is dead, Marxism is undergoing crisis,
and I don 'tfeel so hot myself.'
Umberto Eco
INTRODUCTION.
The postmodern philoso hical project, which aims to undermine the universalistic,
metanarrational an transcendental cts of traditional Western thought and to bring about
an awareness of 'otherness' through deconstruction, has been dismissed out of hand by
some theorists. Roger Scruton, for example, has said,
What deconstruction sets before us is a profound mystery, which ca be
approached only through the incantation of invented words, through a
Newspeak which deconstructs its own meaning in the act of utterance.
When at last the veil is lifted, we perceive a wondrous landscape: a world of
negations, a world in which, wherever we look for presence we find
absence, a world not of people but of vacant idols, a world which offers, in
the places where we seek for order, friendship and moral value, only the
skeleton of power. There is no creation in this world, though it is full of
cleverness - a cleverness actively deployed in the cause of Nothing. . . It is,
in short, the world of the Devil. 1
While in general terms Scruton's intuitions on the subject may be right, such criticisms do
not get to the heart of the 'postmodern problematic'. This thesis aims to demonstrate the
following points: Firstly, that the postmodern insights and critique of the Enlightenment
project are well founded, that there do not exist any universal or transcendental truths.
Secondly, that the attempts of postmodern theorists to derive from these insights any
implication for politics, society, or the self, whether of an emancipatory or of a pragmatic
nature, are misplaced. The validity of the second point will be supported by a
demonstration that there is an inevitable use of a priori truths in the work of the chosen
thinkers as well as everyday discourse; and that postmodern theory, highlighted in the
specific concerns of the deconstructed 'other', remains very much within the liberal
democratic tradition, which can itself be seen as a product of the Enlightenment project.
The philosophers Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, and Alasdair
Maclntyre have been chosen for analysis as their work exhibits the most fundamental
tensions within the postmodern stance, tensions which need to be delineated and examined
for an appraisal of the future of postmodern political philosophy. Each chapter is divided
into sections on Rationality, The Self, and Politics and Society, in part to try to simplify
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and make accessible their often complex and vague theses, but also as an attempt to reflect
how their own rationalities, and views of rationality, are developed into political
commentary and prescription.
It must be noted from the outset that these thinkers do not hold identical definitions of the
Enlightenment or the Western philosophical tradition, and that subsequently, their critiques
and analyses differ. While some postmodern theorists are attacking, for example, what they
see as the failure of the Enlightenment project, others condemn the entire Western
philosophic tradition from Plato onwards. This might appear less ague if we note that at
many points in the postmodern debate the Enlightenment appears to be presented as the
symbolic offspring of the Western tradition, with Plato as its father. Symbolic, that is,
because this aspect of the postmodern project tends to characterise the Enlightenment in
terms of its fundamental, underlying ethos of objectivity and transcendentalism, rather than
of its specific manifestations. We similarly find that the references to their predecessors,
from Aristotle to Nietzsche, have been criticised as often vague and based on
misinterpretations. However, by allowing that these references are symbolic
characterisations of ideas, we can attempt to capture the themes and tensions at the heart of
the debate.
This approach might also go some way to explaining the way that terms such as
transcendentalism, essentialism, objectivity, metanarrational and foundationalism are often
used loosely and interchangeably. In general, the postmodern critique is aimed at traditional
philosophy's attempt to know essential truths which can provide objective criteria by which
to judge our representations 'accurately', and the subsequent moral positions which arise
from this. The notion of transcendentalism is therefore always criticised, either implicitly or
explicitly, as an inherent feature of the Western philosophic tradition. There appear to be
two interrelated senses of 'transcendental' as referred to in the postmodern project. One
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applies to objects, truths, and concepts of reality as somehow outside of and prior to any
contingent, spatio-temporal factors, including our description of them. The other applies to
the viewpoint from which such objects, truths, and concepts of reality are described as
outside of and prior to any contingent factors which could effect this description of them.
The argument central to postmodern philosophical discourse is therefore that while we
might not be able to say for certain that no transcendental truths exist, we can say that there
exists no transcendental viewpoint from which truths and reality can be known in this way.
It is this critique of the notion of transcendentalism, and its accompanying conceptuaF"
terminology, which serves to characterise the thinkers under analysis as postmodern, (
whether they accept the label or not. And it is their desire to extrapolate political
implications of this critique which characteres the 'postmodern problematic', and which
this thesis aims to analyse.
With Foucault, it is the holistic, totalising approach of traditional philosophy and
epistemology which he criticises:
The old questions of the traditional analysis (what links should be made
between disparate events? What continuity or overall significance do they
possess? Is it possible to define a total history or must one be content with
reconstituting connections?) are now being replaced by questions of another
type: which strata should be isolated from others? What criteria of
periodisation should be adopted for each of them?2
Derrida criticises the Western philosophical tradition for the way that it has downgraded the
sign in its never-ending search for what lies behind it, the signified. This philosophical
desire for an unmediated truth has resulted in the somewhat arrogant confidence of Western
rationality, a confidence, he believes, which has come about through the deliberate
exclusion of 'unreason' in a dialectic strategy which was adopted from Plato onwards. His
concept of 'differance' is employed to explore how language and meaning have been
constructed and constituted in such a way as to perpetuate this exclusion, and his
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deconstructive methodology is intended to highlight and overturn the hierarchies and
universalism which have resulted from it.
Rorty's attack on the Western tradition can be seen as similar in that he believes that the
attempt to explicate 'rationality' and 'objectivity' in terms of accurate representation is
deceptive. In place of traditional epistemology, Rorty offers the 'hermeneutic conversation'
and pragmatism, which avoid, he believes, the assumption that all contributions to a given
discourse are commensurable.
Maclntyre's critique is directed more specifically at what he believes to be the failure of the
Enlightenment project, and the subsequent problems which have arisen from this failure.
He firstly criticises the Enlightenment for its claimed neutrality, and argues that although
there can be no a priori argument for the non-existence of a neutral stance or a universal
standpoint, the fact that liberalism (as the strongest claimant to provide such grounds) has
failed in this respect, is evidence enough that there is no such neutral ground. Secondly, he
argues that the philosophical rejection of the Aristotelian view of the notion of 'man-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' is at odds with the attempts of the eighteenth century
philosophers' attempts to find a rational basis for their moral beliefs in a particular
understanding of human nature. Thus Maclntyre's position is that there is a contemporary
moral crisis resulting from the incommensurability of current moral debates.
This overview of the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment, although useful in
providing a sense in which these thinkers are alike and can be properly called
'postmodern', tends to conceal their differences and their problematics. The chapters are
ordered in such a way as to present a (non-chronological) 'development' of sorts, whereby
each subsequent philosopher is solving, to some degree, the problems which are apparent
in the work of the previous thinker. With Foucault, it is difficult to see how, in his analysis
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of power, he can move from being a disinterested historian to a social critic, without
employing the kind of totalising theories and metaphysical assumptions which he attacks.
Although he was working on an essay called 'What is Enlightenment?' towards the end of
his life, which started to tackle this problem, none of his previous work exhibits the kind of
self-awareness which we find in Derrida, for example.
Derrida starts from the premise that there is no privileged space outside of reason, and
therefore accepts the pennanence of our philosophical heritage, attacking it from within in
an attempt to deconstruct our existing hierarchies. The difficult)7 which then arises for
Derrida is that he has been accused of failing to be "explicit about the motivations behind
this guerrilla warfare against the Enlightenment heritage"3.
Rorty's criticism of the attempts of traditional epistemology to mirror nature stem from his
convincing analysis of these attempts, rather from any societal observation. This tends to
mean, however, that as with Derrida, we are left wondering why he feels the need to
extrapolate these insights to the prescriptions he makes for the 'edification' of the
individual, and a 'postmetaphysical' society. Maclntyre believes that there is a current
'crisis', and blames this on the failure of the Enlightenment project. He traces what he
believes to be a direct causal link between this failure and what he describes as
'contemporary moral incommensurablity'. His remedy, to restate the Aristotelian concept
of human nature, puts him in a peculiar position. While the other philosophers I have
chosen see postmodernism in emancipatory terms, or at least try to derive applications of
postmodern theory in such a way as to have emancipatory implications, Maclntyre sees
postmodernism as a disastrous societal reality in the West.
Thus we can see an immediate difficulty with postmodern political philosophy: to remain
true to the postmodern critique of the transcendental, foundational, universalistic, and
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metanarrational aspects of the Enlightenment and traditional philosophy, these thinkers
must be careful not to launch their attacks from a position outside of that which they are
criticising, that is, they must not assume a transcendental position. This in itself is difficult,
and has resulted in the criticism that postmodern theorising inevitably accepts (and remains
within) the parameters set by traditional epistemology and the Enlightenment i particular.
But furthermore, it leaves these philosophers open to questions regarding their motivations.
In particular, I think it can be shown that any attempt to draw from their insights
implications for politics or the self, comes not from postmodern insights into the lack of a
metanarrational unity, which would be an inconsistent position; but rather from their
temporally and spatially situated, hierarchically ordered, concerns.
The difficulties inherent in these starting points, and the tensions within the very nature of
postmodern discourse can be explored through the following themes: i) The tensions which
exist between nihilism, relativism and foundationalism; ii) The argument that
postmodernism is searching for a more 'real' reality; iii) The contention, against
postmodernism, that at the philosophical level, postmodern theorising involves exclusion
and hierarchies; iv) That the postmodern hopes for the 'edification' of the self are
impossible; v) The culturally contingent nature of the postmodern 'other'; vi) The view that
postmodern thought ultimately defends liberal democracy; vii) The difficulties inherent in
postmodern prescriptions for politics.
The first theme to emerge from an analysis of postmodern thought, then, is that which is
concerned with the tensions between nihilism, relativism, and foundationalism. For in
simple terms, what postmodernism is about above all else, is a criticism of totalising
theories which attempt to explain the world through foundationalist means. What is special
about postmodernism is its belief that this criticism does not have to entail a nihilistic or
relativistic attitude. Without exception, however, all of the thinkers under examination can
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be criticised for the nihilistic or relativistic implications of their work.
An immediate problem they face is their inability to provide us with the reason for their
attack on the Western tradition's construction of metanarratives and totalising theories.
What are their motivations for the deconstruction of traditional notions of truth, when they
claim that there is nothing to go in its place? Any answer to that question, such as
'emancipation', can always be met with the question 'According to which value scheme,
which description of human nature, is emancipation important?' In other words, how can
we theorise and communicate without a metanarrational or traiiscendental view? The
problem for postmodern theorists is to do this without resorting to relativism or nihilism.
For Foucault, truth is relative to an archive or 'episteme', within which validity can be
discussed, but outside of which, it has no absolute or universal relevance. This contention,
however,jan be placed squarely within relativism, for which Foucault does not provide a
defence. Derrida's attack on traditional semiology and in particular on the idea that we can
reach the signified through the signifier, along with his questioning of the concept of the
concept, not only have nihilistic implications, but also highlight the problem associated
with the attempt to theorise at all from the postmodern standpoint.
Rorty and Maclntyre are most concerned that they should not be labelled 'relativists', and
go to some lengths to defend their positions against what they see as the perils of holding a
relativistic view. Rorty argues that beliefs can only be supported 'conversationally', that
other sorts of support such as a neutral objectivity do not exist. Yet he believes that this is
not the same as saying that every belief on a certain topic is as good as any other, which is
the relativist's position. His pragmatism and hermeneutic 'intersubjectivity' are an attempt
to work through the delicately balanced theoretical demands made by his critique of
Western philosophy. The problem for Maclntyre emanates from his historicity and his
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argument that moral debates are incommensurable. While the former remains anti-
universalist and within the general spirit of postmodern philosophy, the latter is linked to
Maclntyre's desire to overcome what he sees as contemporary moral chaos. It is through an
examination of his 'tradition-based enquiry' that we see how these tensions relate to his
view of the historically contingent nature of rationality and justice.
The second theme, regarding the ways in which postmodern theorists are searching for a
more 'real' reality, centres on the fact that although there are relativistic and nihilistic
implications of their work, they nevertheless invoke transcendental assumptions either in
their methodologies, or their conclusions. Foucault's 'archaeological' method, for
example, requires an ability to 'suspend belief, and to 'see things as they really are' in the
attempt to achieve 'pure description'. More generally, his critique of power introduces)
normative notions and assumes a superior theoretical perspective.
Derrida specifically criticises Foucault for attempting to stand outside of that which he is
challenging, and therefore carries out his analysis in what he believes to be a more self-
aware fashion. However, his prescription for 'the political management of difference and
equality', along with the deconstructive project in general, imply a normative aspect of his
thought which is all the more worrying because he, and many of his followers, are blind to
it. Rorty, despite his description of the 'edifying' ironist, cites specific human essences as
universal, and in particular, makes universal prescriptions for human society on this basis.
Maclntyre differs from the other theorists in that he is consciously looking for a teleological
view of human nature, which he finds in Aristotle. He also argues that there are certain
universal truths which become apparent to all traditions in times of epistemological crisis.
The difficulty for Maclntyre is that this is at odds with the postmodern spirit of his
historicity, which forms the main thrust of his work.
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The above two themes are of central importance to my thesis because I hope to demonstrate
that while the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment, and the Western tradition of
philosophy, is correct, it is necessarily nihilistic. At the same time, however, it is clear that
these thinkers cannot theorise without invoking transcendental assumptions of some kind
or other. Furthermore, I believe that it can be shown that this is inevitable, that despite the
lack of any objective, transcendental reality and truth, we theorise, think and communicate
as if there were, meaning that postmodern philosophy can have no application to political
theory or practice. The other themes which emerge from an analysis of the work of these
thinkers support, and are supported by, this assertion. The third theme, then, centres on the
idea that because, at the philosophical level, we have no choice but to prioritise and
hierarchically order criteria (which inevitably invoke transcendental assumptions),
theorising necessarily involves exclusion and hierarchies.
Foucault cannot simply remove unity and continuity as privileged concepts in order to leave
the field open for 'pure description'; what he in fact does is to prioritise rupture and
discontinuity - replacing one set of hierarchically ordered criteria with another. Derrida's
critique of Plato's 'Phaedrus" which centres on how Plato excludes some possible
definitions and meanings for the purpose of clarity, can itself be criticised. 4 Derrida seems
to fail to realise that exclusion, and the hierarchical ordering of meanings, is an essential
part of the very formation of any meaning.
Rorty's argument that "a liberal society is badly served by an attempt to supply it with
'philosophical foundations" 5 demonstrates his lack of awareness of the point which I am
making, and is ultimately undermined by his consequent list of specific, foundationalist
criteria which exclude non-liberal values. Maclntyre is a different story. He provides
arguments, in general, which support this theme. He criticises the Enlightenment and its
ideological partners, Marxism and liberalism, not because, in its ambition to provide us
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with a rationally justified standpoint from which to judge and to act, it had a mistaken goal,
but rather because it lacked the essential teleology for achieving this goal. His attempt to
reinstate such a teleology through the notion of 'practice-based virtues', however, fails
because he covertly relies upon the type of transcendentalism for which he criticises the
Enlightenment's claimed neutrality.
From this, follows the fourth theme regarding the self. The arguments which I am
examining here centre on the implications of the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment
for the subject. Foucault's notion of the self vacillates between that which is dominated, the
effect of power, and an almost existential human nature. These contradictions can be seen
as the natural upshot of his desire to provide a reason and explanation for resistance, while
avoiding an essentialist mode of theorising.
Derrida has been criticised for annihilating the very idea of the human subject in his
determination to dispense with essentialism. He argues that in deconstructing the subject,
he is not denying its existence, but rather 'resituating' it. However, when one takes into
account his desire to remove the 'concept of the concept', and his hopes for "the
multiplicity of sexually marked voices" 6, it appears that what he is doing is not giving the
subject a new, more useful identity, but rather removing any identity in his longing for
emancipation from essence. While Derrida is correct in his argument that there is no human
'essence', in the same way that there is no transcendental truth, to prescribe the practice of
deconstructing the self, whether for social, political, or individual ontological purposes, is
a different argument altogether - yet this is certainly an implication of his work.
The type of implications which would follow from such a starting point, can be found in
Rorty's 'ironist'. Rorty argues that freedom is the recognition of contingency in the
subject, whereby it is understood that nothing has an intrinsic nature or real essence. The
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'ironist' is able to redescribe herself, to choose her beliefs because she knows that she does
not have an absolute, objective essence. My argument is that this is impossible, that it
would require a kind of 'ego-splitting', the ability to transcend oneself while choosing
another self-description according to (supposedly) criterionless principles. So while the self
does not have an essence, we cannot escape the practice of 'objectifying' ourselves, we
cannot redescribe ourselves without reference (whether consciously or not) to some
transcendental 'truth' about ourselves and the world which we inhabit.
Again, with Maclntyre it is different. He assumes that what he perceives to be the failure of
the Enlightenment project has resulted in an 'emotivist' self, a self freed from essentialism.
Rather than seeing this in emancipatory terms, he sees it as responsible for current moral
chaos and incommensurability. Because of this view, he argues for the necessity of
restating the Aristotelian human telos. If my argument is sound, however, human nature is
not emotivist, and never could be, and in any case, individuals could not simply choose
whether to adopt a teleology for themselves.
The fifth theme, regarding the cultural specificity of the 'other', comes from a concern that
the thinkers (but specifically Derrida) who write about exclusion of the 'other' seem to be
unaware of the possibility of an infinite number of excluded 'others'; and thus what they
represent as the excluded 'others' are in fact a reflection of their spatio-temporal (Western
liberal democratic) concerns. Derrida's method of deconstruction proceeds by overturning
existing hierarchies in an attempt to make apparent and to emancipate all concepts from
what he describes as the dominant force which has organised the logocentric hierarchy.
However, he cannot simply overturn existing hierarchies and give precedence to that which
has been downgraded, ignored and excluded, because he is unaware of (and would see as
unimportant) most of that which is excluded.
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Instead, out of all the possible meanings, definitions, concepts and values which have been
excluded in the history of the human race, Derrida picks very specific 'others'. These
'others' are then cited as the 'others', the only 'others', and thus enable Den-ida to elevate
them to the top of new hierarchies as if this represents a 'fair' (almost 'neutral') way of
demonstrating the arbitrariness of the old hierarchies. In fact, what Den-ida has done is
chosen 'others' which are ultimately concerned with upholding two values - equality and
freedom - values which are at home in the twentieth century in the West. So instead of
opening up discourse in the way that he hopes, he has closed it down. Of course, if my
previous point, that theorising necessarily involves exclusion, is taken on board, that
Den-ida has fallen into this trap should not come as a surprise.
This leads to my sixth theme: it is not only the case that the 'other' will be determined by
specific cultural values, but also that with postmodernism, these values ultimately uphold
liberal democratic principles. For Rorty, for example, liberal democracy upholds and
extends the principle of tolerance. He believes that liberalism does not need philosophical
foundations, because he is unaware of the liberal values of freedom and democracy as
values. In fact, the criticisms which can be made of Rorty on this point are the traditional
criticisms of liberalism, but they are all the more hard-hitting because of Rorty's anti-
Enlightenment critique. All the philosophers in question are defending the liberal-
democratic principles of freedom and equality: Foucault's analysis of power, Den-ida's
deconstruction, and the liberal democratic structures required for Maclntyre's hopes for
tradition-based enquiry, all emanate from the specific values which are themselves a result
of the Enlightenment project.
The final theme, concerning the difficulties in postmodern prescriptions for politics and the
self, explores the necessity of separating the postmodern insights into the non-existence of
a transcendental, metanarrational unity, from any application or practical use. In other
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words, it clarifies why this non-existence cannot translate to an argument for the
emancipation of concepts and people from traditional logocentric hierarchies.
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CHAPTER 1.
MICHEL FOUCAULT
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PART I - RATIONALITY.
A: Introduction.
Michel Foucault's rationality is formed by two main factors. His style and approach are
heavily influenced by the French structuralist tradition and later, Kant, while his
philosophical oeuvre comes from Nietzsche. Throughout his work, Foucault moves to and
fro between these opposed rationalities, never overcoming the difficulties in the project he
sets for himself, and never finding a 'middle way'. At various stages in his work,
however, we can discern stronger emphases on the different philosophical backgrounds
which inform his goal of an 'anti-humanistic human liberation'.!
Foucault's early work on madness leads to a convincing critique of Enlightenment
rationality as totalistic, exciusionist, and oppressive in its production of specific truths
which ultimately constrain freedom. In opposition to the progressive, teleological aspects
of Enlightenment thought, Foucault follows Nietzsche in emphasising rupture,
discontinuity and contingency, claiming that truth is invented rather than discovered. In
particular, he distances himself from subject-centred humanism, attempting to show how
the self is constituted through complex power relations. This stage exhibits difficulties
which remain unresolved throughout his work; namely, the tendency'i both deny any
sense of human agency, whilst cove1y introducing an eia1i t ent which his
project aims to refute.2
The second phase in Foucault's work, his archaeological method, has been criticised as
structuralist in its attempts to further the critique of subjectivism through the 'discovery'
and description of discursive rules which govern discursive formations and, in turn,
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determine the possibility of speech and thought. The aim of the archaeological method is to
overturn what Foucault sees as the overly unified, progressive and emancipatory nature of
Enlightenment thought. By 'suspending temporal successions', highlighting discontinuity
as opposed to unity, and seeing 'truth' as relative to an era or 'episteme', he believes it is
possible to access these deep-seated structures and therefore explain how speciic truths are
constituted while others are excluded. The criticisms which are fired at this attempt to
extrapolate his critique of the Enlightenment come thick and fast, including arguments
which say that archaeology is relativistic, transcendental, tautologous, overly unified, and
functionalist. Both internally, and in relation to Foucault's overall 'project, archaeology is
beset with the same difficulties and tensions found in his early and later work.3
In Foucault's genealogical phase from the mid-1970s onwards, the constitutive, positive
side of power governing discursive practices and social relations is emphasised.
Continuing from his earlier work on madness, subjects are conceived in radically anti-
essentialist terms as 'docile bodies', constituted by what Foucault calls 'biopower'. By
seeing power in a more positive light, as normalisation rather than repression, he now
describes the emergence of bodies of knowledge as essentially linked to the will to power.
In this way, Foucault attempts to use the enabling aspect of genealogical analysis to serve
archaeology as a method of providing causal explanations for changes in discursive
formations and epistemes. Because genealogy is not aimed at replacing archaeology, and
due to the fact that even in genealogy there is a tendency for Foucault to slip into a view of
power as negative rather than enabling, the criticisms targeted at this stage of Foucault's
work remain the same as those for archaeology. Even in the areas where genealogy differs,
such as the transformation of the will to truth as the will to power, Foucault is attacked for
covertly making naturalistic, neutral and spatio-temporal generalizations.4
Foucault's later work, which introduces the notions of 'governmentality' and 'ethics of the
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self will be dealt with largely within the sections on 'Politics and Society' and 'The Self.
In relation to rationality, however, there are two things to be noted here; Foucault's concept
of the aesthetic, and his turn to Kant. Towards the end of his life, Foucault was attempting
to rethink his position in relation to the Enlightenment tradition, and took up the Kantian
definition of critique as the analysis and reflection upon limits. So while he remains against
the specific doctrines produced by Enlightenment thought, he wants to abstract from it its
critical ethos. The notion of the aesthetic (conceived as an opposition to Enlightenment
positivistic doctrines) is then used by Foucault in an effort to maintain this distinction. This
exacerbates, rather than solves, the difficulties and tensions within his earlier work, as his
vacillations between transcendental essentialism and an almost nihilistic contingency
become more extreme.5
Foucault began, then, with a devastating critique of the Enlightenment which he fails to
maintain as he moves from being a disinterested historian to a transcendental moralist. His
earlier work privileges theory over practice, which his later work reverses in an attempt to
remain consistent with his original goal. For this reason, it has been argued that Foucault's
initial critique of the Enlightenment was overstated - such a critique does not make a good
starting point for the project of human liberation, and is ultimately responsible for the
incoherencies in his work. We could, however, take an alternative view of Foucault (and
the problems encountered by postmodern theorists generally), and ask, "If Foucault's
critique of the Enlightenment was correct, where does this leave the rest of his work?".j
What this question indicates, and what I hope to show, is that once the humanistic
imperative is removed from his rationality - and this is precisely what he attempts (and
fails) to do to the Enlightenment - we find that there is little left of Foucault save a few
unremarkable and inaccurate historical observations. That is, his inability to remain
consistent with his original task is not due to any failing in his initial insights into the
Enlightenment, but rather, is a consequence of the attempt to extrapolate anything from the
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critique of the Enlightenment.
B: Foucault's Critique of the Enlightenment.
Foucault's criticism of the Enlightenment in his early work contains two main elements:
Firstly is the criticism of humanist values as repressive, which comes from his books on
institutions; and emanating from this is, secondly, his rejection of the holism inherent in
Enlightenment rationality.
Foucault criticises Kant for inducing an 'anthropological sleep' by focusing philosophy on
the question 'what is Man?'. He contends instead that there is no constant human subject to
history, and, heavily influenced by Nietzsche's 'de-subjectifying' of the subject; he argues
that the self is wholly contingent and culturally constructed, the object rather than the
subject of power relations. In his work on madness, Foucault describes how madness is
constituted through any deviation from the 'norm'. The asylum, in Foucault's eyes, is seen
as the instrument par excellence of Enlightenment thought, as its normalising function is
linked so closely with 'rational' behaviour. As Boyne points out:
Philosophically, there is no foundation for the claim that our system of
reasonable behaviour is the definitive expression of sanity and reason in
human affairs... If we live in a fractured world, then the combined efforts
of science and the moralising discourse of 'correct ideas' to prevent anyone
from peering through the breaks must be treated with the greatest
suspicion.6
So Foucault finds a covert problem within the conventional politics of good and evil,
which, he argues, instead of representing the 'truth' about human nature, are taken to be
transcendental categories and arbitrarily installed through institutions. Through his view of
madness as the excluded 'other' of reason, "the history of science is enlarged into a history
of reason because it studies the constituting of madness as a reflex image of the constituting
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of reason".7
Foucault argues that, in its positivistic efforts to construct a total history capable of
explaining the entire social reality, the Enlightenment imposed a unity and universalism
which necessarily excludes in order to maintain itself: "A total description draws all
phenomena around a single centre - a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view."8 From
this, Foucault attacks the progressive view of history as teleological. Without any
transcendental, ideal forms to discover and measure our representations and understanding
of truths and concepts against, there exists no goal to work towards
There are the displacements and transformations of concepts: they show that
the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its continuously
increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient but that of its various fields of
constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many
theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured.9
The main criticisms of Foucault's early work in relation to rationality stem from why he
should want to reject totalities. He says that they are without foundation, that the dualisms
they produce contain aninherentcruelty, but cruelty according to what criteria 9 He wants to
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liberate man from the repressive nature of Enlightenment rationality, but this implies that
there is some innate feature of humankind to be set free. This is most apparent in his work
on madness, where the excluded other of reason is privileged as more real than that which
is the result of Enlightenment normalisation. Later, in 'The Birth of the Clinic', Foucault
realises his mistake and explicitly rejects any access to the excluded. However, there still
remains a liberational aspect to his work, and an implicit imperative to resist totalities.
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C: Archaeology.
Having criticised the totalistic and unified nature of Enlightenment rationality so heavily,
Foucault proposes archaeology as an alternative method of analysis which is capable of
describing events and discourse in their specificity. He believes that before tudying the
concepts of discontinuity, we must rid ourselves of concepts of continuity:
We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we
normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is
recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces by
which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they
must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign.lO
We must also question, argues Foucault, those divisions or groupings with which we have
become so familiar. By this he means, for instance, the distinction between such forms or
genres as science, literature, philosophy, religion, history etc., and which tend to create
certain 'great historical individualities'. He makes the point that we are not always aware
when we use such distinctions, and that anyway, they are fairly recent categories, "...they
are not intrinsic, autochthonous, and universally recognizable characteristics". 11
In order to apply Foucault's methodology, these pre-existing forms of continuity, all these
syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense. We must show, he
argues, that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a
construction the rules of which must be known, and the justification of which must be
scrutinised: we must define in what conditions and in view of which analyses certain of
them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can never be accepted in any
circumstances. Thus it is the case that theoretical choices exclude or imply the formation of
certain concepts,
It is not the theoretical choice that governs the formation of the concept; but
the choice has produced the concept by the mediation of specific rules for
the formation of concepts, and by the set of relations that it holds at this
level. 12
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It is also necessary, believes Foucault, that there should be a 'suspension of temporal
successions', that is, of the calendar of formulations, the order of events and conceptual
developments: "But this suspension is intended precisely to reveal the relations that
characterize the temporality of discursive formations and articulate them in series whose
intersection in no way precludes analysis." 13 Thus archaeology is a comparative analysis,
argues Foucault, that is not intended to reduce the diversity of discourses, or to outline the
unity that must totalise them, but is intended to divide up their diversity into different
figures.
Once these immediate forms of continuity are suspended, Foucault contends, an entire field
is set free. A vast field, he says, but one that can be defined nonetheless: this field is made
up of the totality of all effective statements (whether spoken or written), in their dispersion
as events and in the occurrence that is proper to them. "One is led therefore to the project of
a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search of unities that form
within it." 14 Foucault sees this description of discourses as in opposition to the history of
thought, whereby a system of thought can be reconstituted only on the basis of a definite
discursive totality. The archaeological analysis of the discursive field is oriented in quite a
different way; we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence,
determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with
other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it
excludes: "The question proper to such an analysis might be formulated in this way: what is
this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?" 15
However, Foucault does see some degree of order as existing between statements. Thus he
argues that whenever we can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of
dispersion; whenever, between objects, types of statements, concepts, or thematic choices,
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one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings,
transformations), it can be said that we are dealing with a discursive formation. Thus
avoiding, Foucault believes, words that are already overladen with conditions and
consequences, and in any case inadequate to the task of designating such a dispersion, such
as 'sciences', 'ideology', 'theory', or 'domain of objectivity'. The conditions o which the
elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are
subjected, he calls the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence
(but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given
discursive division.
Foucault distinguishes between what he sees as different types of relations between
discourses. He calls 'real' or 'primary' relations those which exist between institutions,
techniques, social forms, etc., which he separates from those he calls a system of
'reflexive' or 'secondary' relations, and those which might properly be called 'discursive':
"The problem is to reveal the specificity of these discursive relations, and their interplay
with the other two kinds." 16 Thus discursive relations are not internal to discourse: they do
not connect concepts or words with one another; they do not establish a deductive or
rhetorical structure between propositions or sentences. They determine the group of
relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to
deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, explain them. The validity of
discourse, argues Foucault, is derived from the status of those who offer it, whether this is
sanctioned by law or tradition, judicially defined or spontaneously accepted. This involves
criteria of competence and knowledge and a system of differentiation and relations. "It also
involves a number of characteristics that define its functioning in relation to society as a
whole." 17 Thus Foucault sees the importance of describing the institutional sites from
which the doctor, for example, makes his discourse, and from which this discourse derives
its legitimate source and point of application.
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Important for an understanding of Foucault's methodological approach is the
conceptualisation of what he describes as a 'statement'. The statement, Foucault explains,
is not the same kind of unit as the sentence, the proposition or the speech act; it cannot be
referred therefore to the same criteria; but neither is it the same kind of unit as the material
object, with its limits and independence. It is a function of existence that propely belongs
to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition,
whether or not they 'make sense' according to what rule they follow. Therefore
A statement exists outside any possibility of reappearing; and the relation
that it possesses with what it states is not identical with its rules of use. It is
a very special relation: and if in these conditions an identical formulation
reappears, with the same words, substantially the same names - in fact,
exactly the same sentence - it is not necessarily the same statement. 18
This illustrates how Foucault believes that meaning in its purest form has its reality and
validity defined by things which are external to it, and in order for us to truly grasp these
meanings and accept them as legitimate, we need to be able to describe and substantiate the
structure which gave birth to them. Therefore a statement is linked to a 'referential' that is
made up not of 'things', 'facts', 'realities', or 'beings', but of laws of possibility, rules of
existence for the objects that are named, designated or described within it, and for the
relations that are brought into play by the statement itself. The statement, then, must not be
treated as an event that occurred in a particular time and place, and that the most one can do
is recall it in an act of memory. But neither is it an ideal form that can be actualised in any
body, at any time, in any circumstances, and in any material conditions.
Too repeatable to be entirely identifiable with the spatio-temporal
coordinates of its birth (it is more than the place and date of its appearance),
too bound up with what surrounds it and supports it to be free as a pure
form (it is more than a law of construction governing a group of
elements).. .the statement may be repeated - but always in strict
conditions. 19
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Foucault's archaeology has been criticised by many as remaining within the epistemological
tradition, although a few theorists have attempted to defend it. Machado, for example,
argues that, unlike epistemology, archaeology "does not give priority to the normative
question of truth" 20; Wahl cites Foucault's challenging of the unity of an object as evidence
for the difference between archaeology and traditional philosophy21 , and Jancaud argues
that archaeology is simply offering an alternative method of analysing truth, rather than the
definitive methq4 However, in each of these cases the defenders are citing Foucault's
stated aims as evidence that archaeology is opposed to traditional epistemology, rather than
critically analysing the processes involved.
The criticisms of archaeology are, in fact, far-reaching, and cannot be so easily refuted.
They appear to fall into one of two categories: Firstly, there are those criticisms which are
aimed at the archaeological method, at its often vague, contradictory, tautologous and
relativistic aspects; secondily, there are those which indicate how archaeology is at odds
with Foucault's stated project, and in particular, his critique of the Enlightenment.
To begin with, the term 'discourse' has been criticised as vague. Discourses can only be
criticised and analysed if they are structured according to rules of formation, which indeed,
is part of Foucault's definition of them. Yet 'rules of formation' has a transcendental ring to ) ?
it which can only be avoided at the risk of an infinite regression or circularity. Although he
later tried to solve this contradiction in his genealogical phase by arguing that discourse is
ordered through the 'will to power', this does not solve the fundamental problem, as Frank
points out,
If this thesis were grounded, the untenable consequence would follow that
the scientific credentials of the analytic of discourse could be guaranteed
only through the repression of this will to power, which so overwhelmingly
subjects and ties the disseminality of our talk to the restrictiveness of
systems of exclusion. As such, the analytic of discourse would be forced
into an appropriation of the subject (whose existence it incidentally denies)
as a transcendental condition before it could proceed.23
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In other words, archaeological analysis is dependent on a notion of discourse with limits,
as necessarily exciusionist, and the archaeological task of grasping a statement in its
specificity, as a 'pure description of discursive events', would be over before it started.
Similarly, others have argued that thecl owers Foucault attributesto rules of
formation are unintelligible. There are different aspects to this criticism. Some argue that
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archaeology must fail simply because it ignores any sense of human agency in its insistence
on the constitutive role of discursive rules. Yet I do not see this as problematic in itself, as
long as Foucault were able to maintain a coherent argument on thisbasis. Rather, there are..
two difficulties which follow from Foucault's dismissal of human agency in the analysis of
the causal powers of discursive rules. Firstly, we begin to see an almost fatalistic
impossibility of saying anything other than that which is made possible by the rules of
discursive formation. In which case, Foucault's own work seems to imply either a claim to
be able to stand outside the totalistic rules which apply to everyone else, or the futility of
his own discourse in its attempts to provide a space from which to resist. The second
problem which arises from Foucault's argument that discursive rules form the sole origin
of all discourse, meaning and events, is the transcendental quality which these rules
assume. Even if this were not completely antithetical to Foucault's project (wherein lies the
main incoherency, of course), Freundlieb points out that the history of a discourse is in any
case too unpredictable: "Foucault's suggestion that one can find a system of rules that
determines which concepts were able to emerge and which ones were not is therefore
extremely unlikely."24
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault distinguishes between the rules of grammar,
which constitute conditions of possibility, and his rules of discursive formations, which he
conceives of as conditions of existence (pp 34-35). That is, the rules of discursive
formation do not simply make possible what can be said, they cause exactly what is said,
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and nothing else. This means that when Foucault gives an example of a change in
discursive formations, it relates to a singular historical event. With each 'rule' applying
only once, archaeology becomes tautologous, with its main statement being not 'what has
happened = what could have happened', but rather 'what has happened = what has
happened', as the notion of a rule is emptied of all content.
Archaeology has also been criticised as relativistic, because it makes truth relative to an
episteme. As with the lack of human agency, there are those who argue that archaeology
must therefore fail because they cannot conceive of a philosophy which is based on this
principle. More importantly, however, this has implications for the second group of
criticisms regarding archaeology, that is, it is at odds with Foucault's stated aims and, in
particular, his critique of the Enlightenment Skinn oints out
Foucault's claim that truth is merely w at counts as true within a discourse
is not easy to accept. If what Foucault says is true, then truth is always
relative to discourse; there cannot be any statements which are true in all
discourses, nor can there be any statements which are true for all discourses
- so that, on Foucault's own account, what he says cannot be true!25
Yet it is not simply the case that all relativists occupy an incoherent position. What makes
Foucault's relativism contradictory is his attempt to extrapolate, from his critique of the
Enlightenment, an argument in favour of resistance. Furthermore, this critique is based not
simply on the undermining of Enlightenment rationality, but also on his offering of a
'better' way of understanding why the universe is the way it is. So while it is the case that
Foucault occupies an incoherent relativistic position, the incoherency arises out of the
transcendental aspects of his work, and not relativism itself. Janicaud tries to defend
Foucault on this point, arguing that Foucault was offering an alternative method of
analysing, not the true method. However, there is no doubt that Foucault does imply that
his own discourse is superior to the traditional history of knowledge, and this translates to
an argument that it is somehow 'better', 'truer'.
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Although there has been a strong debate both while Foucault was alive, and since his death,
over whether he was a structuralist, the importance of the matter lies not in what labels can
be applied to his work, but rather whether he was self-refuting. Gutting, for example,
points out that archaeology does not serve Foucault's philosophical project, and is
ultimately a means of reaching a fundamental truth behind reason. This ca be seen in
Foucault's insistence on the constitutive role of discourse. In order to avoid the implication
that, for example, his discourse on madness actually produces madness, Foucault must
covertly rely on a 'real' madness which exists prior to discourse. From this we can see that
he cannot analyse anything without the assumption that it has an' existence prior to our
discourse on it. In order to escape this difficulty, he would not have to go so far as to hold
that there are uninterpreted, transcendental facts, but simply acknowledge that all discourse
relies upon the assumption that there are.
Linked to this is the more general criticism that archaeology, far from emphasising rupture
and discontinuity, imposes meaning and unity, implying the existence of a referential
structure. Habermas makes the point, for example, that Foucault's privileging of theory
over practice is bound to produce totalities. So although Foucault explicitly rejects the
unifying of groups of statements according to 'the identity and persistence of themes', he
does covertly introduce a unifying criterion when he talks of a system of dispersion and a
discursiveformation:
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system
of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations,
positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of
convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation.26
What must be remembered here is that, at this point in his work, Foucault totally rejects any
sense of human agency, so these 'regularities' and 'formations' must pre -exist man. They
do not even come about, in Foucault's eyes, through a culturally-determined ordering and
categorisation of statements. It is only with his introduction of genealogy and the notion of
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'the will to power' that he begins to recognise and attempt to overcome these deep tensions
within his work.
D: Genealogy
Genealogy is not designed to replace archaeology, but rather to serve it. It is an attempt, as
Gutting points out, to bring archaeology into line with Foucault's earlier project of
describing both discursive and non-discursive practices, and to provide a causal
explanation of changes in discursive formations and epistemes. Before proceeding to a
discussion of what genealogy is and how Foucault makes use of it, it is important to note
that genealogy comes about as a reaction to the failure of archaeology to achieve its stated
aims. What the above section attempted to show, however, is that although archaeology is
internally incoherent, and to this extent may benefit from a genealogical supplement, the
main problems which exist for Foucault arise because any attempt to theorise discursive or
non-discursive formations is antithetical to his original critique of the Enlightenment. From
this perspective, it can be seen that the development of Foucault's rationality takes a wrong
turn quite early on, meaning that archaeology, genealogy and the subsequent work on
governmentality and ethics is bound to fail, not due to methodological incompetence, but
because the entire venture is ill-conceived in light of his original critical project with which
he sporadically attempts to remain consistent.
Foucault borrowed the term 'genealogy' from Nietzsche, who used it to characterise his
historical studies of how the interplay between power and knowledge results in
subjectification. In The Order of Discourse, Foucault describes it as a method of analysis
which traces the haphazard emergence of the event and how it is constituted through
complex contingencies - the 'materialism of the incorporeal'. In Discipline and Punish and
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The History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault places more emphasis on the social and
institutional mechanisms of power, allowing him to explain changes in the history of
discourse that are merely described by archaeology. In this way, power is conceived as a
more positive, enabling phenomenon, underlying all social relations, and thus leads
Foucault to an analysis of power in the diversity of its manifestations as a 'microphysics',
rather than a power centralised in institutions and emanating to the masses.
Habermas argues that Foucault escapes the self-referentiality of archaeology by
subordinating it to genealogy. That is, previously autonomous forms of discursive
knowledge are now given a foundation within power technologies as their emergence is
explained in terms of practices of power:
Genealogical historiography clears away the autonomy of self-regulating
discourses as well as the epochal and linear succession of global forms of
knowledge. The danger of anthropocentrism is banished only when, under
the incorruptible gaze of genealogy, discourses emerge and pop like
glittering bubbles from a swamp of anonymous processes of subjugation.27
In this way, Habermas allows that Foucault is no longer trapped by his own archaeological
rules of discursive formation; that is, genealogy now privileges practice over discourse,
and in doing so, offers an explanation of how discursive rules are constituted.
However, it must be remembered that Foucault's use of genealogy does not involve a
rejection of archaeology - he still seeks to describe the rules which govern discourse, and
for this reason, it seems that genealogy remains rule-bound. For example, the 'documents'
that Foucault must use to excavate an historical event may well be discursive in nature, and
therefore, for an analysis which places importance on 'rules of possibility', it must be
accepted that these documents are governed by rules too. Even non-discursive
'documents', from this perspective, must still be rule-bound, that is, governed by rules
which are contemporary to the event under analysis. This implies that the practices to which
Foucault believes he can apply 'pure description' are already rule-bound, and in analysing
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them, he is drawn unaware into the rules which form them. Even if Foucault were able to
describe an event or practice without being governed by the rules which governed the event
at the time of its happening, endowed it with meaning and made it an 'event', he is
inevitably bound by rules in any method he uses to describe or think about an event or
practice, whether discursive or non-discursive. That is not to say that such, rules exist,
constituting, constituted, or in any form at all, but simply that from Foucault's own
rationality, even with genealogy he is unable to provide a space from which he can describe
or explain the event.
Habermas notices that Foucault's attempts to escape the incoherencies of archaeology
produce further methodological problems in genealogy:
Of course, Foucault only gains this basis by not thinking genealogically
when it comes to his own genealogical historiography and by rendering
unrecognizable the derivation of this transcendental-historicist concept of
power.28
As Habermas points out, Foucault begins with an analysis of the will to knowledge, and
covertly transforms this to a will to power. So Foucault's study of the will to knowledge is
initially confined to the history of metaphysics (and hence his critique of the
Enlightenment), and is subsequently covertly merged into a general theory of power as he
argues that the 'true' is determined by specific effects of power. There are two hidden
operations taking place in this transformation, as Habermas argues. Firstly, Foucault is
making a universalist spatio-temporal generalisation in his argument that all societies
throughout history have constituted truth through the will to power. Secondly, there is a
concealed derivation of the will to power/truth in all discourse, from the will to power/truth
in discourses which specialise in truth, and this de-differentiation remains unexamined and
unexplained. From this, the wisdom can be seen in Habermas's conclusion that
"...genealogical historiography emerges from its cocoon as precisely the presentistic,
relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science that it did not want to be"29.
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That Foucault is still facing the same problems is highlighted by his replacement of the
concept of the episteme with the dispositif. In archaeology, the episteme was intended to
specify the systems of relations among the components of discourse, whereas the use of
the dispositif in genealogy is for the purpose of analysing the power relations between
discursive practices, non-discursive practices, and society at large. This indicates that in
genealogy, as in archaeology, Foucault still fails to analyse without totalising, to categorise
without being transcendental. His failure to do this arises from the fact that the whole
raison d'être of archaeology and genealogy, that is, to analyse, cateorise and explain, is at
odds with his anti-Enlightenment stance.
E: Conclusion
Foucault essentially wants to do two things: i)criticise Enlightenment rationality, especially
humanism; ii)provide an alternative method of analysis. In both of these, he wishes to
provide a reason to resist. In i), the reason to resist the humanistic conclusions reached by
Enlightenment rationality comes from Foucault's belief that this rationality has no
privileged access to 'the truth' about the universe or human nature, and that consequently,
its humanistic conclusions must be overturned and eschewed for any moral or political
application. In ii), the reason for resistance is implied in the way that Foucault arbitrarily
offers Enlightenment rationality's excluded, opposite, 'other' as an alternative method of
analysis. That is, his stated aim is to emphasise discontinuity over continuity, rupture over
progress, dispersion over unity. In this way, his very methodology implies an imperative
to resist. However, these two aims fundamentally conflict. Foucault's critique of the
Enlightenment is based on the	 ariori
truths to be discovered. Yet just about all of his subsequent work is in conflict, if not direct
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contradiction, with this original project. Habermas argues that Foucault's work contains
postmodern terminology and rhetoric but does not really take on board postmodern
assumptions. However, I would argue that Foucault's critique of the Enlightenment is
evidence that he does take on board postmodern assumptions. What he fails to realise,
along with many postmodernists, is that these assumptions inevitably proscribe further
philosophical or political analysis.
Nancy Fraser's oft-quoted passage from her discussion of Foucault's oppositional stance
to all-embracing theoretical assumptions grips the heart of the postmödern dilemma:
Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be
resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind
could Foucault begin to answer this question. Only with the introduction of
normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern
power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose jt.30
Many similar comments have been made: Scruton has argued that Foucault must be taldng a
pass judgement on Enlightenment rationality;
Simons notes that Foucault's critique relies upon the very structure of reason it opposes;
likewise McNay concurs with Habermas that this results in cryptonormativism. To these
general criticisms can be added examples of methodological difficulties - that suspension of
temporal successions makes causal analysis impossible, and that Foucault's desire to
describe a 'disunited discourse' annihilates the very concept of discourse and kills off
meaning along with it.
In his later work, Foucault is more specific about how Enlightenment rationality has limited
human liberty through totalisation and individualisation. This gives added weight to his
imperative of resistance, but further distances his work from the logical implications of his
original critique. Should we therefore ignore Foucault's initial criticism of the
Enlightenment, as the majority of his work would be more coherent without it? No.
Although the ethical content of his later work causes Foucault to re-think his relationship to
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Enlightenment rationality, there are two reasons for bearing his original project in mind
when critically assessing Foucault as a whole. Firstly, the very fact that Foucault begins
with such a far-reaching critique of the Enlightenment is important. It is this which causes
him to attempt to develop an alternative rationality, and in a haphazard, problematical
manner, leads him to his later work. In other words, the position he reached before his
death is a product of his starting point, and the tensions apparent in his later work are the
result of the initial difficulty in extrapolating anything from his critique of the
Enlightenment. The second reason for continuing to assess Foucault according to his
original stated aims is that, to a certain extent, this is what he does himself. The
introduction of new concepts such as governmentality, aesthetics, and technologies of the
self in his later work is not simply for the purpose of strengthening the case for resistance
and liberation, but, more specifically, to do so within his own anti-universalist, anti-
transcendental, anti-foundational criteria.
So while it is the case that, to a certain extent, a critical analysis of Foucault's rationality as
incoherent pre-empts the conclusion on his work as a whole, aspects of his writings on
politics, society and the self may still appear attractive and hold an interest for us. What
now becomes important, then, is to find a way of situating the specific liberational goals
valued by Foucault, as effects of his original anti-Enlightenment stance. It will be shown
that not only are these specific goals borne from Enlightenment, liberal democratic
concerns, but that the postmodem rebellion against Enlightenment rationality itself is almost
inevitably the result of those concerns.
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PART II- POLITICS AND SOCIETY.
A: Introduction.
As Foucault moves from a negative to a positive concept of power, his view of politics and
society alters to take account of the dynamics of social change. It is thus through his
analytics of power that we have access to his view of politics and society, both his
understanding and his prescriptions to make it better.
Foucault's early work, which is explicitly aimed at criticising Enlightenment rationality,
concentrates on how power is expressed through strategies of repression and exclusion in
order to maintain norms. In his archaeological phase, this negative view of power is
explained in terms of deep-seated rules of formation which constitute discourse and, by
implication, society and social relations. The genealogical approach attempts to account for
social change through an understanding of power in a more positive, enabling sense as the
will to knowledge becomes the will to power. However, due in part to the fact that
archaeology is not rejected, this will to power tends to reduce to rules of formation with a
one-way causal effect from an independent, naturalistic power structure, to the regulation
of social relations. In Foucault's later work on govemmentality, the concept of modern
power regimes as 'totalising and individualising' illustrates a more detailed analysis of the
complexities of social relations, and there is a more sustained attempt to see power as a
positive force, in the form of an agonistic struggle that takes place between individuals.
The change in Foucauli's analysis of power and society reflects his increased awareness of
the difficulties and contradictions inherent in the structuralist methodology of archaeology
from an anti-Enlightenment viewpoint. While his early work on exclusion demands a more
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thorough explanation of how this exclusion is constituted, it is when he provides this
explanation through archaeology and genealogy that the contradictions in providing a causal
analysis without transcendentalising becomes clear. So although Foucault's understanding
of power and society is naturalistic in archaeology and genealogy, the power relations they
describe are static and unable to explain social change. Yet the move towrds a more
complex, multidirectional concept of power relations continues to exhibit his search for a
foundational causal explanation, while broadening the category of power to the extent that
almost everything is the effect of the power structure, and as such, the concept of power is
emptied of all meaning. The inevitability of this dilemma can be understood more clearly if
we accept the argument that Foucault has an essentially functionalist view of society, with
resistance as a dysfunctional element in the power structure. From this perspective, what he
does, is to label all that is not an effect of the dominant power dispositif, 'resistance', thus
producing a more unified structure of power. At the same time, this removes any
possibility for resistance to change the system, and again raises the question of why
Foucault should see any need to prescribe resistance. More generally, this leaves him open
to the criticisms which have been aimed at functional analysis, in the main, concerning its
teleology which results in a confusion of cause and effect, and its inability to explain
change.
The result, then, of the attempt to derive principles for political analysis from his critique of
the Enlightenment, is a series of vacillations between a reliance on transcendental categories
and a nihilistic, aesthetic space, void of all meaning, until his work on governmentality
contains both extremes in the attempt to avoid either. In the end, when he is forced to re-
think his relationship to the Enlightenment, Foucault's politics appear as a more 'neutral'
support for the liberal democratic values of freedom and equality.
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B: Power and Exclusion
In his early work, Foucault argues that the change towards positivist methodology came
about to serve the needs of medicine. From the problem of epidemics came the definition of
a political status for medicine, and the constitution, at a state level, of, a medical
consciousness whose constant task was to provide information, supervision and constraint,
thus relating as much to the police as to the field of medicine proper. According to
Foucault's analysis, the role of the Societe de Royale in France
was constantly being enlarged: as a control body for epidemics, it
gradually became a point for the centralization of knowledge, an authority
for the registration and judgement of all medical activity... The Societe no
longer consisted solely of doctors who devoted themselves to the study of
collective pathological phenomena; it had become the official organ of a
collective consciousness of pathological phenomena, a consciousness that
operated at both the level of experience and the level of knowledge, in the
international as well as the national space.3 1
Foucault believed that a similar power centre existed in the Hôpital General, with relation to
the insane. He argues that in its functioning, or in its purpose, it had little to do with any
medical concept. Rather, it was an instance of order, "of the monarchical and bourgeois
order being organized in France during this period"3 2 , and that this structure soon
extended its network all over France. From this, Foucault argues, there evolved a definition
of a 'healthy' man, the 'model' man: "In the ordering of human existence it assumes a
normative posture, which authorizes it not oniy to distribute advice as to healthy life, but
also to dedicate the standards for physical and moral relations of the individual and of the
society in which he lives."33
Thus, according to Foucault, there is always an exclusion of specific groups of people
which occurs with the production of societal norms. He argues that the 'other' of the
medieval world was the leper, who served a symbolic function which was later fulfilled by
the poor, the criminal, the homeless, the mad. These groups were not simply excluded in
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an abstract manner, but were physically removed to 'houses of confinement'. This was
partly caused by the emergence of the new work ethic and the administrative expansion of
the state, and resulted in, according to Foucault, the workhouse movement in England, the
houses of correction in Germany, and the foundation of the Hôpital General in France,
where he centres his analysis. On the surface, he says, the foundation ofthe Hôpital
General appears to be just an administrative regrouping of several pre-existing
establishments, but in May 1657, following an edict which made all forms of begging
illegal, the militia began to round up all the beggars, thence distributing them among the
various buildings of the hospital. The inmates of these institutions 'Tere both physically and
administratively excluded from civil and political society, and the insane were in these
places not because they were ill, but because they were unproductive. It was out of this
heterogeneous process of incarceration, Foucault argues, that the mad were gradually
crystallised, from the seventeenth century onwards, as the definitive social 'other' of the
modern period. Thus the menace of madness is dealt with through the rites of reason which
find their legitimation in the homogeneity of the rules of reason and the norms of the social
group.
Foucault saw this exclusion as an inherent feature of the Enlightenment project, an
absolutist project which enshrines a denial of otherness, of difference. In archaeology, this
is parallelled by the exclusion which occurs with the production of discursive syntheses.
This phase of Foucault's work is aimed at discovering how specific categories and totalities
come about, and, as we saw in the Rationality section above, it concludes that there exist
'rules of formation'. So although Foucault does not directly address the question of power
and society in his archaeological work, the implication for a causal analysis is clear; power
goes in one direction, from fundamental rules of formation to the constitution of discourse,
the self and social relations.
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As the earlier criticisms of archaeology pointed out, this stage fails to adequately theorise
non-discursive practices, their relation to rules of discursive formation, and how social
change is possible. In attempting to overcome these problems, genealogy is aimed at re-
opening the discussion started in his early work by associating the discursive formations
which constitute the will to knowledge, with the will to power. Thus Foucault argues that,
regarding education,
we know very well that, in its distribution, in what it permits and what it
prevents, it follows the lines laid down by social difference, conflicts and
struggles. Every education system is a political means of maintaining or
modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and power
they bring with them.34
Foucault himself recognised that his early work had placed too much emphasis on
domination, which he now reinterprets as 'normalisation'. In doing so, it is the practice of
the will to knowledge/power which now constitutes discourse and social relations, meaning
that genealogy inaugurates a reversal, and privileges practice over the rules of discourse.
This change is most noticeable in Discipline and Punish, where he writes of the
'normalizing judgement' of the prison system:
The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and
those of a normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance
that makes possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over
individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges
them.35
Yet even in genealogy this 'normalisation' is too unidirectional and tends to slip into a
negative view of power, as Foucault himself later realises:
When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I insisted, I think, too
much on the techniques of domination. . . We must not understand the
exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion. Power consists in
complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and
the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-
technologies and self-technologies.36
This self-critique, along with similar comments made by others about Foucault's concept of
power in his archaeological and genealogical phases, centres on the point that this is an
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unrealistic, overly	 of society and
how it functions. But what is more damaging to Foucault is the criticism that his
explanation of social dynamics is unsound on epistemological grounds. Janicaud, for
example, describes the debate between Foucault and Habermas in a comparison of the
methodology of archaeology and genealogy with that of hermeneutics. While the
hermeneuticist presupposes a hidden origin and therefore keeps in reserve a point from
which judgements can be made, Foucault claims to analyse only the logic internal to power
techniques. Yet, as Janicaud and Habermas point out, Foucault does not succeed in his task
because, ultimately, heGannot dispense with comparisons between the different
complexes of power which he studies, and for this reason cannot avoid working on a
hermeneutic basij. In other words, comparative analysis necessitates a transcendental
standpoint from which to view the systems being studied, that is, an assumed neutrality
which is not available to Foucault.
This assumed neutrality, however, inevitably carries with it a hidden set of values. While
Foucault's very project implies a desire for liberation from totalities, his epistemological
position is unable to offer an explanation as to why liberation should be a goal. Simons
concurs with Taylor's argument that Foucault's critique of excessive power must rest on a
notion of the human subject:
Taylor holds that Foucault's concept of power is incoherent. It rests on the
conviction that victims are dominated. This requires an understanding of
what constitutes significant imposition on those victimised, which can be
determined only against the background of shared significance. The root of
Taylor's difficulty with Foucault is that he stands outside of all shared
horizons of significance.38
To be more precise, Foucault claims to stand outside of shared horizons in his attempts at
'pure description' and his rejection of humanistic, Enlightenment categories of meaning. It
is his inevitable failure to maintain this position, which gets him into difficulties, especially
in light of the specifically emancipatory nature apparent in the perspective from which he
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views power and society. The question now, then, is whether Foucault's recognition of the
mistake, in archaeology and genealogy, of insisting on power as domination, enables him
to overcome these difficulties.
C: Governmentality: Individualization and Totalization
'Governmentality' was a neologism coined by Foucault to designate the topic of
'governmental rationality' as an area for analysis and problematisation. He understood
'government' in the traditional, narrow sense, and as the wider, more general, 'conduct of
conduct', by which he meant an activity concerning the relation between self and self,
private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within
social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerning the exercise of
political sovereignty. In the Volume II and Volume III of The History of Sexuality,
Foucault tackles the government of the self by the self, which will be looked at in Part ifi,
but in his annual lectures at the College de France he concerned himself principally with
government in the political domain.
Foucault states that government in Western societies aim to govern 'all and each', resulting
in what he calls a tendency to 'totalize' and to 'individualize'. The regulatory strategies
employed by governments for the well-being of citizens is, he argues, individualistic in
nature, focusing attention on the individual as sovereign in his domain. Yet the success of
such policies results in a set of controls which specifically determine what it is to be an
'individual' in a Western society, thus becoming totalistic in nature through a process of
large-scale normalisation. Humanist myths are therefore more insidious, he argues,
because they incite us to seek our liberation through strategies that resubject us.
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This new concept of power is now seen by Foucault as subjectivising as well as
objectivising. It relies upon the internalisation of social norms through a manipulation of
consciousness, rather than pure domination. It is at this point in Foucault's work that the
concepts of freedom and autonomy are introduced with his notion of power relations
existing as an 'agonistic struggle' between individuals. In this way, he differentiates
between different kinds of power relations, and changes his definition in order to avoid
understanding every cause and effect in terms of power. There is also a degree of
optimism, as Foucault now distinguishes between power and violence, arguing that a
power relation only exists where there is a potential for resistanc'e. This seems to come
from his view that 'normalisation' develops in terms of a shared rationality, and depends,
to some degree, on the willingness of citizens to accept certain values and exist as subjects.
Hence the 'agonism' involved in power relations; it is a struggle between the government
and the governed, and, for the governed, within themselves, as power relations are decided
through a multidirectional, highly contingent, almost existential development of morality.
So this work marks the transition in Foucault from the study of systems of power relations
which, in Discipline and Punish, were able to absolutely tame and subject individuals, to a
study of the creation of political agency through an endless and open strategic game. It
enables Foucault to overcome some of the criticisms which were made of genealogy, in
particular, those which centred on the point that it offered a view of power which was
overly simplistic and unidirectional. Yet the doubt over the internal epistemological
coherency of his project still remains. The concept of govemmentality is confusing because
while it begins with the more detailed critique of government in Western society which
archaeology and genealogy were lacking, it at once attempts to offer a prescriptive theory of
hope for the future. Does the introduction of governmentality involve a concealed
derivation akin to that of the concept of power from the will to knowledge, which was the
criticism made by Habermas of genealogy; or has Foucault at last provided a space from
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which to resist without overturning his critique of foundationalism?
D: Resistance
Foucault's explanation of social change, which is necessary for overcoming the criticism
that archaeology and genealogy are unable to properly describe history, relies upon the
possibility for resistance. As in Nietzsche's agonistic contest, the point is to prevent the
solidification of strategic relations into states of domination. In this he fails, and for several
reasons. Firstly, Foucault radically undertheorises resistance, the result being, secondly,
that even his final works devote more space to discussing domination, and thirdly, that he
fails to provide motivation to resist. Finally, resistance requires a metanarrative that
Foucault is unable to provide, which perhaps explains his reticence towards developing a
theory of resistance more fully.
Brenner points out that while Foucault insists on the centrality of resistance to all power
relations, he devotes his studies of modernity almost exclusively to an analysis of modern
forms of power without ever examining corresponding forms of resistance.39 Simons,
too, complains that "resistance is radically undertheorised in [Foucault's] work" 40, along
with McNay, who argues that,
despite Foucault's assertions about the immanence of resistance to any
system of power, this idea remains theoretically underdeveloped, and, in
practice, Foucault's historical studies give the impression that the body
presents no material resistance to the operations of power.41
Even in The History of Sexuality Foucault talks of bodies as 'saturated' with disciplinary
techniques, indicating his inability to maintain a positive concept of power. "The dialectic
of society and individual, implied in the concepts of power and the subject", McNay
continues,"remains frozen and top-heavy, obviating theories of agency and change"42.
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Political theorists critical of Foucault argue that he fails to provide motivation or reason to
resist. That is, the question arises of whether we are in a humanist trap, destined to be
resubjected. Brenner argues that Foucault's understanding of power relations is
functionalist, and as such, unable to explain social change. This critique rests on the fact
that Foucault describes the dispositif in functionalist terminology, as a tool for analysing
the complex relations among discursive practices, non-discursive practices, and their
effects on society at large. In contrast to these functionally coordinated dispositfs,
resistance is fragmented, distinguishable only by its 'dysfunctional' consequences on the
dominant power dispositf Thus Foucault's concept of resistance can be compared to
Talcott Parson's idea of 'deviance':
The distinguishing feature of the functions of which resistance is composed,
like the 'deviant' motivational orientations in Parsonian normative
functionalism, is simply the fact that they have not been 'institutionalised' or
integrated into the dominant power dispositif. This purely reactive
conception of resistance makes sense only in conjunction with the totalistic
view of power Foucault claims to reject.43
That is, Foucault conceives resistance solely as counter-functions which by-pass or oppose
the imperatives of the dominant power dispositif In other words, Foucault's notion of
resistance seems to rely on the existence of a totalistic, functionalist system of power; there
seems to be no opportunity for such resistance to overthrow or radically alter the system.
Finally, there are criticisms which centre on the epistemological 'cryptonormative'
difficulties which remain with Foucault's concept of power to the very end. His
understanding of power relations as agonistic, for example, implicitly includes a regulative
principle for the assessment of political regimes: l'he question to be asked is whether the
system of constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to
transform the system"This, along with the emancipatory imperative which haunts his
work, seems to lead to an ethic of permanent resistance:
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The ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which
is the main danger. . . My point is not that everything is bad, but that
everything is dangerous . . . If everything is dangerous then we always
have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper-
and pessimistic activism.45
This imperative to resist must rest ultimately on normative grounds, as is illustrated in
Foucault's identification of his politics of resistance with, among other struggles,
"opposition to the power of men over women"46, despite the fact that his work is generally
ungendered. If, however, one argues that emancipation for women must rely upon a
metanarrative, this necessarily translates to a criticism of Foucault's work as
cryptonormative. Although there is disagreement amongst feminists regarding whether
stable, ahistorical categories of gender are necessary for an analysis of oppression, the
point remains that even without these categories any resistance to the status quo requires
normative notions of good and evil which are unavailable to Foucault.
Gutting disagrees with these criticisms of Foucault, arguing that it is possible to make
judgements without grounding them in a metanarrative, and thus avoid the apparent
contradiction in Foucault's work. He says: "Instead of basing our normative judgements on
general philosophical principles, we can ground them in our direct, practical encounters
with alleged sources of domination" 47, and that this will lead to local transformations of
our society. What this kind of analysis fails to take on board, however, is the fact that
experiences are interpreted in terms of our existing conceptual schemes which do invoke
(even if they are not invoked by) general philosophical assumptions. It is not simply the
case that Foucault's hope for resistance must rely upon metanarratives of some kind: more
specifically, they involve liberal democratic values, and as such, form a part of the very
Enlightenment rationality which he attacks.
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E: Conclusion - Liberal Democracy?
Foucault explicitly criticises the liberal concepts of power and freedom, and in terms of his
stated aims, there are fundamental differences between them. Foucault's later work
attempts to mix power and freedom, as constituting each other in an enabling force.
Liberalism places power and freedom in opposition to each other; increased government
power means reduced individual freedom because the individual is originally free and the
role of government must be restricted to maintaining these basic freedoms. Foucault, on the
other hand, sees power as a precondition for freedom, that is, the free individual is an
effect of power relations.
Connolly distinguishes between the liberal and the Foucauldian view of power with the
concept of 'agonistic respect' as a description of the social relation between opponents:
Agonistic respect differs from its sibling, liberal tolerance, in affirming a
more ambiguous relation of interdependence and strife between identities
over a passive letting the others be . . . [T]he call [for agonistic respect] is
made in the context of showing [the fundamentalist] through genealogy
some of the ways in which his fundaments too are questionable and
contestable.48
In this sense, Foucault's final position leads not to a total condemnation of liberalism, but
to transgressive work on its limits, to be specific, the limits of individualisation and
totalisation. He wants power and freedom to be able to transform the liberal state. Yet the
point raised by Connolly seems to imply a hidden assumption of neutrality in Foucault. If
we ask 'Why anti-fundamental?, Why genealogy?', and look for the criteria according to
which Foucault judges this oppositional stance desirable, the proximity of his analysis to
liberalism becomes clear, as McNay notes:
While Foucault is explicitly hostile to formulating a positive basis for
critique, he nevertheless implicitly draws on forms of normative judgements
he claims to have forsworn. .. [T]he tone of disapprobation that Foucault
adopts when discussing modern disciplinary techniques and his
exhortations to resist the government of individualisation ... derives its
force from an unacknowledged judgement about what is wrong with the
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modern power-knowledge regime and from a covert appeal to the ideals of
autonomy, dignity and reciprocity.49
The ambiguity in Foucault's analysis of power emanates from the tensions inherent in his
original project. Not only does Foucault invoke universalistic norms, they are the norms of
the liberal humanistic tradition which he attacks. It seems that he adopts the fundamental
tenets of liberal democratic theory, and then criticises the ways in which actual existing
liberal democracies are not living up to this ideal. So while it is liberal democracy which
produces the kind of subjection that makes Foucault's concept of resistance necessary, it is
liberal democratic values to which he appeals in his imperative to resist. This can be seen in
his objection to the institutionalisation of freedom:
Liberty is a practice . . . The liberty of men is never assured by the
institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost
all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around.
Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because 'liberty' is what must
be exercised. . . I think it can never be inherent in the structure of things to
guarantee the exercise of freedom. The guarantee of freedom is freedom.5°
Foucault has a similar problem with democracy. His work does embody a democratic
ethos, but worries that if it were reduced to consensus politics, state mechanisms of
electoral accountability would result in the production of internal and external others: in
other words, the age-old problem of the tyranny of the majority.
The difficulties that Foucault has with liberal democracy are the difficulties that liberal
democracy has with itself. That is, his work echoes the classic liberal dilemma; namely,
that in order to achieve and maintain a liberal society, non-liberal methods and policies may
have to be used. This arises from the fact that liberalism does not defend every kind of
political freedom; it has a specific agenda, specific foundational ideals which are "often
expressed with a bigoted aversion towards it opponents"5l . The claims to the universal
value of liberty in liberal theory are based on the connection of liberty with individual
autonomy. What Foucault needs to do in order to provide support for his emancipatory
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goals, is to analyse human nature in such a way as to take account of its autonomy and
contingency without grounding this in a universalist theory.
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PART III - THE SELF
A: Introduction.
Foucault criticises Enlightenment humanism for borrowing a specific theological and
metaphysical conception of human nature - the human subject is not given with permanent
structures that constitute or condition reality, but is produced historically from its social
world. His central project is to show how human freedom has been constrained by the
rationality which has viewed the human condition as constant and universal.
However, as Foucault's work developed, his concept of the self changed. In his early
work on madness, he concentrates on illustrating how the effects of the Enlightenment, and
Cartesian rationality in particular, translates to oppressive, exciusionist practices in
institutions. Difficulties which arise from this stage of his analysis centre on his privileging
of the excluded other, namely madness, as an aspect of human nature which has not been
subsumed within the oppressive rationality of the Enlightenment. In his archaeological
phase, he reasserts his original critique of the subject as the sole origin of meaning,
claiming instead that there exist deep-seated rules of formation which produce discourse
and constitute the subject. This area of his work has been criticised for removing any
possibility of human agency and, as a consequence, sounding the death of the subject.
Foucault's genealogical works return to the study of institutions and attempt to reinterpret
complete domination in terms of strategies of 'normalisation'. Although this is partly aimed
at introducing a more positive and multidirectional concept of power, the tendency to see
this 'normalisation' as hidden and repressive results in a concept of the self which still
lacks a sense of agency. This problem is only really tackled directly in his later works, The
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Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, (Volumes II and III of The History of
Sexuality), where the aspect of governmentality which relates to the conduct of oneself
presents a notion of individual autonomy. The concept of the self is absolutely central to
Foucault's work because it provides both the impetus for his original critique, and a space
from which to theorise the imperative to resist. The necessary introduction of an essentialist
moment through the concept of governmentality causes Foucault to re-think his relationship
to the Enlightenment, but he still falls to grasp the ineluctable contradictions in his project
and what this means for political philosophy.
B: Madness and the Essential Other.
In Madness and Civilization Foucault describes how, through confinement, madness is
subjected to the rule of reason: the madman now lives under the jurisdiction of those who
are sane, confined by their laws and instructed by their morality. According to Foucault,
Ultimately, confinement did seek to suppress madness, to eliminate from
the social order a figure which did not find his place within it; the essence of
confinement was not the exorcism of a danger. Confinement merely
manifested what madness, in its essence, was: a manifestation of non-being;
and by providing this manifestation, confinement thereby suppressed it,
since it restored it to its truth as nothingness. Confinement is the practice
which corresponds most exactly to madness experienced as unreason, that
is, as the empty negativity of reason; by confinement, madness is
acknowledged to be nothing.52
So there is a degree to which Foucault seems to view madness as culturally constituted
through the labelling of behaviour which cannot be subsumed within the dominant
conception of rationality. Yet this also imputes to madness a kind of essentialism which
pre-exists any form of labelling by the constitutive powers of Enlightenment rationality; that
is, in posing a threat to the dominant rationality, it must be repressed.
Gutting points out that Foucault strongly suggests that the mad's own experience of their
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madness "has access to a privileged truth about the reality of madness. He further suggests
that this truth, particularly as expressed though the literature of madness, is the key to an
understanding of human reality that will lead us beyond the arbitrary restrictions of mere
reason."53 In other words, this aspect of Foucault's work seems to imply not that there are
no truths to be discovered, no human nature as such; but rather that Enlightenment
rationality, in order to produce 'rational' unities and categorical totalities, has distorted and
oppressed the truth about the self. So, according to Gutting, this represents a desire in
Foucault to find "a fundamental truth buried far beneath the realm of reason" 54. There is
also the implication that Foucault sees madness as a radically transgressive force,
containing the ability to overcome the bastardized form of human nature produced by the
Enlightenment and put us in touch with our true selves.
This confusion causes problems for Foucault's desire for emancipation. The view of the
self as 'corrupted' by the Enlightenment is necessary because it provides a reason to resist
which is not provided by the view that madness, and the self in general, are constituted by
historical and cultural forces. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that
Foucault believes that it is the view of the human condition as constant and universal which
has constrained human freedom, thus prompting his attack of the Enlightenment. So to sum
up: Foucault needs a constituted view of the self for his criticism of the Enlightenment, and
an essentialist view of the self for his project of resistance and emancipation. This tension
sets the stage for the schizophrenic battle which continues through archaeology and
genealogy to the death of the author.
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C: Biopower and Docile Bodies.
In archaeology Foucault seeks to reaffirm his anti-essentialist view of the self. He does not,
however, directly put forward an analysis of human nature, rather this is to be read from
his description of the powers of discursive rules of formation, and his argument that there
is no pre-discursive subject. Pizzorno contends that from Foucault's discussion of the
'event' in archaeological analysis, we can derive the implications for his view of the
individual:
The notion of the individual human being therefore loses its privileged
epistemological status. It is a construct like the others that are needed to
make sense of acts and events that reach us like atoms and are to be pieced
together and assigned to meaningful series. Personal identities are one
among other series. They emerge in a battlefield, which means that
differentiation and opposition are the main features through which they
receive a recognisable form.55
This 'differentiation and opposition' refers to how the rules of formation structure
discourse, the event, and the individual. The concept of the unified subject is thus
uncovered as an illusion created by structural rules: the direction of causality operates from
the system to the subject rather than the other way around.
Along with the criticism of the lack of agency in this view of the self, is the argument that
Foucault causes further problems by separating the rules of discursive formation (and
therefore, of the subject) from their social and cultural context, and is thus unable to explain
how individuals come to occupy certain discursively constructed subject positions.
Freundlieb argues that, on the contrary, "subject positions' are, if anything, newly created
rather than simply available for occupation"56. Thus it is not simply a sense of agency
which is ignored by archaeology, it also seems to ignore the contingency of the self, the
ways in which individuals are constituted by socio-historical factors; and this is due to the
overly determined structuralist nature of archaeological analysis. So once again Foucault
implies a view in which the subject is essentialist. He has avoided the autonomy and
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'reality' which he seemed to attribute to madness in his earlier work, but only to replace it
with a subject who is determined ultimately by transcendental rules, the origin of which is
unaccounted for.
Genealogy attempts to explain how the rules of discursive formation originate through the
notion of the 'will to power'. Foucault has another look at how institutions produce
'others', but now he emphasises the constitutive aspects of power relations, instead of
viewing power as pure domination which corrupts the essence of human nature: "The
classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy enough to find
signs of the attention paid to the body - to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained,
which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces."57 In this way, Foucault
introduces a more positive concept of power as able to create docile yet productive bodies
who have internalised the gaze of authority - it is normalising rather than purely repressive.
One of the problems with this concept of 'biopower' is that it replaces the subject with the
body, invoking behaviourist assumptions. As McNay points out:
The problem. . . with such a conception is that it tends to reduce all forms
of psychic inner life and the diversity of human experience and creativity to
the effects of a unifying bodily discipline.. . As some critics have argued,
the construction of the subject cannot be explained simply through reference
to bodily experiences, but must be legal, social and psychological
constructs.58 -
This means that although Foucault avoids essentialism, he still excludes any sense of
agency. The constitutive aspect of biopower is also vague and ephemeral; as Foucault slips
again into a dominatory concept of power, its origins appear to remain transcendentally
described as rules of formation. In other words, despite his attempt, in genealogy, to
privilege practice over discourse for the purpose of causal explanation, the lack of human
agency in biopower and his consequent inability to explain what motivates action, results in
an ultimate reliance on archaeological method and all that it entails.
53
D: Ethics of the Self.
In a lecture given at Dartmouth college in 1980, Foucault states "Now I wish to study those
forms of self-understanding which the subject creates about himself' 59. This project
emanates from his work on governmentality, in the widest sense, as the 'conduct of
conduct', and is aimed at providing a concept of individuals as having a sense of agency in
order that they can resist the 'individualisation' and 'totalisation' of government power.
Foucault argues that in contemporary society, adherence to a set of moral rules is
disappearing, and in response to this he offers his interpretation of the Ancient Greek's
aesthetic 'ethics of the self.
In The Use of Pleasure Foucault describes the 'agonistic' relationship that the Greco-
Romans had with themselves as a method of the self-formation of the individual as a moral
subject: "In classical Greek thought, the 'ascetics' that enable one to make oneself into an
ethical subject was an integral part - down to its very form - of the practice of a virtuous
life, which was also the life of a 'free' man in the full, positive, and political sense of the
word." 6° Thus he emphasises the way that moral reflection intensified the relation to
oneself by constituting oneself as the subject of one's acts. Forming oneself as an ethical
subject requires, he argues, practices or 'technologies' of the self by which individuals
"effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform
themselves in order to attain a state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or
immortality. "61
This ethics of the self came about, Foucault argues, through self-mastery, which had three
central aspects. Firstly, there were 'testing procedures', exercises in abstinence and self-
control. Secondly, it involved 'self-examination', that is, reviewing one's moral progress
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at the end of the day, and praising or admonishing oneself in order to learn lessons for the
future. Thirdly, there was 'a labour of thought within itself as object', screening one's
representations to make sure they are true: "It is to assess the relationship between oneself
and that which is represented, so as to accept in the relation to oneself only that which can
depend on the subject's free and rational choice. "62
Foucault argues that this self-mastery, particularly in its relation to sexual austerity, should
be understood not as an expression of deep and essential prohibitions, but as the
elaboration and stylization of an activity in the exercise of its power and the practice of its
liberty. He thus distinguishes between morality that is code based, and morality born of an
ethics of the self. Where morality exists as a code, emphasis is placed upon the authority
that enforces it; that is, the ethical subject refers his conduct to a law, or set of laws. The
other type of morality, which arises from practices of the self, on the other hand, places
more importance on the forms of relations with the self, on the practice of working out
personal ethics. Moral conceptions in Greco-Roman antiquity were, Foucault contends,
much more oriented toward practices of the self than toward codifications of conduct: "If
exception is made of the Republic and the Laws, one finds very few references to the
principle of a code that would define in detail the right conduct to maintain."63
Although the theme of moral reflection and sexual austerity seems to continue with
Christianity, Foucault points out that the ethical subject is not constituted in the same
manner; instead of taking the form of a savoir faire and ethics of the self, the moral self is
constituted through the recognition of the law and an obedience to pastoral authority. In
Ancient Greece, however, the requirement of sexual austerity for the self-disciplined
subject was not presented in the form of a universal law, "but rather as a stylization of
conduct for those who wished to give their existence the most graceful and accomplished
form possible" 64 . In contrast, says Foucault, contemporary Western society, with its
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institutionalisation of individualism, relies upon the normalising effects of moral codes, and
for this very reason, the relations of oneself to oneself are largely undeveloped. As an
antidote for these ills, Foucault presents the principle of an aesthetic of the self.
This concept of the aesthetic is borrowed from Nietzsche's notion of making one's life a
work of art. For Nietzsche, life has value as an aesthetic achievement and ascetic practice as
a method of self-constituting. Foucault turns to particular forms of self-reflective modern
art in order create a space from which to reveal the limits of our thought and language,
implying a form of transgression and the overcoming of strategies of normalisation. Thus
liberty is achieved not in a state of liberation, but through the practice of freedom, through
the act of creating oneself.
Foucault's concept of 'technologies of the self overcomes some of the problems with his
earlier work by introducing a notion of autonomy and self-fashioning through agonistic
struggle. The ultimately dominatory concept of individualisation in his genealogical phase
is now presented with a counter-force with which individuals can resist, no longer 'docile
bodies' produced by power techniques. Foucault himself seems to have noted the problems
with his earlier conception of the self in archaeology and genealogy, and sees this later
work as a direct attempt to overcome those difficulties: ". . . the self is not something to be
discovered or deciphered as a very obscure text. . . The self has, on the contrary, not to be
discovered but to be constituted, to be constituted through the force of truth."65
In responding to the criticisms that his earlier work lacked a sense of human agency, and
was therefore unable to explain social change, Foucault has been led down a blind alley.
The ultimate tensions in his work arise from the incoherency of his original project: the
dream of providing a reason to resist what he sees the totalising nature of humanistic
Enlightenment thought. While his earlier work was unable to provide the necessary
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description of the subject without invoking universalistic and transcendental assumptions,
and was thus unable to provide a reason to resist the dominant rationality, his later work on
the ethics of the self swings to the other extreme.
To start with, Foucault exhibits a blatant disregard for historical accuracy in his
determination to provide an alternative to code-based morality. Hadot points out that, from
a historical perspective, the philosophical practice of the Stoics and the Platonists was not
related only to the self, to the cultivation of the self and to the pleasure taken in the self. For
the Stoics, the aim was to go beyond the self by thinking and acting in union with
universal, transcendental reason. The 'screening of representations' that Foucault describes
was thus not for the purpose of accepting 'only that which can depend on the subject's free
and rational choice', but, on the contrary, to free oneself from one's individuality, to raise
oneself to universality. Hadot points in particular to the role of the practice of writing as a
method of linking the self to reason, logic and universality:
As such one identifies oneself with an 'other' which is Nature, universal
Reason, which is present in each individual. In this there is a radical
transformation of perspective, a universalist and cosmic dimension which
Foucault, it seems to me, did not sufficiently stress: interiorisation is going
beyond the self in a way which leads to universalisation.66
At the epistemological level, there is the inevitable difficulty that, in introducing a sense of
agency, Foucault necessarily implies an essentialist authenticity. There is the ambiguity, for
example, of how an ethics of the self is to be distinguished from a moral code. He seems to
simultaneously hold two views of human nature: When discussing code-based morality, he
implies a behaviourist understanding of the body as 'normalised', but takes the opposite
stance when describing techniques of the self. So is it the case that a society which
cultivates self-formation actually produces autonomous agents? And if so, how is this to be
distinguished from strategies of individualisation? In other words, Foucault cannot
distinguish between a strong, powerful, but invisible code of normalisation (such as he
57
says exists in contemporary Western societies), and a society in which individuals feel that
they form themselves unaffected by an invisible moral code, unless he states that
individuals are constituted by external forces in both types of society (thereby losing any
sense of agency), or he says that in one of the societies, individuals are suffering from a
form of 'false-consciousness'. It is this latter stance which is most strongly implied - yet
this invokes assumptions about an 'authentic' self, and, as McNay points out, "brings the
idea of the ethics of the self close to a Sartrean existentialism"66.
Foucault's attempt to distinguish between the 'individualisation' which takes place in
modern society, and the cultivation of the self which he describes, seems to translate to the
prescription for a more 'real' individualism. The concept of autonomy required by self-
forming thus highlights the essentialist aspect of Foucault's work, which was previously
seen in his notion of madness as the essential other. This is a double contradiction, for not
only does it invoke an epistemology which is antithetical to his original project, it also relies
upon the specifically Enlightenment values at which his critique is aimed: "Far from
redefining a notion of the self along anti-essentialist lines, Foucault's ethics in fact reinstalls
a notion of sovereign subjectivity in which there is a short-circuited link between aesthetic
self-fashioning and self-knowledge"67.
Foucault's privileging of modern art as a site of freedom also invokes transcendental-like
forms, failing to consider the culturally contingent character of aesthetics, and
consequently, how an appeal to aesthetics might simply re-confirm established norms and
values. McNay points out, for example, that the conception of the artist as a free agent of
creativity is both elitist and gendered, and Hadot concludes that "Foucault might have been
advancing a cultivation of the self which was too purely aesthetic - that is to say, I fear, a
new form of dandyism, a late-twentieth-century version"68. What is above all clear, is that
Foucault's final version of the self contains a moral imperative - it is not only a historical
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study, it was meant also to offer contemporary man a model of life.
E: Conclusion.
"Foucault's work is a search for truths that will make us free."69
Foucault offers two reasons for proposing an ethics of the self: Firstly, he argues, there is a
lack of adherence to any rule-based morality in contemporary society, so a more
appropriate alternative should be sought; secondly, he argues that the relation of oneself to
oneself is underdeveloped in contemporary society due to the normalising effect of
individualisation. The basic contradiction in these two statements is overwhelmingly
apparent, and is a reflection of the tensions inherent in a project which seeks to both
undermine any a priori concept of the self, while providing a basis for a 'better kind of
freedom'.
The difficulty in Foucault's work is a manifestation of the postmodern contradiction in the
political imperative to deconstruct existing hierarchies. That is, the attempt to extrapolate
from the critique of transcendental categories and meanings any political implication, is
doomed to failure, as Brenner points out:
I contend that all forms of social theory and analysis rest upon determinate,
normative, theoretical, and empirical assumptions about how human society
works. Such assumptions, in my opinion, remain implicit even in
postmodern approaches to social theory that claim to reject 'grand theory'
and 'metanarratives'.7°
So, while the critique of Enlightenment values and exclusions is based on the lack of any
transcendental support for them, this cannot then provide support for deconstruction or the
prioritising of previously excluded 'others'.
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However, as we have seen, it is not simply the case that Foucault invokes transcendental
assumptions of some kind; he invokes peculiarly Enlightenment assumptions. Yet he is
unwilling and unable to explain the criteria to which he appeals in his attack on power,
knowledge and subjectivity. These come not from the Nietzschean heritage of extreme anti-
normativism and anti-universalism which he claims as his own, but from the modern
culture which he denounces. The circularity in Foucault's argument arises because it is
modern society which makes possible both the power structure which he criticises, and
critiques such as his. That the critical theory which emerges from this starting point should
be constituted by Enlightenment concerns, therefore, should not come as a surprise. What
is surprising, however, is the radicality which continues to be imputed to it.
Foucault, the vehement questioner, was after all a professor at the College
de France: this position went almost unchallenged during his lifetime; after
the death of Sartre, Foucault, the genealogist of morality, became a sort of
moral authority. What then, is the biopower which leads to nominations of
this nature? Is it all just some kind of trick?7 1
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CHAPTER 2.
JACQUES DERRIDA.
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PART I - RATIONALiTY.
A: Introduction.
The conceptual and methodological approach adopted and put forward by Derrida takes as
its starting point a general critique of the Western philosophical tradition. At the base of this
critique is his assertion that this tradition has been founded on and shaped by a fundamental
error, the belief that there is something present behind the concept, and that whatever does
lie behind the concept (or behind the sign, the word) can be reached. Derrida illustrates that
the point of arrival at 'reality' will always be deferred by the creation of another concept,
and that the essence behind the idea can never be appropriated. This argument is supported
by specific criticisms of various thinkers from Plato to Foucault, and is particularly
persuasive in his comprehensive assessment of classical semiology and structuralism. By
engaging in (dare we say it?) an almost dialectical debate with a succession of these
-
thinkers, he shows that the idea of a transparent language, in which that which it describes
is assumed to be immediately present, is pure fantasy. In other words, language itself is a
medium, the signifier, and never the signified.
Through this debate, Derrida works out his central notion of the irreducible structure of
dfferance as it operates in human consciousness, temporality, history and above all in the
fundamental activity of writing. By means of this concept of differance - a neologism
meaning both to 'defer' and to 'differ' - Derrida proposes to show how the major
metaphysical definitions of Being as some timeless self-identity or presence, which
dominated Western philosophy from Plato to the present day, could ultimately be
deconstructed. Such a deconstruction is designed to show that in each instance, differance
precedes presence rather than the contrary (as has been presupposed by what Derrida terms
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the 'logocentric' tradition of Western thought).
In his most central works, Of Grammatology (1967), Writing and Difference (1967),
Dissemination (1972) and Margins of Philosophy (1972), Derrida applied his
deconstructive analysis to a wide variety of subjects - literary, scientific, liiiguistic and
psycho-analytic, as well as the strictly philosophical. Works such as Glas (1974) and The
Double Session (1972) freely experiment with modes of thinking and writing in an attempt
to overcome the rigid traditional divide between aesthetic and philosophical discourses: a
divide determined by the 'logocentrism' of Western metaphysics which sought to exile
from the realm of pure reason all that did not conform to its centralising logic of identity
and non-contradiction.
By re-directing our attention to the shifting 'margins' and limits which determine such
logocentric procedures of exclusion and division, Derrida contrives to dismantle our
preconceived notions of identity to expose us to the challenge of hitherto suppressed or
concealed 'otherness' - the 'other' side of experience, which has been ignored in order to
preserve the illusion of truth as a perfectly self-contained and self-sufficient presence.
Thus, for example, we find Derrida questioning and subverting the traditional priorities of
speech over writing, presence over absence, sameness over difference, timelessness over
time and so on. His work of rigorous deconstruction poses, accordingly, a radical
challenge to such hallowed logocentric notions as the 'Eternal Idea of Plato', the 'Self-
Thinking-Thought of Aristotle' or the cogito of Descartes.
Despite his radical claims, Derrida escapes many of the criticisms which can be made of
other postmodern thinkers due to his realisation that there is an inevitable permanence of
our logical-philosophical heritage, and that we cannot therefore escape Enlightenment
rationality. This self-awareness directly disagrees with Foucault's attempts, for example, in
63
Madness and Civilization, to describe madness without using the Enlightenment rationality
which defined it, thus replicating, in Derrida's eyes, Cartesian dualism. Derrida, on the
other hand, seeks to show that there can be no privileged space outside of reason and no
higher reason, so although it is permiss able to write some kind of history of unreason, one
cannot logically question reason-in-general.
This degree of self-awareness does not, however, automatically remove the problematic
aspects of Derrida's project, in the same way that the fundamental contradictions in
Foucault's work could never be overcome. Ultimately, it is the critical edge given to the
concept of differance and the project of deconstruction which causes problems for Derrida.
These problems highlight the inevitable dichotomy between nihilism and an idealised
transcendentalism, along with Derrida's failure to avoid the former without invoking the
latter.
B: Derrida's Critique of the Western Tradition.
Through his analysis, interpretation and critique of various thinkers, Derrida underscores
the persistence of logocentrism in Western thought. At the same time, he takes something
from each of them as he formulates a critique which undermines the éonfidence in the
interpretive power of logos to overcome otherness in the process of reaching genuine
understanding. Through his analysis of Hegel, for example, Derrida takes on board the
significance of the negative other, while his critique of the synthesizing aspect of Hegelian
dialectic shows that the 'other' is unsublatable, that at its heart, Hegelian semiology
remains within the work of meaning and truth.
Among Derrida's first published works was a book on Husserl (Speech and Phenomena,
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trans. 1973), in which he contested the idea that philosophy could work its way back to a
logic of meaning and experience derived from the immediate data of consciousness itself.
Husserl thought the sign, the mark, the word, to be a secondary phenomenon. What such
phenomena are secondary to, in his view, are the originating identity between
consciousness and meaning, a pure presence of meaning to consciousness prior to the
defilements of language. More specifically, Husserl drew a distinction between two kinds
of sign, the 'indicative' and the 'expressive'. It is only expressive signs, he argued, which
represent the communicative purpose or the intentional force which springs directly from
the consciousness of the speaker. Indicative signs, by contrast, ar devoid of expressive
intent and function merely as 'lifeless' tokens in an arbitrary system. Thus Husserl
prioritizes expressive signs over indicative signs; the expressive as self-presence, the
speaker as present in his speech. It is the maintaining of this distinction at the linguistic
level, the separation of the authentic from the inauthentic, which characterises Derrida's
concern with semiotics:
In both expressive and indicative communication the difference between
reality and representation, between the true and the imaginary, and between
simple presence and repetition has always already begun to be effaced. Does
not the maintaining of this difference - in the history of metaphysics and for
Husserl as well - answer to the obstinate desire to save presence and to
reduce or derive the sign, and with it all powers of repetition?'
Thus Derrida shows that what Husserl calls 'expressive' signs cannot be distinguished
from 'indicative' signs, that all language is, in this sense, indicative, as it necessarily
conforms to the 'arbitrary system' talked of by Husserl and forever defers the immediate
presence to consciousness.
For Derrida, Husserl simply revives for modem philosophy the project of thought which
Descartes had initiated three centuries earlier, and is replicated even by Foucault. What
Derrida is fundamentally taking issue with here is the aim of re-establishing the certitudes
of reason. In Husserl, as we saw, this was attempted through the false dichotomy of
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'expressive' and 'indicative' communication, by positioning the 'indicative' in a secondary,
derivative position in order to establish the primary, privileged position of 'expressive'
communication as certainty. Such an approach necessarily involves, argues Derrida, a prior
position which is external to reason itself, and this is what both Descartes and Foucault do
with respect to madness.
Derrida points out that Descartes' use of hyperbolic doubt to separate madness from
deception by the senses fosters the illusion that one can step outside of philosophy in order
to provide its definition from a fictitious exteriority. Foucault' interpretation of this
exclusion of madness as a historical marker by which reason defines itself, then replicates,
according to Derrida, the metaphysical transcendentalism which Foucault aims to criticise:
The attempt to write the history of the decision, division, difference, runs
the risk of construing the division as an event or a structure subsequent to
the unity of an original presence, thereby confirming metaphysics in its
fundamental operation.2
To put it simply, Foucault, like Descartes, must be adopting a transcendental stance which
incorporates a preconceived notion of reason, in order to note the division between
madness and reason. This Cartesian gesture is implicit, as Derrida suggests in his
discussion of Foucault and his criticism of structuralism as a whole, in all of those who
attempt to step outside of philosophy and find themselves paradoxically secured within it.
On the surface, Derrida finds in Saussurean structuralism an approach to linguistics which
no longer privileges the signified over the sign, no longer downgrades the sign in relation
to the immediate presence of an origin. Saussurean structuralism understands language as a
differential network of meaning, whereby the meaning of a word, the sign, comes not from
any link to a signified, but rather from its position in a referential structure, its relation to
other signs. In other words, meaning is produced by the organizing ground-rules of
language.
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Derrida, however, saw that structuralism retained a residual attachment to a Western
metaphysics of meaning and presence. More specifically, this can be found in Saussure's
privileging of speech over writing. Derrida points out that for Saussure, writing is treated
as a secondary form of linguistic notation, always dependent on the primaiy reality of
speech and the sense of a speaker's 'presence' behind his words.3 For Saussure, it seems,
there is a two-way causal relationship between speech and the structure of the linguistic
system, such that although the meaning of the sign is determined by its place in a linguistic
system, it is also the case that this differential network of meaning develops from, and is
constituted by, the practice of speaking. This paradox exists, argues Derrida, because it is
only by downgrading the written word, by repressing its significance, that Saussure is able
to maintain the spoken word as a source of truth and authenticity. So although Saussure
professes to maintain the prior significance of language as a system, Derrida shows how he
ultimately relies upon a notion of the privileged status of the speaking subject. It is this
underlying assumption which places Saussure squarely within the Western metaphysical
tradition, as Derrida argues:
The system of language associated with phonetic-alphabetic writing is that
within which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as
presence, has been produced. This logocentrism, this epoch of the full
speech, has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for
essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing.4
Derrida's criticism, to put it simply, is that by prioritising speech over writing, the idea of
an immediate, intuitive access to meaning and truth, is maintained. By reversing this
hierarchy, within the parameters of a Saussurean linguistic system, Derrida completes
Saussure's project, and finally 'depersonalises' language. That is, he shows how, without
the medium of a thinking subject, the sign is forever separated from the signified. He
undertakes this reversal not to introduce a new hierarchy - he does not want to prioritise
writing over speech, but rather to indicate that the sign, whether written or spoken, is
67
always the product of a system, and does not denote any relation to an immediate presence.
In more general terms, Derrida's notion of the downgrading of 'otherness' in the Western
philosophical tradition is heavily indebted to Heidegger. Heidegger attacked Western
metaphysics for its dualistic approach to reality, and cited, as examples of this, Plato's
separation of ideal Forms from everyday existence, the medieval separation of God and the
physical world, and Descartes' separation of the thinking consciousness from its physical
surroundings. For Heidegger, these dualisms, whereby certain aspects of human nature are
always downgraded, result in 'inauthentic existence', an alienatioii from our true selves
which should, and can, be overcome. Thus he saw his major task to be to carry out a
'Destruktion' of the history of ontology. By this he does not mean 'destruction' in the
usual sense of the word, but rather something close to a 'destructuring' or a 'dismantling'.
For in Heidegger's view, by privileging some aspects of reality and excluding others, the
tradition of ontological thought has served to conceal the original sources from which it
arose. As he puts it,
If the question of Being is to achieve clarity regarding its own history, a
loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments
produced by it are necessary. We understand this task as the destruction of
the traditional content of ancient ontology. . . This destruction is based upon
the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding
determinations of Being were gained.5
Thus through Heidegger, Derrida is introduced to the ways in which the Western tradition
has always excluded the 'other' in its attempts to uncover an absolute, idealised truth, and
also to the Heideggerian version of a deconstruction which aims to expose this
concealment. Yet, as Derrida points out, Heidegger's longing for authenticity, for the
immediate presence of an origin, replicates the quest in traditional metaphysics for a
transcendental truth. In dividing 'authentic' existence from inauthentic existence, Heidegger
is producing his oppositional own binary pair, his own dualism. This can be seen, for
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example, where Derrida plays Heidegger off against Nietzsche:
There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we
must think of this without nostalgia; that is, outside of the myth of a purely
maternal or paternal language, a lost native country or thought. On the
contrary, we must affirm this, in the sense in which Nietzsche puts
affirmation into play, in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance.6
So Derrida's critique centres on the fact that Heidegger's 'destruktiRn' aims at
deconstructing a tradition in order to get back to an original, unconcealed meaning, and it is
this point of departure which begins to characterise Derrida's project of deconstruction.
Nietzsche, whom Heidegger criticised as the last of the metaphysiians, gets treated very
differently by Derrida:
Radicalizing the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation,
difference. . . Nietzsche, far from remaining simply (with Hegel and as
Heidegger wished) within metaphysics, would have contributed a great deal
to the liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with
respect to the logos and the related concept of truth or primary signified, in
whatever sense that is understood.7
Derrida thus interprets Nietzsche's position as one which separates forever the signifier and
the signified, in which writing is not subordinate to truth, while Heidegger argues that
Nietzsche supposes the existence of determinate meanings. In Spurs, Derrida argues that
Nietzsche's styles "protect against the terrifying, blinding, mortal threat [of that] which
presents itself, which obstinately thrusts itself into view: presence, content, the thing itself,
meaning, truth"8.
It is strange that Derrida does not apply his usual deconstructive critique to Nietzsche, for
while it is arguably the case that Nietzsche is one of Derrida's more radical predecessors,
and closer to Derrida than any other, it is not certain that Nietzsche's work could provide
Derrida with the support which he imputes to it. Nietzsche's style, his poetics of writing
for the purposes of diversion and parody, does, as Derrida recognises (and adopts for
himself), undermine the notion of a transcendental signified. Yet Nietzsche's constant
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position is that language ensues from a prelinguistic experience. Thus song and poetry, for
Nietzsche, are meaningful not simply as tools for disrupting logocentric truths, but because
they immediately access something more fundamental: the self. It seems that Derrida
misinterprets Nietzsche, as Hoar points out,
There is certainly a Nietzschean philosophy of writing, but it isn't exactly
the one attributed to him by Derrida. For style as defined by Nietzsche'....
does not amount to an absence of origin and absence of foundation. The
world for Nietzsche is not a groundless chess board.9
If it is the case, as it appears to be, that Derrida turns a blind eye to the aspects of Nietzsche
which do not support his own position, this could raise difficulties for his own project. The
reason that Derrida is not critical of Nietzsche in the way that he is critical of just about
every other philosopher, is that he believes that Nietzsche has shown that writing is not
/
subordinate to any originary truth. Thus Derrida makes Nietzsche's style his own, without
in the least adhering to Nietzsche's fundamental thesis, for if he were to recognise that
"Nietzsche, just like Plato and Rousseau - in an entirely metaphysical manner - theoretically
conceives of writing qua style as a pale imitation" 10, he would be left unable to explain the
existence of writing and the sign without inviolating his own non-metaphysical, non-
transcendental premises.
q
C: Differance.
'Differance' is the neologism coined by Derrida to describe how a sign comes to occupy a
certain position in a system of signifiers. One must first of all understand this invention in
the context of the modern French language. Unlike English, French has not developed two
verbs from the Latin dfferre, but has maintained the senses of both to differ and to defer in
the same verb, 'differer'. Derrida's invented word, 'differance', thus welds together /'JO
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difference and deferral, containing a sense of both spatial and temporal difference.
More specifically, Derrida's concept of differance stems from his critique of classical
semiology, which seems to be both a critique of semiology's interpretation of language and
the sign, as well as a critique of how this interpretation represents and produces a typically
Western understanding of signs, meaning and reality. This double critique, exposed by the
concept of differance, also clarifies Derrida's own understanding of the nature of language.
The following extract from Margins of Philosophy serves to summarise and elucidate
Derrida's critique of classical semiology in relation to differance:
The sign is usually said to be put in place of the thing itself, the present
thing, 'thing' here standing equally for meaning or referent. The sign
represents the present in its absence. It takes place of the present. When we
cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, when
the present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the
sign. We take or give signs. We signal. The sign, in this sense, is deferred
presence. Whether we are concerned with the verbal or the written sign,
with the monetary sign, or with electoral delegation and political
representation, the circulation of signs defers the moment in which we can
encounter the thing itself, make it ours, consume or expend it, touch it, see
it, intuit its presence. What I am describing here in order to define it is the
classically determined structure of the sign in all the banality of its
characteristics - signification as the dfferance of temporization. And this
structure presupposes that the sign, which defers presence, is conceivable
only on the basis of the presence that it defers and moving towards the
deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate. According to this classical
semiology, the substitution of the sign for the thing itself is both secondary
and provisional: secondary due to an original and lost presence from which
the sign derives; provisional as concerns this final and missing presence
toward which the sign in this sense is a movement of
mediation." [emphasis added.]
In this way, differance describes how, in classical semiology, the sign is always
understood as secondary to that which it represents; it is only a representation of the 'real'
thing, the signified.
For Derrida, as we saw in his analyses of various thinkers and Saussure in particular, the
meaning of the sign is constituted not by its relation to the signified, but through its
position in a referential structure of other signs; its difference to other signs. The signified,
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the thing itself, is forever deferred by the sign, and the concept of an unmediated presence
is a nostalgic fallacy. Derrida refers to the process by which the sign always replaces the
lost origin as supplementarity:
One could say . . . that this movement of play, permitted by the lack or
absence of a center or origin, is the movement of supplementarity. One
cannot determine the center and exhaust totalization because the sign which
replaces the center, which supplements it, taking the center's place ih its
absence - this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a supplement. 12
So for Derrida, the supplement is that which both signifies the lack of a 'presence', and
compensates for that lack of presence by setting in motion its own economy of difference.
Philosophies which take no account of its activity are, accordingly,doomed to mistake the
sign for the missing origin which it represents. To put it simply, this permanent deferral is
caused by difference. Derrida is arguing that because the sign is produced, determined by
its relation to other signs, by not being other signs (for example, the meaning of the sign or
word 'black' is determined by its relation to other signs, that is, 'not white', rather than any
relation to an immediate, unsignified presence) we can see how this process of
differentiation always gets in the way of, defers, the signified.
Derridats description of linguistic meaning as the 'systematic play of differences', and the
way in which this means that the signified is always deferred, is illustrated in his analysis
of Plato's Phaedrus. The principal guide Derrida chooses to follow within the intricacies of
this play is the family of pharmaceutical terms that are associated by Plato with writing, but
particularly the term 'pharmakon'. In classical Greek, a pharmakon is a drug, and as such it
may be taken to mean either a remedy or a poison, either the cure of an illness or its cause.
This is problematic for Plato, argues Derrida, because pharmakon cannot be made to
function as an unambiguous term available to dialectic reasoning. Instead, it enters the
dialectic from both sides at once (remedy-poison, good-bad, positive-negative) and
threatens the philosophical process from within: "It is precisely this ambiguity that Plato
attempts to master, to dominate by inserting its definition into simple, clear-cut opposition:
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good and evil, inside and outside, true and false, essence and appearance" 13. What Derrida
exposes here, is how the dialectical logic of Western philosophy requires that one term be
valued over the other, that one term is necessarily excluded such that the concept is defined
as the difference of the other. The efficacy of a particular sign depends upon the implied
presence - that is, the absence, or non-presence - of the other linguistic signs with which it
has an oppositional relationship. Linguistic signification and verbal meaning are thus
inextricably interwoven with non-presence.
There are two criticisms which can be made of Derrida's conceptof differance, the first
centring on the inaccuracy of it as a descriptive tool, the second highlighting the way that it
covertly moves from explanation to critique. Firstly, then, it could be the case that the
'systematic play of differences' is in fact less influential than Derrida believes in the
determination and invention of a sign, and rather it is other non-linguistic cultural factors
which place the sign in opposition to others in the existing linguistic structure. That is, by
explaining the formation of signs in purely linguistic terms, Derrida is describing an
enclosed system which seems to have no causal interaction with, for example, a society's
ontological and cultural influences. He does notice this problem, pointing out that"
these differences are themselves effects. They have not fallen from the sky fully formed,
and are no more inscribed in a 'topos noetos' than they are prescribed in the gray matter of
the brain." 14 Yet despite this insight, Derrida somewhat ambiguously describes differance
as something which produces difference, as something which is constituted historically as a
weave of differences. So while he recognises that his concept of differance constitutes a
complex and interrelated structure of both cause and effect, he is unable to describe the
non-linguistic aspects of the process in more explicit terms without the danger of citing a
non-linguistic 'origin' of differance, and this means that the dynamics at work in the
'systematic play of differences' take on a rather transcendental quality.
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Secondly, it must be pointed out that Derrida's description of the differance explicit in
Plato's Phaedrus does not logically equate with a criticism of it. Derrida's analysis could be
read simply as a description of the way meanings are produced, yet Derrida strongly
implies that he is critical of this process. But from what standpoint can a criticism be made?
Derrida insists on the binary nature of differance, for every sign there is one excluded
'other'. Yet surely there must be an infinite number of excluded others for every sign
which makes its way into our conceptual vocabulary. If this were the case, the critical
aspect of differance could be shown to be groundless: exclusion is inevitable in the
production of meaning. To put it another way, there is a simjälicity apparent in the
retrospective analysis that Derrida applies to Plato's Phaedrus, which makes deconstruction
appear as a method of restoring a natural balance. That is, in highlighting the oppositional
binary pair and the single excluded other, Derrida is imposing his own critical schema upon
infinite heterogeneous possibilities - a multitude of excluded others. It is this partisan
imposition which, mistakenly, gives differance its critical edge, and it is the criticism of the
exclusion produced by this misunderstanding of differance which deconstruction aims to
expose.
D: Deconstruction.
Derrida's well-known method of deconstruction is essentially an attempt to right the
wrongs of Western philosophy as he sees them. Through this approach, Derrida aims to
illustrate that the desire for an unmediated truth of the world is false, that since Plato,
Western rationality has produced hierarchically-ordered concepts based upon binary
oppositions, and that any attempt to totalise the text can be seen to depend transcendentally
upon a generalised form of the differences it proposes to subsume.
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Derrida describes deconstruction as the genealogical analysis of how the concept is built
and legitimised, that is, as a discovery of the concept's hidden assumptions. Thus Derrida
exposes an uncertainty principle under the foundation stone of everything he deconstructs.
In order to remove or make apparent the assumptions and hierarchies of Western
rationality, Derrida has to hurdle an immediate obstacle; that is, he cannot simply stand
outside of reason and take a neutral view of the metaphysical system of hierarchies that
presents itself:
Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralisation:
it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing,
practice an overturning of the classical opposition and a general
displacement of the system. 15
In other words, deconstruction must initially give precedence to the 'other' of the
metaphysical system, overturn hierarchies, not in order to produce yet another set of
hierarchies, but to make apparent and to liberate all concepts from what Derrida describes
as the dominant force which has organised the logocentric hierarchy.
Derrida believes that literary and poetic language, because it works around the limits of our
logical concepts, can provide the space from which to attempt such a deconstruction. In
The Double Session and Glas, for example, Derrida attempts to put deconstruction into
practice with a typographic invention. In The Double Session, Derrida inserts the poetic
text into the very 'process of truth' which has always been philosophy's exclusive concern.
Thus this text initiates its highly complex trajectory with a single page on which a short
piece by Mallarme (Mimique) appears inset into a fragment from Plato's Philebus. By
means of this method, Derrida already announces an intention: to open up a space within
the truth process inaugurated by Plato for a consideration of the poetic operation it has
always condemned or excluded.
Glas is even more complex. On its large, square pages, two wide columns face off in
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different type: smaller, denser on the left, larger, more spaced out on the right. There is
also a third type in places, the smallest of the three, cutting into the column at various
points, forming inscribed incisions either along its outermost edge or down the centre. On
every page Glas attempts to demonstrate the borderless condition of texts, and their
susceptibility to the most unexpected encounters. The Hegelian dialectic of Absolute Spirit,
tracked relentlessly with the left hand, are compared with the writings of Jean Genet, on the
right. The work of the negative which drives the dialectic towards an ever-higher synthesis
on the left is constantly encroached upon by the glorification of the criminal underclass
cited at length on the right. Thus Derrida is tracing what he sees as the failing dialectic
attempt to totalise.
These attempts at deconstruction ar pretentious and simp1isti. More importantly, they fail
to overcome both the transcendentalism erived from Derrida s misunderstanding oh
differance, and the nihilism of which he is often accused. Derrida is aware of the criticism
of deconstruction as nihilistic, a label which he hastily refuses:
There have been several misinterpretations of what I and other
deconstructionists are trying to do. It is totally false to suggest that
deconstruction is a suspension of reference. Deconstruction is always
deeply concerned with the 'other' of language. I never cease to be surprised
by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is nothing beyond
language, that we are imprisoned by language; it is, in fact, saying exactly
the opposite. The critique of logocentrism above all else is the search for the
'other' and the 'other of language'.16
Yet it is this search for the other which brings to the fore the transcendental character in
Derrida's concept of differance and deconstruction, and in doing so, ultimately exposes the
nihilistic tensions within his work. By speaking of the one, single excluded other, Derrida
is unwittingly being drawn into the prevailing hierarchy which he aims to expose. That is,
once it is realised that his understanding of differance is simplistic and partisan in the way it
ignores the infinite possibility of a multitude of excluded others for each sign which makes
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its way into our conceptual system, one can see how deconstruction gives precedence only
to a single 'other' which is determined by the prevailing hierarchy. The result is, despite
Derrida's claims, a transcendental view, a view which always already has a preconceived
notion of what the 'other' is. In this way, Derrida necessarily replicates the system of
hierarchies which deconstruction aims to expose.
Nevertheless, there is, in Derrida, an unconscious battle going on, a battle which surfaces
here and there in his fight against transcendentalism and nihilism. For if we were to re-
write differance and deconstruction in a way which, by recognising the infinite possibility
of heterogeneous others, avoided this transcendentalism, deconstruction would then
become a strategy of nihilism. It would become a strategy of nihilism because the
predominant hierarchy would be shown not only to be arbitrary in relation to the single
excluded other which exists (in Derrida's view) for each dominant concept, but to be
absolutely arbitrary in relation to the infinite number of possible excluded others which
exist for each concept. A strategy which then aims at exposing differance in this way, is a
strategy which ultimately levels hierarchies as it exposes their absolute arbitrariness.
Glimpses of both the transcendental and nihilistic tendencies in Derrida can be found, for
example, in his proposed two-phase programme of the deconstruction of sexual difference
('phase' being understood as structural rather than chronological). In the first place, as
Derrida describes it, a reversal would take place in which the opposed terms would be
inverted. Thus 'woman', the previously subordinate term, might become the dominant one
in relation to 'man'. Yet because such a reversal could only repeat the traditional scheme (in
which the hierarchy of duality is always constituted) it alone could not effect any significant
change. Change would only occur, Derrida argues, through the 'second', more radical
phase of deconstruction in which a new concept would be forged simultaneously.
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Thus what we see here, is how Derrida's view of the excluded other is always binary and
oppositional, and, more importantly, subconsciously arises from a predetermined notion of
what the 'other' is. He does react to this tendency, however, although not, perhaps, from
any real understanding of the source from which it emanates:
It is the word 'concept' or 'conception' that I would in turn question in its
relationship to any essence which is rigorously or properly identifiabl1.
The concept of the concept, along with the entire system that attends it,
belongs to a prescriptive order. It is that order that a problematics of woman
and a problematics of differance, as sexual difference, should disrupt along
the way.17
This implies, then, that deconstruction aims at the removal of the concept in an attempt to
remove the hierarchies which produce, and are produced by it. One can see how Derrida is
right in his argument that the concept is necessarily prescriptive - it is prescriptive because
the mere existence of the concept means that an (or for Derrida the) alternative concept has
been excluded. Yet it is prescriptive precisely because it carries a determinate meaning,
such that to remove the concept through deconstruction does indeed become a strategy of
nihilism.
Once Derrida's misunderstanding of differance is understood, it can be shown how the
dichotomy between transcendentalism and nihilism prevails, and how Derrida avoids one
only by invoking the other. His deconstruction of sexual difference, in its later, more
radical form, is an example of how deconstruction would proceed if the misunderstanding
of differance were to be worked through and revised in the way discussed. By replacing
the binary opposed pair with the infinite possibility of heterogeneous others as I suggested
above, the result would be a levelling of hierarchies and thus a removal of the concept But
what it does, more importantly, is to show how more consistent notions of differance and
deconstruction must be nihilistic if they are to avoid transcendentalism. If nihilism is to be
avoided, then the message is clear - do not deconstruct, or at least, do not do it very well.
Sooner or later, however, deconstruction must come up against the transcendentalistlnihilist
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dichotomy.
To summarise this complex critique: It was shown how Derrida's understanding of
differance is necessarily transcendental because the single, excluded 'other' is
predetermined. Yet a proper understanding of differance unearths the nihilism apparent in
the absolutely arbitrary way that concepts come to the fore from an infinite possibility of
heterogeneous others. Because Derrida's deconstruction generally proceeds from his
misunderstanding of differance, it exhibits a transcendentalism which is at odds with his
project. Yet when he tries to counter this, as he does with his argdment in favour of the
removal of the concept, he inevitably exhibits the nihilism which is at the heart of
differance. My argument is not, therefore, that there should be a more consistent form of
deconstruction based on a better understanding of differance, but rather that because
differance, the way that meanings and concepts come to exist, is necessarily nihilistic, there
is little to be said in favour of the project of deconstruction at all.
E: Conclusion - Hermeneutics and 'Cinders'.
The debate between Derrida and hermeneutics is often an indirect one, but it is nevertheless
useful to situate Derrida in relation to hermeneutics as a way of clarifying his position. In
particular, it can be shown that Derrida's implicit critique of hermeneutics is a convincing
one. In Cinders, a recent work of Derrida's which serves to summarise his critique of
classical semiology, however, we find that he can be placed, along with Gadamer,
Habermas, and the whole hermeneutic project, squarely within the Western metaphysical
tradition.
In Truth and Method (1975), Gadamer defines his hermeneutic project as an attempt to
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understand what the human sciences 'truly are', and 'what connects them with the totality
of our experience of world'. In particular, he is concerned to resist the truth-claims of
scientific method, to question its legitimacy and to situate it within truth-claims emanating
from non-scientific modes of experience. More specifically, his explanation of truth and
understanding centres on the intrinsic historicity of the object:
• . the purpose of my investigation is . . . to discover what is common to
all modes of understanding and to show that understanding is never
subjective behaviour towards a given 'object', but towards its effective
history - the history of its influence; in other words, understanding belongs
to the being of that which is understood.18
This 'effective history' exists, for Gadamer, over and above interpretation, and means that
there is a universality of the hermeneutic viewpoint. In other words, there is a permanence
in our historical heritage which produces the definitive nature of objects prior to any
subjective interpretation of them, and that understanding of objects comes, in the main,
from this 'effective history'.
We find agreement between Derrida and Gadamer in some aspect of Gadamer's notion of
language. He says, for example, that "that which comes into language is not something that
is pre-given before language; rather it receives in the word its own definition" 19• This
implies, as with Derrida, that there is no signified outside of that which is expressed in
language. For Gadan-ier, however, while the relation between the signifier and the signified
is not the distinction maintained in the notion of a 'mirror of nature' whereby there is an
absolute separation of signifier and signified, it is rather the belief that they are one and the
same. This is different from Derrida, who could be interpreted as reading signifier and
signified as one and the same, but only insofar as the signified disappears in any absolute,
'real' sense. For Gadamer, on the other hand, "to be expressed in language does not mean
that a second being is acquired. The way in which a thing presents itself is, rather, part of
its own being" 20. In other words, the signifier is not mere linguistic representation, it is
also the 'thing itself, the signified.
80
The specific difficulty that Derrida would have with Gadamer's hermeneutics would centre
on the fact that in order to avoid contradicting his assertion that understanding is a function
of the object rather than the subject, Gadamer would have to maintain that the object, the
signified, creates its own signifier, and that this is how the two are unified, how the
signified exists in the signifier. However, this then presupposes a signified which pre-
exists its signifier - for however fleeting a moment, the signified comes first, thus placing
Gadamer within the traditional semiology of Husserl and others.
While Derrida has not entered into a debate with hermeneutics directly, Gadamer has tried
to anticipate his objections, arguing that he has not 'wandered into the dried-up pastures of
metaphysics'. Nuyen argues that such a critique from Derrida would be based on a
misinterpretation of the nature of hermeneutic understanding:
The concern is legitimate oniy if in every act of understanding, the
overcoming of otherness reaches a finality, a Hegelian end-point. . . It is in
fact a kind of understanding that always 'places itself in question', a
conversation that 'never ends', a dialogue in which 'no word is the last
word', and every word 'always gives rise to a new question'.2!
However, Derrida would not have to show that hermeneutics has a 'Hegelian terminus ad
quem', as Nuyen puts it, but only that Gadamer presupposes an a priori truth, as described
above. Haberrnas makes the same point about Gadamer, pointing out that Gadamer feels
that interpretation and understanding take place against a background of a consensus that is
reliable because it is part of the tradition. In other words, Gadamer's concept of 'effective
history' which produces the objects in which meaning is implicit, works with an always
already achieved consensus, again placing Gadamer within metaphysics.
Habermas also criticises Derrida, however, arguing that he sets out to reduce all texts to an
undifferentiated 'freeplay' of signification in his levelling of genre distinctions between
philosophy and literature22. Habermas rightly goes on to point out that such a levelling
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means that philosophy is just one 'kind of writing' among others, with no special claim to
validity or truth. More importantly, however, he notices that this will mean that the same is
true of poetry and literature, thus removing any emancipatory promise which Derrida
attributes to it. This reflects the earlier criticism of deconstruction, above, in which it was
shown that a more consistent analysis of differance would point to the absolutly arbitrary
nature of meaning. There remains a problem with Habermas, however, and that is that his
critique, instead of tackling the question of whether this unfortunate implication of
Derrida's work is nevertheless true, is determined to maintain an a priori distinction
between theoretical understanding, practical reason and aesthetic jftdgement, thus placing
his notions of 'transcendental pragmatics' and 'ideal speech situations' within
foundationalist thought along with Gadamer's 'effective history'.
The problems which hermeneutics point to in Derrida's work are therefore only problems if
one remains within the traditional philosophical schema, and from this perspective, Derrida
would have little difficulty in refuting the hermeneutic critique of his position. However,
that is not to say that Derrida's position has no internal difficulties and contradictions.
These can be exposed by a close examination of one of his more recent works, Cinders.
The whole book revolves around a single phrase, a phrase which first appeared in
Derrida's Dissemination, and has been haunting him, it seems, ever since: The phrase is 'ii
y a là cendre', with a grave accent over là so that it translates as "cinders there are", which
means both 'cinders exist' and also points to them in a place, 'there are cinders'. For
Derrida, 'cinder' is a metaphor for the sign, its existence relying on the myth that it
represents a signified, that it is what is left after that signified is burnt. But, of course,
Derrida's point is that there was never anything there to burn, never an origin, only that
which gives the impression of a reflection, a remnant of a non-existent fire: cinders. As
Ned Lukacher puts it in the Introduction,
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The fire has always already consumed access to the origin of language and
thus to the truth of being. But by leaving cinder remains, it allows the
relation between the coming of language and the truth of being to presist, to
smolder within the ashes. Cinders name both the extreme fragility and the
uncanny tenacity of this tradition.23
So in this book, Derrida is doing several things. Firstly, through the use of this metaphor,
he is reiterating his critique of classical semiology, deconstructing dfferance again, in order
to clarify his argument regarding the significance of the sign in relation to a non-existent
origin: "[The cinder] remains from what is not, in order to recall the delicate, charred
bottom of itself only non-being or non-presence"24 . Secondly, by
deconstructing/destructing the word 'cinder', by playing with it, using it and re-using it
until when he writes the word 'cinder' we no longer have the image of a cinder (ash, etc) in
our minds, he is demonstrating the separateness of the sign from that which it is supposed
to represent, the signified. That is, he is showing how the sign takes its meaning from the
other signs that surround it, from its position in a referential structure.
Thirdly, and more specifically, Derrida is not taking as his starting point the argument that
there is no such thing as the origin, but rather that as soon as we have a sign for something,
its signified, its unmediated origin, disappears:
I understand that the cinder is nothing that can be in the world, nothing that
remains as an entity. It is the being, rather, that there is - this is thç name of
the being that there is there but which, giving itself, is nothing, remains
beyond everything that is, remains unpronounceable in order to make
saying possible although it is nothing. 25 (emphasis added)
In other words, in order to appropriate a meaning we must capture it, express it, grasp it,
through a sign we must represent it. Yet in doing so, it exists solely in the sign, because the
system of signifiers, differance, then determines its meaning. In capturing a meaning
through the signifier, we lose it forever. And, because we cannot know something without
its sign, we know only signs. Signs saturate meaning, and there is nothing left over.
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Fourthly, and most importantly for an appraisal of Derrida, Cinders implies
the existence of the signified. In fact, one could not see how this book could be written
unless Derrida has in mind an absolutely idealised picture of the signified. The debate
seems to replicate the absolute distinction maintained by Plato and others between the
signifier and the signified. For Derrida, the signified is something that can never be
reached, unlike Platonic Forms. Yet it is there, nonetheless, despite his claims that cinders
are what is left after a fire that never was, the impression/representation of a non-existent
origin. For if he truly believed that there is nothing beyond the sign, surely he would not
maintain the distinction between the sign and the signified? The sign, for Derrida, would be
the signifie . The origin would not be a non-origin, it would exist in the sign. The sign
wou d be Derrida's reality, his total reality. Yet he cannot maintain a discourse, a writing or
thinking of any kind, without the notion of an origin - non-existent or otherwise. Imagine,
for example, that Derrida has completely taken on board his own claims about the non-
existence of the signified, the free-play of signifiers; his thought, his writing, would
contain no reference to the non-existence of the origin, or the signified, because it would be
all there in the sign. He would write and think as if the sign were his total reality, all
meaning forever only in the sign.
This point is worth emphasising, for it is fundamental to the whole
deconstructionistlpostmodernist debate. Derrida is protesting about the notion that signs
represent something more real, that the sign is secondary to the signified. We can never get
past the sign, he says, it forever defers the signified, and anyway, the meaning and use of
the sign is determined by difference, by its position in a referential structure of other signs:
all signs and no signifieds. Derrida's ultimate critique, therefore is aimed at the
philosophical tradition which desires to know an unmediated signified. However, unless
Derrida himself maintains a distinction between signifier and signified, he is replicating
this. In asserting that the totality of meaning and reality is to be found within the sign, he is
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saying that truth is in the word and the word is God. Never mind how the meaning of the
word is determined (this, after all, could be reduced to the nature/culture debate), if there is
nothiigbuttletextext, then the text is everything - it is Derrida's transcendental signified, and
it is more immediate than Platonic Forms. The significance attached to the signified in
traditional Western metaphysics is simply transferred to the sign.
To avoid this conclusion, Derrida must argue that the truth and reality accorded to the sign,
is somehow less true, less real, than that previously accorded to the signified. If we accept
that Derrida is correct in his assertion that the meaning of a particular sign is derived solely
from its position in relation to other signs, then does this somehow make it less real?
Derrida is damned if it does, and damned if it does not. If it does not, then he is, as
described above, transferring to the sign the significance previously attached to a
transcendental signified - he is turning it into the Platonic Form of the twentieth century. If,
however, the fact that the sign is determined by a linguistic system of differences does
somehow make it less real, then we must ask 'less real than what?', and this implies that
Derrida has in mind an unachievable, idealised transcendental signified, thus replicating the
secondary position accorded to the sign in traditional semiology.
There is, of course, a third alternative to the above two ways in which Derrida replicates the
traditional significance of the sign, and that is the removal of any significnce whatsoever,
as was implied in his deconstruction of sexual difference. The nihilism which goes hand-
in-hand with this alternative approach, however, removes all support for a project of
deconstruction. Such a project can only be supported by attaching some significance to
meaning, which, as we have seen, necessarily replicates Western metaphysics, thereby /
reducing deconstruction to mere critique-_-_.
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PART H - THE SELF.
A: Introduction.
Derrida points out that the individual has been defined and redefined, and that this
illustrates that the subject is not a formal identity. Rather, he argues, the production of these
definitions depends on external influences of which one must become aware. 26 This
perspective has led some critics to accuse Derrida of annihilating the very idea of the human
subject in his determination to dispense with all centralising agencies of meaning.
However, Derrida has argued that:
To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence. There are
subjects, 'operations' or 'effects' of subjectivity. This is an incontrovertible
fact. To acknowledge this does not mean, however, that the subject is what
it says it is. The subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or identity,
some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language. My
work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to resituate
it.27
Derrida's 'resituation' of the subject emanates from his linguistic analysis, whereby
subjectivity, like objectivity, is inscribed in a system of differance. This redescription of the
self emancipates it from previously prescriptive notions of identity, but it can be shown that
to do this effectively, such a project results in nihilistic implications. In an effort to avoid
such implications, Derrida introduces the notion of 'invention' as an interplay of subject
and object. Yet this almost existentialist view of the self seems to exacerbate, rather than
overcome, the difficulty of finding a 'middle way' between the old transcendental concept
of 'being' and the nihilism encountered by Derrida's attempt to free the subject.
Manifestations of these confused vacillations can be found in a detailed examination of how
Derrida separates speech acts from the speaker, ultimately exposing a covert
transcendentalism in his desire to emancipate an idealised self.
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B: The Deconstruction and Resituation of the Subject.
As with his linguistic analysis of differance, meaning is dependent upon signs. Not only,
asserts Derrida, can we not comprehend an object immediately and without the sign, it is
also the case that mental phenomena can take place only via the mediatin of signs.
Furthermore, the deferral of an immediate self-consciousness is permanent and infinite;
'Being' exists only in the realm of signs:
Subjectivity - like objectivity - is an effect of dfferance, an effect inscribed
in a system of dfferance. That is why the a of dfferance also recalls the fact
that spacing is temporisation, detour, delay via which intuition, perception,
consumption, in a word the relationship to the present, the reference to a
present reality, to a being (étant), are always deferred. Deferred precisely
because of the principle of difference, which means that an element only
functions and signifies, only takes or gives 'meaning' ('sens') by referring
to another past or future element in an economy of traces.28
In other words, Derrida believes differance to be a condition of self consciousness. That is,
one cannot be self-aware without signs, and in thinking of oneself through signs, the
signified (oneself) is forever deferred. This is because, he argues, the self, the subject, is
no different from the object, in that it is located within a system of signs. In the same way
that the object, as a signified, is forever deferred because of the necessary conceptualisation
of it through a system of signifiers, the subject too is constituted by the signifying rules of
its formation. As Manfred Frank points out, "Instead of the play of reflection attesting or
confirming the identity of what is reflecting with what is reflected, the detour through
reflection is sufficient to deprive the self of its identity forever".29
For Derrida, the importance of this removal of identity lies in the fact that it erases
prescriptivity along with it. By redescribing subjectivity as an effect of differance, Derrida
points to the arbitrary nature of the relationship between the signifier and the signified,
between prevailing concepts of what it is to be human, and what it actually is to be human.
In particular, he seems to have an emancipatory vision of sexuality once the privileged
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status of existing identities are removed:
• . . What if we were to approach here (for one does not arrive at this as
one would at a determined location) the area of a relationship to the other
where the code of sexual marks would no longer be discriminating? The
relationship would not be a-sexual, far from it, but would be sexual
otherwise: beyond the binary difference that governs the decorum of all
codes, beyond the opposition feminine-masculine, beyond bi-sexuality as
well, beyond homosexuality and heterosexuality, which come to the same
thing. . . I would like to believe in the multiplicity of sexually maiked
voices.30
Derrida is attempting to avoid privileging the 'other' of prevailing notions of sexuality so
that he cannot be accused of replicating the old schema of determinate sexual identity by
producing a new hierarchy. But as was noted in the section on Deconstruction, above, he
can only do this by removing the concept altogether, meaning, in this case, that he removes
the self. That is, a Derridean deconstruction of the self can only remain internally coherent
if it involves a removal of all definitions of what it is to be human, and when one bears in
mind the starting point of Derrida's analysis of the subject, the deferral of self-
consciousness, this seet
	 point to an inevitable nihilism.
C: The Human Reality Behind the Sign.
Despite the implication in his argument that 'being' is forever deferred, that subjectivity is
constituted externally through the sign and differance, there sometimes appears to be a
reticence, on Derrida's part, to sustain the implications of such a position. As Michel Hoar
points out: "The yes, says Derrida, necessarily comes back to itself, refers back to its self..
But this yes, again ambiguous, congeals, becomes immobilized, surprised by its
audacity, as if it were afraid to recognize. . . its force." 3 1 Indeed, if it was not for the fact
that Derrida has plainly stated that differance has a determining role in the signs which
necessarily defer self-consciousness, one could see how his deconstruction of sexual
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difference, for example, could lead to an almost existentialist view of the self. That is,
instead of pointing to nihilism, the removal of determining concepts and prescriptive
definitions of identity could result in a kind of infinite freedom to be self-forming.
In Psyche: Inventions of the Other, for example, Derrida's analysis of 'inyention', in
relation to the self, gives quite a different impression of subjectivity to that discussed
elsewhere. He poses the following questions: Why is it that invention cannot be reduced to
the discovery, the revelation, or the unveiling of truth? No more than it can be reduced to
the creation, the imagination, or the production of the thing? In other words, Derrida sees
invention as an interplay of object and subject, deriving neither solely from one or the
other. This argument, that there is a human reality behind the sign, is necessaly for Derrida
to prescribe deconstruction as an emancipatory project. More importantly, however, it
brings to the fore the contradictions in his concept of the self which stem from his desire to
avoid both a transcendental notion of being, and nihilism.
D: Conclusion - Idealised Being.
The specific manifestations of these contradictions can be found in Derrida's discussion of
the 'speaking subject'. Derrida argues that the speaker is not present in his discourse, and
provides two main reasons for this; differance and the iterability of the sign, and the
'boundless context' of the speech act. In both of these cases, however, it can be shown that
Derrida's arguments ultimately rely upon an idealised, transcendental notion of the self.
The concept of differance, as was discussed earlier, entails that presence is always
deferred. But it will also be remembered that the meaning of a particular sign is determined
by difference, by its oppositional relationship to the non-present 'other'. Since meaning is
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determined by the 'systematic play of differences' and the iterability of the sign is governed
by the rules which make it possible, argues Derrida, meaning must be an effect of
language, and cannot, therefore, emanate from the outside world or the speaking subject:
there can be no pre-linguistic self-consciousness:
'Language is not a function of the speaking subject.' This implies that the
subject (self-identity or even consciousness of self-identity, elf-
consciousness) is inscribed in language, that he is a 'function' of the
language. He becomes a speaking subject only by conforming his speech..
to a system of differences. . . to the general law of clifferance.32
So on the one hand, Derrida seems to see the system of differences as the law of
differance, external to the subject, and almost transcendental. Th subject exists only by
entering into a system of differences - he is situated, even produced, made by that system.
The meaning of a speech act is determined by conventions and the place of the word in a
system of signs, rather than by the intentions of the speaker. Yet Derrida talks of the
subject conforming his speech to a system of differences. What would the subject's speech
sound like before it was thus conformed? That is, Derrida implies a more real speech, or at
least, a pre-linguistic concept or meaning which is then bastardized as it comes imdem the
influence of differance in an attempt to express itself linguistically.
Derrida's second reason for his argument that the speaker is not present in his speech
centres on Austin's point that the meaning of words in a speech act are determined by the
context in which they are spoken. While Derrida agrees with this, he goes on to argue that
the context can never be completely specified. From this, he argues that as the meaning of
speech acts is neverthiess determined by their context, the speaker cannot know what the
meaning of his speech will be. That is, if we cannot fully describe the context which gives
our speech meaning, we cannot intend what we say, we cannot be fully present in our
utterances.
Yet this argument only makes sense if one has a very idealised view of being. The
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effectiveness of our speech acts, being able to fulfill a promise for example, has no bearing
on whether we are 'fully present in our speech acts'. Our inability to fully specify the
context in which we speak does not effect our 'being'. This would only be the case if we
could argue that we would be present in our speech acts if only we could account for every
aspect of the context in which we speak. The fact that this cannot be done as Derrida
rightly points out in his criticism of Austin, does not bring the relation of 'being' and
contextualisation closer together. What it should show, is that 'being' is unrelated to
contextualisation of speech acts. To summarise this point in simple terms: Derrida can only
argue that non-being relies upon our inability to fully specify the context in which we
speak, if he were to believe that 'being' relies upon an ability to fully specify that context.
His argument that we can never fully specify that context because it is infmite therefore
bears no relation to what 'being' is. In other words, to measure 'being' against a non-
existent ideal is senseless unless one secretly believes in that ideal as a realistic criterion.
The criticisms which can be made of Derrida's concept of the self closely parallel those
made of deconstruction in general: Derrida's critique of the transcendental signified (in this
case 'being') must ultimately rely upon a transcendental notion of a lost origin. If Derrida
were able to give up his idealised notion of 'being', he would remove the problem, as R.
Talus explains,
The question of the context of acts can be approached in a non-Derridean
spirit. The boundless text of society which no one can fully specify but
which is requisite for acts to have their special meanings is not necessarily
alien to the actors. It is arguable that the sum of our contexts, of
circumstances, is what we are; or rather we are that in virtue of which all of
this loci are specified or designated as contexts. There is no absolute
difference between the self that has a context and the context that surrounds
To put it slightly differently, a far more coherent view of the self than Derrida's would be
to see it as fully constructed by a system of signifiers such that the meaning intended by the
speaker in his speech act is also the meaning constructed by the system of signifiers. In this
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way, there is no 'seW that is separate from, and compromised by, the need to conform to
the linguistic system. The system of signifiers is not 'outside' of the self, but forms the
self.
Derrida cannot rid his work of its transcendental aspects, however, for to çlo so would
mean that deconstruction would lose its emancipatory force. The entire project would come
tumbling down if it were not for the fact that, hidden in his work somewhere, is the
assumption that human nature is somehow being distorted by the prevailing hierarchies. If
Derrida were to fully take on board the fact that subjectivity is ãnstituted by context,
including differance, then the distinction he maintains between sign and signified would
disappear, and as was noted in relation to Cinders, the sign (in this case the speech act)
would replace the signified ('being'); speech would signify not deferred presence, but
presence itself.
In everyday language, of course, speech is taken to imply presence. Yet, as Habermas
argues, Derricla levels these genre distinctions, and as Talus points out, "Derrida is caught
up in an absurd confusion of levels - between metaphysical absolutes and the ordinary
senses of words; or between the absolutes of the metaphysician and the facts of everyday
experience"34. Thus if Derrida were to rethink his work in a way that would no longer
maintain the distinction between signifier and signified, his notion of the self would closely
resemble the everyday idea of what it is to be human. This does not detract from his
insights regarding, for example, the arbitrary nature of hierarchies of meaning or the
contextualised nature of 'being'. Rather, it is the transformation of these observations into a
prescription for deconstruction through a covert introduction of a transcendental view of the
self that causes problems for Derrida. Tallis attempts to sum up this complex critique as
follows:
That a literary critic should have his daily practice influenced by the
'discovery' that the external world is only an effect of language, and
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consequently write and try to publish one kind of article rather than another,
is rather like a sports commentator deriving the superiority of cricket over
football from the discovery that the 'outside world' (including playing
fields) is a mental construct.35
In other words, Derrida seems to believe that a readjustment of our academic assumptions
can have a desirable effect on our everyday practices. There are two problens. with this.
Firstly, there is the question of whether his insights regarding the human condition could
provoke a change in everyday ontology. The answer is a most definite 'no', and highlights
the inevitably nihilistic implications of such a view of human nature. To carry on with
normal life while having an awareness of our lack of intention and 'being' would require a
kind of 'ego-splitting'. But even if it could be shown that such an outlook could be
desirable in some way, it would not be logically possible at the personal level. To believe
that one is not 'present' in one's speech or thought is still to believe something, after all.
For as soon as we try to take on board Derrida's concept of the subject, we instantly refute
it by thinking it. Another example from Tails serves to illustrate the point:
By abolishing intention from speech - or treating the idea that what we say
is informed by our intentions as an aspect of the logocentric fallacy - then
we must abolish intention from our entire lives. This conclusion must be
unpalatable to Derrida himself. After all, he must have, in some sense,
intended to write Of Grammatology rather than to earn his living as a
harpooner or a tatooist.36
That is not to say that Derrida's interpretation of human nature is completely wrong - I am
not trying to simply restate Descartes - but rather that it is useless. This takes us to the
second problem. Why should it be desirable to have an awareness of our 'non-being'?
What we find in Derrida, ultimately, is the desire to get at 'the truth of the matter', and this
comes, not from contextualisation, but rather from the fact that, at the end of the day, he
has a nostalgic, transcendental and idealised view of what it is to be human. Again, to
measure 'being' against a non-existent ideal is senseless unless one secretly believes in that
ideal as a realistic criterion.
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PART Ill - POLITICS AND SOCIETY.
A: Introduction.
Despite Derrida's turn to the political in his later works, there are two interrelated reasons
which suggest that there can be no political implications of his earlier philosophical
insights. Firstly, the sense of deferral in differance implies that any political stance which
believes itself to be based on a 'truer' understanding of man and society is always
mistaken: there are no Platonic Forms, no models to imitate, no 'good' or 'bad' by which
we could judge a political system. Secondly, Derrida argues that the very concept of the
concept necessarily belongs to a prescriptive order, and it is this prescriptivity which
deconstruction aims to disrupt and expose as foundationless. In other words, because the
concept as such implies the existence of an origin, a signified, it already defines 'truth' and
necessarily prescribes that this truth be represented as closely as possible. In political
terms, for example, determinate concepts such as 'man' and 'society' carry with them
prescriptions for specific ideologies and political structures. So, from Derrida's point of
view, the first point illustrates that it is only by mistaking the sign for the signified, in the
form of determinate concepts of some kind, that we could have a political position at all.
The second point shows that any attempt to describe man or society 'the way it really is'
will necessarily be prescriptive.
Derridean deconstruction is political, nonetheless. The political stance implicit in
deconstruction evolves from the covert critical edge which Derrida gives to his concept of
dfferance. Derrida's insists on the binary nature of differance, for every sign there is one
excluded 'other'. Yet as was discussed earlier, there must be an infinite number of
excluded others for every sign which makes its way into our conceptual system. Once this
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is established, the critical aspect of differance can be shown to be groundless - exclusion is
inevitable in the production of meaning. So Derrida's concentration on the single excluded
other covertly introduces critique into what should be simply a description of how
meanings are made. It is only this introduction of critique, however, that can provide the
motivations for the project of deconstruction. In practice, the deconstruction f tradillonal
hierarchies means overturning existing privileged concepts in order to expose what Derrida
sees as the previously downgraded 'other'.
Thus Derrida's interpretation of differance already casts the politicaf die for deconstruction:
to celebrate the marginal. And the marginal, in relation to the dominant political trends in
the West this century, is generally encapsulated by the Left. Indeed, it has been argued that
"there is no doubt that Derridean deconstruction was a political project from the outset, or
that Jacques Derrida himself, in some suitably indeterminate sense, has always been a man
of the Left"37, and that "deconstruction', if there is such a thing, always already moves
within a certain spirit of Marx"38. This political characteristic of deconstruction is
manifested in Derrida's more recent works, The Other Heading (1992) and Specters of
Marx (1994), which attempt, respectively, to deconstruct liberal democracy and to offer a
reinterpretation of the 'spirit of Marxism' as the basis for what Derrida calls 'The New
International'.
An analysis of these two books, however, indicates that the bias, in Derrida's description
of differance, is not simply in favour of the marginal per Se, but leans, specifically,
towards freedom and equality. This means that Derrida's 'critique' of liberal democracy
comes from within, and rather than questioning its legitimacy, strives to make its practice
more consistent with its ideals through a radically reinterpreted (even misinterpreted) 'spirit
of Marxism'. The contradiction can be seen, for example, in the reductive nature of
Derrida's position that "if the Enlightenment has given us human rights, political liberties
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and responsibilities, it would surely be out of the question to want to do away with the
Enlightenment project39. This is reductive because, as Derrida seems to forget, he has
already provided us with very good reasons to regard the Enlightenment project as
fundamentally flawed. Yet his initial insights into the Enlightenment project are ignored as
he fails to critically analyse the origins and justification of liberal democratic ideals, and in
the end, his new concept of Marxism is revealed as a charade which attempts to hide his
support for an idealised liberal democracy.
B: Derrida's Critique of Liberal Democracy.
The significance of the title of Derrida's book The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's
Europe, plays on the French translation of the word 'heading' as cap. He interprets this in
several ways. Firstly, he says, he was thinking of 'heading' in terms of a direction, so by
'the other heading' he is referring to the other of the heading (direction) of Europe. He goes
on to distinguish between the feminine la capitale, the capital city of a country, and the
masculine le capital, meaning capital in the monetary sense. His aim is to analyse and
deconstruct the current direction of European identity in terms of both of these senses of
capital.
Derrida argues that European cultural identity cannot and must not be dispersed into a
multiplicity of little nationalisms, but neither should it accept the capital (la capitale) of a
centralizing authority:
If it is necessary to make sure that a centralizing hegemony (the capital) not
be reconstituted, it is also necessary, for all that, not to multiply the borders.
It is necessary not to cultivate for their own sake minority differences,
untranslatable idiolects, national antagonisms, or the chauvinisms of
idioms. Responsibility seems to consist today in renouncing neither of these
two contradictory imperatives. One must therefore try to invent gestures,
discourses, politico-institutional practices that inscribe the alliance of these
two promises or contracts: the capital and the a-capital, the other of the
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capital.40
In this way, Derrida seems to have pin-pointed the tensions within liberal democracy
between the two extremes of homogeneity and heterogeneity. The tendency towards these
two extremes, he appears to argue, emanates from liberal democracy itself, and measures
must be taken to ensure a balance between these two contradictory injunctions. .
Derrida also talks of the extremes of le capital in the monetary sense, arguing that we need
a new way of taking capital into account while avoiding not only the
frightening totalitarian dogmatism that some of us have known how to resist
up until now, but also and simultaneously, the counter-dogmatism that is
setting in today. . . Is it not necessary to have the courage and lucidity for a
new critique of the new effects of capital (within unprecedented techno-
social structures)?. . Is it not also necessary to resist with vigilance the neo-
capitalist exploitation of the breakdown of an anti-capitalist dogmatism in
those states that had incorporated it?41
In other words, Derrida wants a critique of contemporary capitalism in Europe, without
simply offering an alternative which would be akin to the totalitarianism of the old
communist states, while also guarding against the neo-capitalism that has sprung up in
those states now.
Derrida's desire for a balance between such extremes can be understood, in the first place,
as a backlash against the postmodern reaction to capital in both the senses he describes.
That is, the initial Derridean reaction to la capitale and le capital reverses the traditional
hierarchy imposed by the Enlightenment project, a project which posits and perpetuates
homogeneous and free-market interpretations. The deconstructive reversal implies
heterogeneity and socialism, but Derrida quite rightly realises that such a reversal would
replace the traditional structure of hierarchy, and thus looks for an almost pragmatic
solution (we could even say a synthesis) in order to avoid these extremes.
However, it could be argued that both of the oppositional interpretations of la capitale and
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le capital emanate from the values of the Enlightenment: freedom and equality. In other
words, the contradictions - homogeneity versus heterogeneity, capitalism versus socialism,
are a result not of a reaction to liberal democratic values, but the product of the tensions
within liberal democracies and liberal democratic ideals. If this is the case, Derrida's
position is situated within the parameters of the liberal democratic debate, \rather than
opposed to it.
Now, of course it could be argued that Derrida cannot stand outside of liberal democracy,
criticise it from a 'neutral' position, without invoking epistemo1ogiiaI assumptions which
are antithetical to his critique of the Enlightenment and classical semiology, and so,
therefore, the only way forward for his discourse must be a discussion of the internal
coherency of liberal democratic theory and practice. However, what we find in Derrida is a
complete lack of analysis regarding the justifiability of liberal democratic ideals in the first
place. He seems to have forgotten that he has undermined the raison d'être of the
Enlightenment project. So tackling the contradictions which he so rightly highlights is a
pure volte-face; it is an attempt to perfect a theoiy/practice which results from a misbegotten
project. The apparent 'deconstruction' of liberal democracy does not continue his earlier
critique of Enlightenment fallacies, but instead covertly jumps into Enlightenment
manifestations without attempting to critically analyse their source. That is, he assumes that
liberal democracy is good and desirable per Se, and that the only difficulty is in preventing
it from becoming either too fractured or too totalising. This then distracts, or even
excludes, discourse which might, from an anti-Enlightenment perspective, argue that
human rights and political liberties (for example) are unjustified, because Derrida's
'critique' gives the impression of having dealt with all fundamental questions in this regard.
That Derrida seems to have in mind some kind of 'golden mean', in terms of a liberal
democratic ideal, is further indicated by his analysis of the tendency to extremes in
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European cultural identity in relation to language:
What philosophy of translation will dominate in Europe? In a Europe that
from now on should avoid both the nationalistic tensions of linguistic
difference and the violent homogenization of languages through the
neutrality of a translating medium that would claim to be transparent,
metalinguistic, and universal?42
Why should Derrida be concerned to avoid these things specifically? Firstly, 'ationalistic
tensions of linguistic difference' are contra to European democracy, because democracy, by
its very nature, requires shared values and abidance by majorities. Secondly, 'the violent
homogenization of languages' is contra to liberty. In each of the specific 'extremes' cited
by Derrida, we find a description of tendencies which detract froni the liberal democratic
ideal. Yet, as with the Aristotelian 'golden mean', this is posited as a form of neutrality. It
does not seem to cross Derrida's mind that these extremes are direct manifestations of
liberal democracy itself, of the contradictions inherent in the Enlightenment ideals of
freedom and equality. With this in mind, it appears that Derrida's desire to avoid these
extremes comes not from a critique of the Enlightenment project which gave birth to this
ideal, but from the wish to purify it, to keep liberal democratic practice liberal and
democratic.
Derrida talks of the need to guard against aiming for, or believing that we have achieved,
transparency in discourse:
Claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense, common sense,
or the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very things,
and as if naturally, to discredit anything that complicates this model. It tends
to suspect or repress anything that bends, overdetermines, or even
questions, in theory or in practice, this idea of language.43
Again, this demonstrates that Derrida is aware of the contradictions within liberal
democratic practice, aware of the fact that liberal 'freedom' is not absolute freedom, but that
it has its own specific list of values. But Derrida's motivation for guarding against the
imposition of homogeneous discursive norms springs not from an insight into the
incoherencies of liberal democracy, but from his desire to remain true to liberal democratic
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ideals. He talks, for instance, of the multiplication of European projects that are explicitly
'pluralistic, democratic and tolerant', and says that "we can be happy about this, provided
our attention does not lapse. For it is necessary that we learn to detect, in order then to
resist, new forms of cultural takeover" 44. So it could be said that Derrida himself is
assuming a form of transparency, exposed in his vigilante approach to keeping liberal
democracy pure.
There are a couple of points to be made in relation to Derrida's concerns regarding
'transparency'. Firstly, it could be argued that we cannot but oi5erate with a notion of
transparency, with the belief that, in some sense, our norms and our ontological concepts
are 'true'. Secondly, that if we did not live and think like this, there would be an infinite
regression. In other words, if it were not for the fact that Derrida inadvertently assumes a
transparency of some kind, a 'truth' in his representations, where would he stop? He
would not be able to be 'happy' about the 'pluralistic, democratic and tolerant' projects in
Europe, because this does, on his own terms, assume the kind of transparency which he
feels it necessary to guard against.
Derrida points to the gap between public opinion and the representation of public opinion:
if it had a proper place (but that is the whole question), public opinion
would be the forum for a permanent and transparent discussion. It would be
opposed to non-democratic powers, but also to its own political
representation. Such representation will never become adequate to it, for it
breathes, deliberates and decides according to other rhythms.45.
In other words, the media through which public opinion is expressed, even produced and
constituted, are always imprecise in their representations. But there are other, less explicit,
assumptions exhibited in this extract. Firstly, Derrida assumes that public opinion is
important, and that therefore it is desirable to represent it as accurately as possible.
Secondly, he assumes that public opinion is always in favour of democracy. Thirdly, he
states that public opinion is opposed to its own political representation. Finally, he believes
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that the representation of public opinion is a poor imitation of the 'real thing'.
These assumptions are all problematic. Firstly, as has been discussed, Derrida seems to
believe that democracy is a priori good, so it comes as no surprise that he values public
opinion in itself. That this position nevertheless remains unanalysed by Derrila is further
supported by his assumption that public opinion is always in favour of democracy,
although the two are plainly not synonymous. The last two assumptions indicate that
Derrida has a highly idealised notion of liberal democracy. By separating representation
from that which it represents, Derrida is replicating the separation of sign and signified. To
maintain this distinction and to sketch a situation in which the representation (the sign)
could be by-passed, or at least appropriated more accurately, exhibits an unexamined
idealism which is antithetical to the very starting point which gave rise to Derridean
deconstruction.
C: Derrida and Marxism.
Derrida's book Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the
New International (1994) continues the theme in The Other Heading. It compares the
failures in liberal democratic practice with the liberal democratic ideal as characterised by
'the New World Order' in Fukuyama's The End of History and The Last Man (1992). In
particular, Derrida is concerned with the self-congratulatory optimism in the West that has
followed events such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the 'global triumph of free
market economies' in the late eighties and early nineties. As with The Other Heading,
Derrida wants to guard against hegemony and neo-capitalism without going to the other
extremes of nationalistic heterogeneity or old-style communism. To this end, he proposes a
radical reinterpretation of the 'spirit' of Marxism. This reinterpretation, however, emerges
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as a misinterpretation of Marxism, one which, in the end, is aimed at positing a more
rigorous adherence to an idealised liberal democracy.
Derrida begins by stating that the ghost of Marxism has never gone away:
In proposing this title Specters of Marx, I was initially thinking of all the
forms of a certain haunting obsession that seems to me to organise'.the
dominant influence on discourse today. At a time when a new world
disorder is attempting to install its neo-capitalism and neo-liberalism, no
disavowal has managed to rid itself of all of Marx's ghosts. Hegemony still
organizes the repression and thus the confirmation of a haunting.46
By this he means that, as the 'other' of the prevalent political discourse, Marxism serves to
define that discourse in more unified terms. What is more, the very hegemonic nature of the
status quo, relying as it does on Marxism for the hegemony which sets its boundaries,
ensures the continuing existence of Marxism through its repression. By phrasing the
situation in such a way, Derrida attempts to provide the motivation for a deconstruction of
the status quo in a manner which will avoid seeming arbitrary or partisan because it is
simply invoking a temporary reversal of the existing hierarchy.
As the excluded 'other' of today's privileged concepts, Marxism, for Derrida, provides a
space from which to criticise neo-liberalism and neo-capitalism. But this is not the Marxism
of old. Derrida believes that we can delineate a certain 'spirit' of Marxism from traditional
Marxist ideology, and suggests that the word conjuration sums up this spirit: "If Marx had
written his Manifesto in my language, and if he had had some help with it, as a Frenchman
can always dream of doing, I am sure that he would have played on the word
conjuration"47. Derrida goes on to define this term: "A conjuration, then, is first of all an
alliance, to be sure, sometimes a political alliance, more or less secret, if not tacit, a plot or
a conspiracy. It is a matter of neutralizing a hegemony or overturning some power."48 In
this way, Derrida is extracting the critical aspect of Marxism in the senses in which it is
compatible with deconstruction. As he puts it, "To continue to take inspiration from a
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certain spirit of Marxism would be to keep faith with what has always made of Marxism in
principle and first of all a radical critique, namely a procedure ready to undertake its self-
critique"49.
Derrida is aware, of course, that many aspects of Marxism are antitheticalto his own
postmodern stance, and that this means that he must reject these 'spirits' of Marxism:
We would distinguish this spirit from other spirits of Marxism, those that
rivet it to the body of Marxist doctrine, to its supposed systemic,
metaphysical, or ontological totality (notably to its 'dialectical method' or to
'dialectical materialism'), to its fundamental concepts of labor, mode of
production, social class, and consequently to the whole history of its
apparatuses.5°
So not only does Derrida want to distance himself from the ideological nature of Marxism,
he also rejects the political manifestations of Marxism this century - 'the whole history of
its apparatuses'. Yet he sees Marxism as more than simply an analytical tool for political
theory. Derrida notes that
people would be ready to accept the return of Marx or the return to Marx, on
the condition that a silence is maintained about Marx's injunction not just to
decipher but to act and to make the deciphering into a transformation that
'changes the world'. . . It is something altogether other that I wish to
attempt here as I turn or return to Marx.5'
So Derrida believes that his chosen 'spirit' of Marxism can provide a political imperative to
act without invoking the metaphysical aspects of Marxist doctrine, and without resulting in
the totalitarian regimes that have been connected with Marxism in the past..
Derrida's chosen 'spirit of Marxism' centres on the idea of permanent critique, but more
specifically, critique for the purpose of emancipation:
Now, if there is a spirit of Marxism which I will never be ready to
renounce, it is not only the critical idea or the questioning stance. . . It is
even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain
experience of the promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics
and even from any metaphysico-religious determination from any
messianism. And a promise must promise to be kept, that is, not to remain
'spiritual' or 'abstract', but to produce events, new effective forms of
action, practice, organization, and so forth.52
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It is quite clear that Derrida wants to equate this spirit of Marxism with deconstruction:
Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as
undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, a
certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the
formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a
messianic without messianism, an idea of justice - which we distinguish
from law or right and even human rights - and an idea of democracy - which
we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates
today.53
The above extracts tell us several things. Firstly, it is clear that Derrida reinterprets
Marxism as deconstruction. That is, he highlights those aspects of Marxism which are not
reducible to an ideology, and in doing so, seems to attempt to justify deconstruction in the
same way. Secondly, the aspect of Marxismldeconstruction which is over and above
ideology is, according to Derrida, its emancipatory spirit. This tells us, in no uncertain
terms, what Derrida wants from deconstruction, what deconstruction is about. This
separation of the 'spirit' from the practical actuality also implies a transcendentalism in
Derrida's thought - the 'idea' of justice, the 'idea' of democracy, as with the emancipatory
'spirit' of Marxismldeconstruction. It is the maintenance of this dichotomy between theory
and practice which characterises the difficulties in Derridean thought. He cannot marry the
two, because this would produce an ideology, and this is why his discussion of Marxism
always backs away from the practical. Yet, as we saw with Cinders, these efforts to avoid
a replication of the ideological approach to philosophy and politics are always doomed.
Doomed because it inevitably involves a distinction between theory and practice, between
the signified and the signifier. As a result of this, we find in Derrida's work a flitting
between a transcendental idealism on the one hand, and an inability to say anything at all on
the other.
In reinterpreting Marxism as critique and emancipation, Derrida is simply disregarding all
those aspects of Marxism which do not coincide with his definition of deconstruction. By
renaming deconstruction 'Marxism' (which is what he is doing), he can introduce it to
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political practice in a way which would have attracted much criticism if it had remained
'deconstruction'. Similarly, by renaming Marxism 'deconstruction', he can reintroduce it to
political discourse in a way which he hopes will lose the totalitarian intonation. But this is a
sleight of hand. Derrida is using (abusing) Marxism for his own purposes. Deconstruction,
on its own, cannot even be called a method, let alone a political practice, withqut exposing
internal contradictions and incoherencies. But by extracting those aspects of Marxism
which can be directly translated as deconstruction, Derrida can use this 'spirit' of Marxism
to do deconstruction's dirty work.
These difficulties can be better understood if we take a closer look at the similarities and
differences between Marxism and deconstruction. Firstly, on a superficial level, one can
see how Marx, like Derrida, wanted to point to contradictions in the status quo, and to
show how the privileged status of certain concepts (and social groups) does not arise
naturally, but through domination and repression. Therefore, Marx, again like Derrida,
wanted to temporarily reverse this hierarchy in order to bring about a new state of affairs.
So, on the one hand, Marx's work was purely descriptive, an explanation of the dynamics
of social and economic history, and that element of Marxism is not incompatible with
deconstruction.
On the other hand, there is arguably an element of prescriptivity in Marx. This arises from
the more specific aspects of his description of historical change, a description that would
not see deconstruction as necessary. Marx has a concept of the 'natural'. This can be found
in his understanding of alienation and false consciousness. It is this aspect of Marxism
which explains the step from description to prescription. More importantly, it forms the
background to his 'description' of contradiction and historical change. So, unlike
deconstruction, Marxism has a concept of 'natural man' from which it develops notions of
right and wrong. It is this which allows Marx to join his 'description' of historical change
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to a prescription for activities which will help to bring about such change.54
Once it is understood how all of Marx's work is imbued with this prescriptivity, how, in
fact, Marxism would not be Marxism without it, we can see how Marxism and
deconstruction are, and must be, fundamentally different. Marx, like Heidegger, ultimately
wanted to reinstate an unalienated origin to remove the distortions which produce an
inauthentic existence. So whilst there may be many 'spirits' of Marxism, the desire for
authenticity haunts all of them, and it is this which makes it fundamentally incompatible
with deconstruction. More importantly, what this points to are the hidden normative
assumptions in deconstruction, and in particular, Derrida's desire to privilege freedom as
the very raison d'être of deconstruction.
So Derridean Marxism is not Marxism at all: it is deconstruction. And what this analysis
tells us about deconstruction, is that it is ultimately no more than a discursive tool for the
purpose of emancipation. Even the foundation stone of Derrida's deconstructive enterprise
- dfferance - predetermines the single excluded 'other' as one which always lends itself to
the project of emancipation. But this is not any kind of freedom, it is liberal democratic
freedom, as becomes apparent in Derrida's discussion of Fukuyama.
Derrida quotes Fukuyama's argument that "While some present-day countries might fall to
achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, more primitive
forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the ideal of liberal democracy could not
be improved on" 55 . Derrida argues that Fukuyama's book, The End of History and The
Last Man, ignores the differences between the liberal democratic ideal and the experience of
actual liberal democracies. So the criticism which Derrida raises against the above extract is
that instead of recognising the problems that exist within liberal democracies, Fukuyama
would see these problems as existing outside of liberal democracy, and label the societies in
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which they exist as 'theocratic' or 'dictatorial'. In other words, Fukuyama refers only to
the aspects of liberal democracies which are compatible with the liberal democratic ideal.
So, as with The Other Heading, Derrida is pointing, in Specters of Marx, to the fact that
liberal democratic practice does not live up to the democratic ideal. However, he is not
taking issue with Fukuyama's comment that "the ideal of liberal democracy could not be
improved on".
Derrida states:
By hiding from themselves all these failures and all these threats, people
would like to hide from the potential - force and virtuality - of what we will
call the principle and even, still in the figure of irony, the spirit of the
Marxist critique.56
But this 'spirit' of Marx, it must be remembered, is no more than a hope for emancipation
through permanent critique. And this critique, as Derrida applies it, exists for the purpose
of exposing "all these failures and all these threats", not in order to replace the ideals of
liberal democracy with those of Marxism, but rather in the hope that the gap between liberal
democratic practice and the liberal democratic ideal be lessened. So rather than seeing the
problems with liberal democratic practice as evidence that the ideal is flawed, Derrida
believes that it is necessary to resurrect a 'spirit of Marxism' (or, more accurately, the
'spirit of liberalism') in order that the ideal be appropriated more closely.
D: The New International.
Derrida suggests, as a way of maintaining the ideals of liberal democracy, 'The New
International'. This is a vague term, for while on the one hand he states that it should be
"an alliance without institution . . . inspired by at least one of the spirits of Marx or of
Marxism" 57 , on the other, he seems to interpret this concept in more specific terms as an
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international law and government:
International law should extend and diversify its field to include, if at least it
is to be consistent with the idea of democracy and of human rights it
proclaims, the worldwide economic and social field, beyond the sovereignty
of States and of the phantom-States we mentioned a moment ago [the mafia,
drug cartels etc.]. Despite appearances, what we are saying here is not
simply anti-statist; in given and limited conditions, the super-state, which
might be an international institution, may always be able to limit the
appropriations and the violence of certain private socio-economic forces.
But without necessarily subscribing to the whole Marxist discourse, one
might still find inspiration in the Marxist 'spirit' to criticise the presumed
autonomy of the juridicial and to denounce endlessly the defacto take-over
of international authorities by powerful Nation-States, by concentrations of
techno-scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State
capital and private capital.5
Not only is this a further example of Derrida's abuse of Marxism, in that the concept of
'The New International' exists in order to keep liberal democracy more rigorous, it is also
an indication of the superficiality of Derrida's political theorising. As Terry Eagleton points
out, Derrida "has never been at his most impressive when at his most politically
explicit" 59. Derrida does not tell us, for example, from where such a super-state would
receive its mandate. He makes it clear that the whole idea of 'The New International' is to
maintain a consistency with democracy and human rights, but does not question or analyse
the potential for conflict between national democracies and that of the international law
which he prescribes. There seems to be a complete lack of any notion of power which
could explain why sothe kinds of power are desirable, and some not. Instead, Derrida
seems to assume, despite his critique of the excesses of liberal democracy, that democracy
fosters democracy. One wonders, for example, what he would have to say about the
French strikes of December 1995 and the political opposition in Britain to a more unified
Europe. What these events point to is the fact that democracy is not always compatible with
freedom and equality on the kind of grand scale which Derrida hopes for. Thus, at the end
of the day, Derrida's 'New International' comes across, in Eagleton's words, as some kind
of 'post-structuralist fantasy':
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And what does Derrida counterpose . . . to the dire conditions he so
magnificently denounces? A 'New International', one 'without status,
without title and without name. . . without party, without country, without
national community. . .' And, of course, as one gathers elsewhere in the
book, without organization, without ontology, without method, without
apparatus. It is the ultimate post-structuralist fantasy: an opposition without
anything as distastefully systemic or drably 'orthodox' as an opposition, a
dissent beyond all formulable discourse, a promise which would betray
itself in the act of fulfilment, a perpetual excited openness to the Messiah
who had better not let us down by doing anything as determinate as coming.
Spectres of Marxism indeed.60
E: Conclusion.
Let us summarise the way in which deconstruction emerges from Derrida's critique of
classical semiology and moves into the sphere of international politics. His starting point,
then, is the argument that the sign is not constituted by its relation to a signified, but
through its position in a referential structure of other signs - its difference to other signs.
Through his examination of Plato's Phaedrus, we see how Derrida believes that the
opposite 'other' of the sign is always excluded. By understanding differance and exclusion
as binary, the task of deconstruction emerges in an almost self-evident manner as a project
which aims simply to 'restore balance'.
What we find, however, is that this 'balance' inevitably has a certain bias. Even if we were
to ignore the problems associated with Derrida's binary interpretation of differance, there is
no reason for it to come out so clearly in favour of liberal democracy. In fact, Derrida
himself has pointed to alternative political implications of the deconstructive project. He has
stated, for example, that the political equivalent to deconstruction could take the form of
'responsible anarchy', while stressing the 'interminable obligation' to deconstruct these
two terms 'responsible' and 'anarchy' in order to avoid them becoming unthinking and
reified dogmas6 l . He has also pointed to the nationalistic implications of deconstruction,
109
directly contradicting his arguments in The Other Heading and Specters of Marx. He has
stated, for example, that because philosophy is nationally determined, and that as a concept
cannot be distinguished from the word to describe it, language is of central significance to
the development of culturally specific ontologies 62. This interpretation would appear to
have implications more in line with the German conservatives of the last century and the
idea of a 'nation-state' than the 'New International' he prescribes.
In fact, incoherencies exist for Derridean politics at a more fundamental level. As was
pointed out in the section on rationality, the notion of differance as binary is wrong - there
could be an infinite multitude of excluded 'others' for every privileged sign which makes
its way into our conceptual system. Yet it is this misunderstanding which covertly gives
way to the critical aspect of the deconstructive project. That is, by reversing the privilege of
the binary pair, it appears to simply restore balance. Yet the excluded 'other' highlighted by
Derrida is as arbitrary as the sign which is privileged in the first place. This technical point,
along with the fact that Derrida fails to properly analyse power, means that the critical
aspect of deconstruction, and therefore its raison d'être, is removed. That deconstruction
cannot produce a politics and remain consistent is further indicated by Derrida's failure to
theorise his political prescription, as Boyne notes:
The advice which can be drawn from Derrida is to overturn the privilege of
the high side and celebrate the secondary, derivative, low-side: the
supplement. . . But Derrida's deconstruction does not provide a practical
social theory which would indicate what such an intervention, such a
celebration of the low side, might look like, or how it might be achieved.63
So why does Derrida turn to Marxism? I think that there are two reasons for this. Firstly,
he wants to find support for his liberal democratic agenda without appearing to replicate the
old epistemological approach at which his critique is aimed and without appearing to simply
prop up the status quo. By stripping Marxism of all the characteristics which do not also
happen to be the characteristics of deconstruction and liberal democracy, he tries to make
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use of this 'spirit of Marxism' by describing it as the 'other' of liberal democracy. Now,
not only is it the case that liberal democracy has a multitude of political alternatives, of
repressed 'others', it is also the case that Derrida's reinterpretation of Marxism is not one of
them. The central values of freedom and equality in Marxism develop from liberalism,
rather in opposition to it. For all intents and purposes, for Derrida's 'spirit of Marxism'
read 'spirit of liberal democracy' or 'spirit of deconstruction'.
Secondly, and related to the above point, is the fact that not only is Marxism (in Derrida's
eyes) the excluded other of liberal democracy, it is also marginal per Se. As Eagleton notes,
"Derrida has turned to Marxism just when it has become marginal, and so, in his post-
structuralist reckoning, rather more alluring" 64. He goes on:
There is an exasperating kind of believer who holds what he does until he
meets someone else who holds the same. At this point, confronted with the
bugbear of 'orthodoxy', he starts nervously to retract, or at least to qualify.
There is more than a touch of this adolescent perversity in Derrida, who like
many a postmodernist appears to feel (it is a matter of sensibility rather than
reasoned conviction) that the dominant is ipso facto demonic and the
marginal precious per se.65
It is this need to privilege the underdog (one of the implications of deconstruction) that
leads Derrida to hide his support for the status quo behind the Marxist banner.
It is clear, from the earlier analyses of The Other Heading and Specters of Marx, that
Derrida wants to ensure that liberal democracy stays as close to its ideal form as possible,
and it is also clear that he does not question for one moment the desirability of this ideal.
What is more, he assumes that this ideal is universally desirable, and that liberal democracy
equates with a reduction in human suffering if 'it is done properly'. These assumptions are
all problematic in themselves, but more importantly, there is the question of why Derrida
ranks liberal democratic values so highly: Where is Derrida coming from? The answer is
simple - France, twentieth century France. Derrida is a man of his times. He is not a
visionary or an alien from outer space, and therefore his critique and subsequent theorising
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come from the concerns which form him.
There are two aspects of Derrida which are clearly manifested in his work: his outrage and
his style. Firstly, then, he is severely upset about something. As Eagleton pointed out, the
adolescent character of his work almost implies that it is unimportant what this something
is, all that matters is that it be expressed. This is why, when we dig deep enough, we find
that Derrida is such a mainstream conservative. Like a teenager, he needs to shout about
something, and replies to those who tell him off that they do not understand him. As Boyne
points out:
[Derrida] is not explicit about the motivations behind this guerrilla warfare
against the Enlightenment heritage. He has not made repeated accusations
about, for example, reason and repression, or reason and evil. A sense of
outrage does, however, permeate his work.66
This anger of Derrida's visibly produces a certain style of writing, and it is the combination
of his temperament and its manifestation through a permanent questioning, which finds
expression in his attack on the status quo despite his deepest desire to uphold it:
What is it, now, to chew carrots? Why this plural? could there ever be more
than one of them? Could this question ever have a meaning? Could one even
speak of the 'chewing' of a carrot, and if so how, why, to whom, with
what onto-teleo-theological animus?67
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CHAPTER 3
RICHARD RORTY
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PART I - RATIONALITY
A: Introduction.
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty sets out his critique of traditional
philosophy:
I argue that the attempt (which has defined traditional philosophy) to
explicate 'rationality' and 'objectivity' in terms of accurate representation is
a self-deceptive effort to externalize the normal discourse of the day, and
that, since the Greeks, philosophy's self-image has been dominated by this
attempt... I present Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey as philosophers
whose aim is to edify - to help their readers, or society as a whole, break
free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than to provide
'grounding' for the intuitions and customs of the present.l
After offering a convincing argument regarding the fallacy of knowledge as an accurate
representation of nature, Rorty goes on to offer an alternative approach in the form of a
hermeneutic 'conversation'. This, he asserts, should not be a successor subject to
epistemology, and that philosophy should steer clear of a 'universal pragmatics' or a
'transcendental hermeneutics'. Instead, the pragmatism which he is advocating is designed
to bring about a post-metaphysical society analogous in its relationship to the Platonic
tradition, with "secularists who urge that research concerning the Nature, or the Will, of
God, does not get us anywhere"2.
Rorty's work can be criticised on several counts, both in the conclusions that he reaches,
and the methodology that he employs. There is a difficulty right at the start, as Jane Heal3
points out, in accounting for Rorty's claim that he is practising 'edifying' rather than
'systematic' philosophy - that is, as offering 'ironic' remarks which encourage us "to break
the crust of convention"4. However, as it is an implication of the criticisms which can be
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made of Rorty that what he calls 'conversation' is more like 'inquiry' than he allows, it
seems justifiable to represent him as proceeding in the customary fashion by offering
claims and defending them with argument.
The difficulties in Rorty's 'non-realism' are common to postmodernism in general. It
contains, for example, relativistic and universalistic elements which are at odds with his
central thesis, as does his hope for 'conversation', which, it can be argued, demands a
consensual belief in objective realities. Another implication of his argument is that we can
choose what to believe, yet disagreement with this has been seen by some as sufficient to
undermine his prescription for change. However, there is an underlying criticism of
Rorty's pragmatic position which ties together these difficulties and strengthens the body of
opposition, and that is that without occupying a transcendental viewpoint (which is what
the pragmatist tries above all to avoid), he is unable to tell us why we should abandon
mirroring nature.
To agree with Rorty's position on the fallacy of the Platonic legacy whilst disagreeing with
the implications of his hermeneutics and pragmatism, thus leaves us wondering about the
role of the philosopher. It will not be, as Rorty argues, "to help us avoid the self-deception
which comes from believing that we know ourselves by knowing a set of objective facts"5,
but can only arise from a recognition of the human need to objectify oneself. In fact,
Rorty's political conclusions would be far more consistent if he were to recognise this, as
Cleveland points out, "In the end, perhaps one will see how a serious liberal concern for
human solidarity creates a limit on how much contingency one can embrace" 6 . This also
indicates that, despite Rorty's portrayal of his political writings as the natural logical upshot
of his philosophical investigation, his 'ironist' philosophical stance on contingency is
actually designed to serve the needs of his covert political agenda. The problem with Rorty
is that his critique of traditional philosophy, and the correspondence theory of truth, is
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convincing. Thus its incompatibility with liberalism results in an undermining of Rorty's
liberal politics - it destroys the very project for which it was designed. Irony indeed.
B: The Platonic Legacy.
Rorty starts by pointing out that since Plato, philosophy's central concern has been "to be a
general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into the areas which
represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those'which do not represent
it at all."7 According to Rorty, all subsequent philosophical theorising up until this century
(apart from the occasional unheard protest) has consolidated this notion of a 'theory of
knowledge'. In the seventeenth century, and due especially to the influence of Locke, this
notion was based on an understanding of 'mental processes'; Descartes provided us with
the notion of 'the mind' as a separate entity; and, partly as a consequence, Rorty implies,
we owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason to the eighteenth century and
especially to Kant. It was Kant, he asserts, who transformed the old idea of philosophy as
the 'queen of the sciences' (in terms of it being concerned with what was most universal
and least material) into a foundational discipline: "Philosophy became 'primary' no longer
in the sense of 'highest' but in the sense of 'underlying'." 8 Tracing this consolidation
further, Rorty points to the neo-Kantians as responsible for putting epistemology and
metaphysics at the centre of philosophy, and describing metaphysics as something which
emerges out of epistemology, rather than vice versa. At the beginning of our century, this
claim was reaffirmed by philosophers such as Russell and Husserl, who were concerned to
keep philosophy 'rigorous' and scientific. In their attempts to recapture the mathematical
spirit of Plato, Rorty argues, Russell discovered 'logical form' and Husserl discovered
'essences'.
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Thus Rorty comes to the conclusion that to think of knowledge as a 'problem' for which
we need a theory, is a product of the above view. The above philosophers are seen by
Rorty as having chosen 'perceptual metaphors' which make them want to get behind
reasons to causes, and that it is this confusion between justification and causal explanation
which produces the basic confusion in the idea of a 'theory of knowledge'. The reason for
this confusion, he argues, is that the original dominating metaphor was one that saw our
beliefs as determined by being brought face-to-face with the object of the belief ('the
geometrical figure which proves the theorem, for example'). The implication of this
confrontational metaphor was to attempt to discover a set of pri'ileged representations
whose accuracy could not be doubted. That Rorty is content to describe this development
as a linear sequence can be seen in his assertion that: "we can at least take from Heidegger
the idea that the desire for an 'epistemology' is simply the most recent product of the
dialectical development of an originally chosen set of metaphors."9 Even more recent in
this dialectical development are what Rorty describes as the 'heretical' followers of Husserl
and Russell (such as Sartre, Heidegger, Sellars and Quine), who raised the same sorts of
questions about the possibility of apodictic truths as Hegel had raised about Kant.
Rorty rightly points out that linguistic analysis, despite its attempts to overcome the
previous transcendental assumptions, is very much within the Kantian tradition in that it
remains foundational, and is still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral
framework for inquiry, and thus for all of culture. Instead, Rorty subscribes to the
Wittgensteinian position that if language is seen as a tool rather than a mirror, we will not
look for the necessary conditions of the possibility of linguistic representation. The
argument that he is offering states simply that since truth is a property of sentences, since
sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are
made by human beings, so are truths. He supports this position with Davidson's view that
a theory of meaning for a language must do no more than "give an account of how the
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meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words" 10.
It is an obvious implication of Rorty's description of this Platonic legacy that the very idea
of 'apodictic' truths is irrelevant nonsense, and that the subsequent search for accurate
representations of a 'reality' are a waste of time. "The trouble with Platonic notions is not
that they are 'wrong' but that there is not a great deal to be said about them - specifically,
there is no way to 'naturalize' them or otherwise connect them to the rest of inquiry, or
culture, or life." There almost exists a consensus in contemporary philosophy on this
view. There tends to be more disagreement, however, on what hapiens next - where do we
go from here?
C: Rorty's Dream: Hermeneutics and Contingency.
Epistemology, Rorty has argued, is the form that philosophical reflection takes when the
idea of mirroring is our main concern. Hermeneutics is his name for the activity which he
commends to us as what philosophers should concern themselves with once the mirroring
notion has lost its grip. Hermeneutics is the study of various different ways of looking at
and approaching the world, together with the attempt to interpret one way to another and to
see what they have to offer. The hermeneutic philosopher is a pragmatist in that he sees
different kinds of discourse (scientific, literary, moral) as different kinds of linguistic
strategy that we have evolved for coping with the world and living our lives. Some of these
linguistic practices are pursued by agreed rules and result in the delivery of agreed verdicts
which are labelled 'objective' and 'true'. But there is no more to 'objectivity' than this
resulting from an agreed procedure, and in particular, there is no link with the discarded
idea of Truth.
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Rorty emphasises the point that hermeneutics is not the name for a discipline, but rather an
expression of the hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be
filled. Whereas epistemology assumes that all contributions to a given discourse are
commensurable, hermeneutics is largely a struggle against this assumption. This means,
for Rorty, that
there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones - no wholesale
constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of
language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our
fellow inquirers. 12
Rorty argues that this involves a fundamental choice for the reflective mind; that between
accepting the contingent character of starting-points, and attempting to evade this
contingency. He believes that to accept the contingency of starting-points is to accept our
inheritance from, and our conversation with, our fellow humans as our only source of
guidance.
Thus Rorty's hermeneutical position stems from his concept of contingency and his
argument that
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there
and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it
is not our creation, is to say with commonsense, that most things in space
and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states.
To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no
sentences, there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human
languages, and that human languages are human creations.l3
The point of this passage is that Rorty is attempting to defend his view against the charge of
linguistic idealism, the idea that language creates the world. This somewhat revises his
assertion that since truth is a property of language, and since language is man-made, so are
truths. So now, rather than simply stating that truth is created by human beings, the claim
is that 'true sentences are created by human beings'. Yet this can be interpreted in two
ways. Firstly, it could mean that i)'the sentences which are true are created by human
beings', and secondly, that ii)'human beings make sentences be true; human beings bring it
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about that 'is true' is rightly predicated of sentences'.
In assessing Rorty's claims, it must be remembered that his starting point is that of an
ironist philosophical stance, that he is insisting on a theory of truth based on contingency
rather than one based on correspondence. At the same time, however, Rorty is determined
to avoid what he sees as the untenable position of linguistic idealism and any kind of
relativism. To ascertain the validity of Rorty's analysis, we must clarify two points: Firstly,
to what extent is his position internally coherent, that is, does his understanding of
language and truth suit his purpose? Secondly, how does this discussion provide the
philosophical world with a better understanding of the nature of truth?
D: Non-Realism and Transcendentalism.
I think that Rorty's ironist philosophical stance, which forms the basis of his view on the
contingency of truths, is problematic from whichever way we look at it. Firstly, Timothy
Cleveland's discussion of Rorty's claims regarding language and truth show that, in the
end, Rorty has found no middle way between linguistic idealism and a correspondence
theory of truth i4. Secondly, Bhaskar's discussion regarding Rorty's failure to distinguish
between ontological and epistemological transcendentalism goes some way to helping
Rorty to avoid transcendental idealism. Ultimately, however, it can be shown that, as with
Derrida's book Cinders, it is this very desire to avoid transcendental idealism which gets
him into trouble.
To start with, then, the first interpretation of Rorty's argument, that i) 'the sentences that
are true are created by human beings' consistently follows from the passage quoted above,
but as Cleveland points out, this "does not capture any non-trivial sense in which truth is
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created" 15. The reason for this triviality stems from the fact that it could still be the case
that th world, and truth, is 'out there', and that sentences merely act as a vehicle for
expressing that truth. A Platonist, for example, would have no problem with this claim.
Cleveland rightly states that, in this interpretation, the talk of truth is irrelevant and
misleading, and it would be more accurate to say 'the world is not created, but sentences
are'. This lets Rorty off the hook as far as linguistic idealism is concçrned, but makes a
trivial point which tells us nothing about truth:
If this is all that truths being created amounts to, then it is obviously
compatible with a correspondence theory of truth. So although this trivial
sense of the conclusion helps Rorty to distinguish his views from idealism it
does so at the cost of deflating his idea that truth is created. 16
However, if we take Rorty's argument to be ii)human beings make sentences to be true;
human beings bring it about that 'is true' is rightly predicated of sentences', he is still faced
with similar problems. It must be remembered that his desire to avoid linguistic idealism is
a reaction to his original critique of attempts to mirror reality, and that this critique
maintains an absolute separation between the world being out there and truth being out
there. Cleveland argues that Rorty's insistence that "anything can be made to look good or
bad by being redescribed" 17, means that his entire position depends upon the claim that
truth is created, and "the problem now is that Rorty seems to have abandoned any
distinction between the world being out there and truth not" 1 8 In other words, as far as
Cleveland is concerned, Rorty has fallen into the trap of linguistic idealism.
This criticism of Rorty is based on the strong sense in which Rorty seems to believe that
truth is created. What it fails to take account of, however, is the strong sense in which
Rorty believes that this 'truth' has nothing to do with the world 'out there'. Or rather,
Cleveland believes that if Rorty is going to make a substantial claim about the human
creation of truth, he cannot consistently maintain a distinction between that truth and the
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world. The reason that Cleveland will not allow Rorty to maintain such a distinction, is that
unless we fall back on a correspondence theory of truth and the world, we would have to
claim that the truths made by humans simply coincide with the world in such a way as to
make it possible for us to live in that world. So on the basis of both Rorty's assumptions,
and Cleveland's analysis of the logical conclusion of these assumptions, either the world
creates truth, or we create the world; that is, we must commit ourselves either to a
correspondence theory of truth, or linguistic idealism - there is no middle way.
Cleveland's analysis is correct in that Rorty's position is internallyincoherent, that it fails
to provide an analysis of truth which could support his ironist stance on the contingent
nature of truth. This does not mean, however, that truths are not contingent. Rather, these
problems arise because both Rorty and Cleveland, and thinkers like them, remain
imprisoned within the signifier/signified distinction. Bhaskar, for example, points out that
Rorty confuses ontological transcendentalism with epistemological transcendentalism19.
His point is that for Rorty, all transcendental truths are epistemological transcendental
truths, and, as transcendental truths do not exist (the world does not create truth), are
therefore always based on a falsehood. This means, he argues, that Rorty is operating with
a notion of absolute (epistemological) transcendental truth, and cannot take account of the
view that humans can only and must operate with a notion of (ontological) transcendental
truth. So, in perceiving human use of (ontological) transcendental reality and truth, Rorty
mistakes it for reference to a non-existent epistemological transcendental truth. It is on this
basis, states Bhaskar, that he takes a wrong turn quite early on, and forecloses the
possibility of operating (on a day-to-day level and philosophically) with ontological
transcendental truths. This means that he then has to develop an ironist concept of the self
and politics which attempts to avoid reference to any transcendental truth.
This dichotomy can be better understood if we examine what this alternative to
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epistemological transcendental truth would look like:
Such a philosophy would be a transcendental realism, not idealism:
ontologically rather than epistemologically geared; and unafraid of
recognizing epistemically relativist implications - which are . . . quite
consistent with judgementally rationalist results.2°
Bhaskar goes on to clarify his position by proposing that such a philosophy would "have a
use for the category of the 'non-empirical but real', for example, in desi'g.nating the
transfactual operation of causal laws prior to, outside and independently of human
experience"21.
The distinctions made by Bhaskar are useful in understanding the more subtle dynamics at
work in Rorty's understanding of truth, and the philosophical problems which these create.
However, these insights do not, in themselves, provide us for a reason for maintaining a
separation of the ontological from the epistemological. The reasons for doing so would
come (and seem to, in Bhaskar's argument) from the desire to avoid a transcendental
idealism, and therefore, ultimately, to avoid ideology and what Bhaskar refers to as 'the
dangers of reifying or hypostatizing truth'. So while Bhaskar would be of some use to
Rorty's attempts to avoid both correspondence theory and linguistic idealism, a discussion
of his analysis reveals that such a project is misbegotten, that the desire to avoid 'reifying
or hypostatizing truth' cannot be supported without contradicting Rorty's original insights
into the fraudulent claims of Plato.
I would like to propose two arguments here: Firstly, that the desire to avoid a Platonic
transcendental idealism and its consequences must come from either a confusion of
ontological and epistemological transcendentalism which ultimately rests upon the
epistemological kind, or, an infinite regress of ontological transcendentalism into
relativism. Secondly, that the answer lies in the absolute conflation of ontological and
epistemological transcendentalism such that there would be no use for the category of 'non-
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empirical but real' - in fact, it would make no sense.
So firstly, then, let us summarise Bhaskar's proposed philosophical perspective. He wants
to do two things through the separation of ontological and epistemological
transcendentalism. These are i)to accord an unequivocal reality to things; whilç ii)avoiding
transcendental idealism. He believes that ontological transcendentalism can be given its
status through a recognition of the contingency and historicity of human knowledge. Yet
this, as we saw with Foucault, cannot be done without invoking a transcendentalism of the
epistemological kind. Both archaeological and genealogical methods necessarily involve, at
some point, stepping outside of ontological transcendentalism in order to define categories
and prioritise evidence. The alternative is to attempt an equalisation of the hierarchies of
what counts as true so that all ontologies are given relative validity. This would be a
fruitless task, but illustrates that without invoking epistemological transcendentalism,
ontological transcendentalism would infinitely regress to absolute relativism and non-
realism. This is in fact one of the implications of Rorty's philosophical stance, although for
him this comes as an upshot of his confusion of ontology with epistemology, and the
ultimate opposition of these two to his proposed anti-transcendental alternative, as
mentioned before. As Taylor remarks:
In particular I reject Rorty's non-realism. Rather, I believe that non-realism
is itself one of the recurrently generated aporia of the tradition we both
condenm. To get free of it is to come to an uncompromising realism. . . I
see him in fact as still very much a prisoner of the epistemological world-
view.22
So, in Bhaskar's discussion of Rorty we are witnessing a repeated fundamental mistake -
the unconscious reliance upon epistemological transcendentalism. The nature of this
unconscious activity can be better understood, and perhaps solved, if we take a closer look
at Bhaskar's proposed example of the category of 'non-empirical but real'. Bhaskar's
criticism of Rorty here is that by treating the 'ontological' and the
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'epistemologicallempirical' as synonyms, he is automatically excluding any reference to the
'real' while nevertheless invoking a higher transcendentalism in order to maintain the
distinction and downgrade this onto-empiricism as existing wholly 'within the mind', in the
way that Kant conflates the a priori and the subjective. Yet, as we have seen, this proposed
category of Bhaskar's (deliberately) maintains the distinction, thus (inadvertently) invoking
an epistemological transcendental category in order to do so.
We can find the solution if we ask ourselves what would happen if the ontological and
epistemologicallempirical were to remain conflated but not downgraded. The result would
be transcendentalism, resulting in 'reifying or hypostatizing truth'. But when it is realised
that any alternative necessarily invokes the very kind of transcendental assumption which
both Bhaskar and Rorty wish to avoid, the inevitability of such an outcome is clear.
A parallel point was made in relation to Derrida's Cinders, where it was found that Derrida
could only avoid giving the signifier a transcendental significance (previously attributed to
the signified) if he maintained the distinction between signifier and signified in the
traditional way. Rorty is faced with the same choice as Derrida: non-realism or
transcendentalism.
E: Conclusion.
Jane Heal argues
Unless we can find a third way through, a way of finessing the question of
why we hold so firmly to certain opinions, we shall fail to walk the
tightrope between 'mirroring realism' on the one hand and some form of
idealism on the other. Protest he never so much, Rorty has wobbled and
fallen off on the idealist side.23
This criticism summarises many of those made by Rorty's critics, including that of
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Bhaskar. What I hope to have shown, however, is that the very distinction between
correspondence and idealism unconsciously relies upon transcendental assumptions, so that
while it might appear that Rorty's 'ironist' stance towards contingency is idealist, such a
position can only be reached through an attempt to mirror reality. The problem, then, is one
of recognising the postmodern critique of the Platonic legacy as true, while finding a way
of getting around our inescapable practise of talking about 'truths'. Rorty has not managed
to provide a way forward for philosophy, instead, his thought has helped to highlight and
clarify the problems which still need to be dealt with.
Charles Taylor offers the concept of 'framed representations' as a route out of this
philosophical impasse:
The framework understanding... is not in itself a representation of our
position in the world. It is that against which I frame all my representations,
and that in virtue of which I know that these are true or false because of the
way things are.24
Rorty would not accept this point, believing that a representation which is not made true by
some independent reality might just as well not be considered as a truth at all. Yet this reply
would only make sense on the old schema. Once the idea of 'conceptual frameworks' is
accepted, Taylor would sly, it makes no sense to discuss whether there is a reality
independent of these frameworks which makes them true or false. Rorty would reply that
this outlook simply reduces philosophy to relativism, that it would not be able to provide
opinions with any justification except that which relates to 'internal coherence'. As was
shown above, however, he can only make This criticism if he maintains traditional
distinctions which are not available to him.
Thus philosophy needs a new dualism which can cope with what would have seemed like
contradictions in the metaphysical tradition, one which will break the back of the dialectic
struggle forever. As Taylor states, only "really burying epistemology leads you back to
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realism"25 . My argument would be that if we were to do this consistently, we could not
even talk about 'framed representations' without inadvertently invoking transcendental
assumptions. Thus the only way to remain consistent would be to disregard Rorty's
original critique of correspondence and refer to truth as if it were indeed true. Of course, all
this navel contemplation might make such a simple, unselfconscious task appear impossible
now, but if we were to be honest with ourselves, we would realise that this is all we ever
have done, and all we could ever do.
After all of that philosophical kibitzing, Rorty somehow thinks that he has provided the
perfect defence and that his work is therefore immune to criticism:
The difficulty faced by a philosopher like myself. . . - one who thinks of
himself as auxiliary to the poet rather than the physicist - is to avoid hinting
that this suggestion gets something right, that my sort of philosophy
corresponds to the way things really are.26.
The phrase 'the way things really are' reinforces my main criticism of Rorty, but the point
here, is whether Rorty can simply get out of trouble in this way by claiming that he was
being 'ironic' all along, and that any critique which fails to take account of this must be
trapped in the traditional epistemological view. My counter-attack is that as we are all
trapped within epistemological transcendentalism anyway, my critique of Rorty is safe. His
attempt to extrapolate from his philosophical stance a theory of the self and politics will
further bear this out.
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PART II - THE SELF.
A: Introduction.
Rorty's view of human nature arises from what he considers to be the logical implications
of his critique of the metaphysical and epistemological tradition. On the one hand, his
historicist approach enables him to understand the self as in some sense determined by
specific temporal and spatial influences. On the other, embracing this type of contingency
means that he takes an existentialist view of the possibility of human nature as self-
constituting, or 'edifying', as he describes it. The difficulties in this analysis are akin to
those contained in Rorty's rationality in general. It becomes clear that a universalistic,
transcendental approach is necessary, and this is borne out by Rorty's own (somewhat
contradictory) need to cite essences in order to be able to say anything at all about what it is
to be human. The most significant criticism of Rorty's prescription for human 'edification'
- and this can be said of the postmodern critique as a whole - is that it contains an element
of cruelty, an element which can only be avoided by removing the need to make a
description of human nature compatible with philosophical insights regarding the non-
existence of an 'absolute good'.
B: The Contingency of the Self.
According to Rorty, there has been a
tension between an effort to achieve self-creation by the recognition of
contingency and an effort to achieve universality by the transcendence of
contingency. The same tension has pervaded philosophy since Hegel's
time, and particularly since Nietzsche. The important philosophers of our
own century are those who have tried to follow through on the Romantic
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poets by breaking with Plato and seeing freedom as the recognition of
contingency.27
Rorty relates Nietzsche's definition of truth as a 'mobile army of metaphors', which
amounts, he argues, to saying that the whole idea of 'representing reality' by means of
language, and thus the idea of finding a single context for all human lives, should be
abandoned. He goes on to argue that if the notion of language as fitting the world is
dropped, it means that the person who can use words in a way that they have never before
been used, can appreciate her own contingency. "For then she can see, more clearly than
the continuity-seeking historian, critic, or philosopher, that her language is as contingent as
her parents or her historical epoch." 28 Thus Rorty agrees with Freud's description of
subconscious fantasy as a sign that man is self-constituting, because for Freud, fantasy is a
faculty for creating metaphors.
To confuse matters, Rorty backtracks slightly, implying that he wishes to say that man is
both constituting and constituted. He attacks Nietzsche for producing a kind of 'inverted
Platonism' in his suggestion that a life of self-creation can be complete, although at times
this is the argument which Rorty himself appears to be presenting. In Contingency, Irony
and Solidarity Rorty presents a concise view of what he means by the contingency of the
self, in his description of the 'ironist'.
I shall define an 'ironist' as someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She
has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently
uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies
taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that
argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor
dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation,
she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it
is a power not in touch with a power not herself.29
This seif-realisation, Rorty argues, puts the ironist in a position that Sartre called 'meta-
stable': never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in
which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and
fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves. The opposition of irony, Rorty
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states, is common sense. This involves an unselfconscious attitude in which it is taken for
granted that statements formulated in one's own vocabulary "suffice to describe and judge
the beliefs, actions and lives of those who employ alternative final vocabularies" 30. Thus
the metaphysician is considered by Rorty to still be attached to common sense, in that he
assumes that the terms in his own vocabulary refer to something which has a real essence.
The ironist, by contrast, Rorty describes as thinking that nothing has an intrinsic nature or a
real essence.
For us ironists, nothing can serve as a final vocabulary sa'e another such
vocabulary: there is no answer to redescription save a re-re-description.
Since there is nothing beyond vocabularies which serves as a criterion of
choice between them, criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on
that, not of comparing both pictures with the original. Nothing can serve as
a criticism of a person save another person, or of a culture save another
culture - for persons and cultures are, for us, incarnated vocabularies. 3 1
Two problems with Rorty's description of the ironist appear immediately. Firstly, one
wonders how looking at other people, cultures and vocabularies help us to judge our own
when they cannot be assessed by an external set of criteria, and we know our own criteria
to be contingent. Rorty, it seems has instead provided a strong argument for the relativist's
view that the most we can do is to look to the internal coherency of our final vocabularies.
Secondly, Rorty's remarks seem to raise the question of why the ironist should want to
create another final vocabulary, if (as Rorty makes it a condition) she does not think that
her vocabulary is closer to reality than any others, and others cannot be described as in any
sense 'better'.
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C: Transcendentalism and Essentialism.
Rorty agrees with Proust and Nietzsche that "there is nothing more powerful or important
than self-rediscription" 32. Yet Rorty's prescription for seif-rediscription does not raise the
question of whether it is within our power to account for everything which constitutes us.
It assumes that we are able to describe ourselves in the first place, to know what it is that
has made us what we are, and to know what it is that we are. But in order to be able to
fully describe (and re-describe) ourselves, it seems that it would be necessary to be an
onlooker, to have a neutral or differing viewpoint. The very idea of being able to transcend
oneself is at odds with Rorty's thesis, yet 'seif-rediscription' would appear to necessitate it.
As Richard Bernstein says of Rorty:
He is arguing against all notions of a centered and transcendental self.
Whatever his motivations in coming up with a picture of 'the self as
centerless, as historical contingency all the way through', he is arguing that
his is a more perspicious - one is tempted to say a 'truer' - understanding of
the self.33
This brings us to an even more obvious criticism of Rorty's view of human nature. It is
illustrated above that he is already in a tricky position in attempting to describe human
nature at all, even if it his view that man does not have a 'nature' as such. But Rorty makes
the further mistake of being quite specific in his description. He distinctly names four
human essences; that we have a desire to be kind, that we have a common susceptibility to
humiliation, that we have a conscience which gives us dignity and rights, and that we have
feelings of solidarity:
The liberal ironist just wants our chances of being kind, of avoiding the
humiliation of others, to be expanded by redescription. She thinks that
recognition of a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social bond
that is needed.34
[There isi a universal human faculty, conscience - possession of which
constitutes the specifically human essence of each human being. This is the
faculty which gives the individual human dignity and rights.35
Our insistence on contingency, and our consequent opposition to ideas lIke
'essence', 'nature', and 'foundation', makes it impossible for us to retain
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the notion that some actions and attitudes are naturally 'inhuman'... Yet at
times like that of Auschwitz, when history is in upheaval and traditional
institutions and patterns of behaviour are collapsing, we want something
which stands beyond history and institutions. What can there be except
human solidarity, our recognition of one another's common humanity?36
These essences which Rorty cites are not descriptions of perceptions and values within
specific cultural ontologies, because of his fear of the label of relativism. But the point is,
that they should be if his thought is to remain at all coherent. Again, it is because he feels
the need to make his view of the self consistent with his critique of epistemology, that he
falls into the trap of non-realism. And again, as we have seen, this means that he has to
make universalistic claims and cite essences in order to remain consistent in this way.
More specifically, these problems stem from Rorty's desire to describe the self in such a
way that would make it compatible with individual freedom. This is what produces his
concept of 'edification', an existentialist, self-creating view of agency. But in order to
avoid a thorough-going idealism, Rorty attempts to knit this together by also describing
human nature in behaviouristic, materialistic and positivistic terms. as Bhaskar notes:
Rorty comes to replicate the problematic of the Kantian solution. The basic
distinction he invokes is that of Kant's"'existentialist' distinction between
people as empirical selves and as moral agents" (Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature p382). We are determined as material bodies qua empirical selves,
but free as writing and speaking (ie. discursive) subjects qua moral
agents.37
Bhaskar's point is that Rorty's specific description of what it is to be human in empirical,
positivistic, terms gets in the way of self-creating agency. In trying to link the two,
freedom would depend on the latter having an effect on the former, "for such agency
depends on the agent 'making a difference' to the material world"38. In order to provide an
adequate account of embodied human agency, this would require that the determined,
physical world coincides with existential agency. This is either too much of a coincidence,
or not agency at all.
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D: The Impossibility and Cruelty of Edification.
There is a telling passage in Rorty's paper 'The Pragmatist's Progress' which serves to
highlight not only the inconsistencies in his prescriptions for the ironist, but also to indicate
why his desire for the recognition of one's contingency is an unachievable one:
The final stage of the Pragmatist's Progress comes when one begins to see
one's previous peripeties not as stages in the ascent toward Enlightenment,
but simply as the contingent results of encounters with various books which
happened to fall into one's hands. This stage is pretty hard to reach, for one
is always being distracted by daydreams: daydreams in which the heroic
pragmatist plays a Walter Mitty-type role in the immanent teleology of world
history. But if the pragmatist can escape from such daydreams, he or she
will eventually come to think of himself or herself as, like everything else,
capable of as many descriptions as there are uses to which the pragmatist
might be put, by his or her self or by others. This is the stage in which all
descriptions (including one's self-description as a pragmatist) are evaluated
according to their efficacy as instruments for purposes, rather than their
fidelity to the object being described.39
There are several major criticisms which can be made of this passage. Firstly, despite
Rorty's assertion that the pragmatist's self-conception exists in opposition to the mirroring
model, no longer conceived of as partaking 'in the ascent toward Enlightenment', his talk
of 'stages', 'the final stage', and 'progress' implies a teleology. As such, this teleology
requires criteria according to which such progress can be judged. In Rorty's words, the
criteria of self-description is to be judged not according to its ability to mirror reality, but
according to its 'efficacy as instruments for purposes'. This has two problems: If these
'purposes' are multifarious and infinite, Rorty can be charged with the meaninglessness of
any practical application of such criteria. Yet if they are limited, then the source of the
criteria for such limitations needs to be made explicit. Also, we can question Rorty's use of
the word 'efficacy' - surely it is another standard which begs the question of hidden
assumptions and criteria.
The second major criticism centres on the mental state required for such 'progress';
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namely, that it would require a schizophrenic approach to self-description. As Rorty's
reference to Walter Mitty implies, the temptation is always there to fall back on
Enlightenment-type teleological views of oneself and history. The very desire to overcome
this nevertheless necessarily implies a desire to achieve enlightenment of some kind.
Rorty's description of this 'progress' implies that it is necessary to be at onceboth aware
and not aware - that it must happen at a subconscious level because as soon as we will it,
we take a transcendental position in relation to ourselves, and this is antithetical to the very
goal of this 'progress'.
This point is clarified very well by Jane Heal's discussion of our ability to choose to
believe. It is central to Rorty's view that acquiring beliefs, theories or views can be
regarded as a matter of choice. Yet as Heal points out, if we were able to choose our
beliefs, it would be necessary for us to have a view of the world first, in order to have a
reason for choosing certain beliefs over others. This would be the case whether we were
attempting to choose beliefs on the basis that they represent 'reality', or if we were
choosing them because we thought they would be more 'useful' to us. Thus Rorty's
argument that we can choose certain beliefs because there are overwhelming practical
reasons for doing so, makes little sense. As Heal explains,
We have our concepts because we have our interests - no interests, no
concepts. But this is not to be heard as saying that we choose or devise our
concepts in the light of knowledge of our interests. That way of reading
things presupposes that we can conceptualise our interests before we have
any concepts, which is absurd.40
A third, more general criticism, which serves to summarise these points, is that Rorty's
description of self-awareness implies that there is a non-contingent, 'core' of a self of
which to be aware. The entire way in which he talks of the 'pragmatist's progress' is
imbued with a certain elitist smugness, implying that this final stage is a higher
enlightenment of a kind of Platonic ideal form. To clarify this, we can place this
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characterisation of Rorty's 'final stage' in opposition to a view which would see it as
merely contingent. The arrogance of the person who feels that he has reached a 'final stage'
in his progress toward self-awareness by which he is aware of his own contingency, fails
to acknowledge the contingency of this self-description.
Thus, in a rather obvious way, it can be seen that Rorty has a hierarchy of self-
descriptions, with attempts to mirror reality at the bottom, and descriptions which are
'evaluated according to their efficacy as instruments for purposes' at the top. The fact that
both kinds of self-description are contingent does not enter into the discussion, and the
implied prescription for the latter, along with the hierarchy which accompanies it, indicates
a hidden transcendentalism. In support of this point, we can look at two of the phrases in
the quoted passage: i) 'books which happened to fall into one's hands'; and ii) 'this stage is
pretty hard to reach'. The former indicates an almost complete lack of agency, while the
latter requires quite the opposite, that is, that one has an ability to influence getting to this
stage. This contradiction is akin to that pointed out by Bhaskar, that Rorty has not managed
to find a way to consistently hold these opposing views of human nature. The reason that
any attempt in this direction will inevitably be thwarted rests, as has been demonstrated
above, upon the inevitability of taking a transcendental view in relation to oneself for the
purpose of self-description.
Rorty believes that the social function of philosophy is to prevent "man from deluding
himself with the notion that he knows himself, or anything else, except under optional
descriptions"4 l• There seems to be an inherent cruelty in this. Rorty is, however, aware of
the potential dangers:
But most people do not want to be redescribed. They want to be taken on
their own terms - taken seriously just as they are and just as they talk. The
ironist tells them that the language they speak is up for grabs by her and her
kind. There is something potentially cruel in that claim... But notice that
redescription and possible humiliation are no more closely linked with
ironism than with metaphysics. [The difference being, that with
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metaphysics, redescription] presents itself as uncovering the interlocutors
true self, or the real nature of a common public world which the speaker and
the interlocutor share, [suggesting] that the person being redescribed is
being empowered, not having his power diminished.42
But as Rorty notes, this is not what people want, metaphysical realities are a far more
attractive proposition than the alternative 'pour-soi'. The effects are unlikely to be
particularly healthy, either. As Guignon and Hiley point out, it seems more likely that
Rorty's vision "would exacerbate rather then resolve disorders of the self"43. To a certain
extent, however, these criticisms are merely hypothetical, as the argument that the
edification which Rorty desires would be impossible to achieve, is extremely convincing.
The difficulties which remain for Rorty centre on the point that, whatever he says to the
contrary, his description of human nature as having the ability to recognise its own
contingency comes across as a prescription, precisely as presenting itself to the person
being redescribed in this way as being empowered by this recognition of contingency.
Surely this is the cruellest thing of all?
E: Conclusion.
Rorty's position began by making the point that once we have dropped the notion of
language as fitting the world, we are free to redescribe ourselves. Yet in order to avoid an
'inverted Platonism' of the Nietzschean kind, he goes on, this must involve an 'ironist'
stance, whereby we recognise our contingency. My central criticism of this argument is that
in order to be able to redescribe ourselves, we must transcend ourselves. It was also
pointed out that Rorty's specific description of human nature makes his view essentialist,
and this comes from his desire to describe a self which has a sense of agency and freedom,
despite the inherent cruelty in the prescriptivity which necessarily accompanies this.
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It might appear that the problems with Rorty's concept of the self arise from the difficulties
discussed in the Rationality section, that is, the impossibility of maintaining a distinction
between correspondence and idealism without invoking transcendental assumptions. That
is undoubtedly part of it. But for Rorty, his entire philosophical project, and th concept of
the self that accompanies it, emanate from a hidden political agenda. This will be
demonstrated in the following section.
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PART HI - POLITICS AND SOCIETY
A: Introduction.
Rorty's political theory contains similar tensions to those apparent in his thought on
rationality and the self. On the one hand, he wants to make his prescriptions for society the
outcome of his attack on traditional philosophy, while on the other, he feels the inevitable
need to privilege certain concepts such as freedom and democracy: He attempts to justify
such an apparently contradictory stance with four main assertions. Firstly, Rorty argues
that private self-creation can be separated from public justice. Secondly, he sees liberal
polity specifically as the natural upshot of the postmodern approach to rationality. Thirdly,
he argues that although the justification for liberal democracy was initially grounded in
Enlightenment rationality, it can continue without the need for such foundationalism.
Finally, and linked to the last point, is Rorty's clalm that internal, circular justification is all
that is required for the maintenance of the liberal status quo. All of these assertions can be
criticised in one way or another, but more importantly, it can be shown that the 'post-
metaphysical' society which Rorty prescribes is an impossibility, and that his thesis
ultimately appears to stem from his desire to justify liberal democracy, rather than from any
philosophical insights.
B: The Postmodern Liberal Polity.
Rorty portrays his political theorising as if it is the logical consequence of the conclusions
reached in his discourse on rationality and the self: "One of my claims. . . is to suggest the
possibility of a liberal utopia: one in which ironism, in the relevant sense, is universal. A
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postmetaphysical culture seems to me no more impossible than a postreligious one, and
equally desirable."44 To attempt to give plausibility to his claim that his view is well
adapted to a liberal polity, Rorty cites Isaiah Berlin's defense of 'negative liberty'. In
Berlin's words, we need to give up the conviction that all the positive values in which men
have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and even entail each other. Qu9ting Joseph
Schumpeter, Berlin argues that, "To realise the relative validity of one's convictions and yet
stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilised man from a barbarian." On
this, Berlin comments, "To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable
metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one's practice is a ymptom of an equally
deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity"45 Rorty argues that this
translates into the claim that the liberal societies of our century have produced more and
more people who are able to recognise the contingency of their own consciences, yet
remain faithful to those consciences. He goes on to claim that 'freedom as the recognition
of contingency' is the chief virtue of the members of a liberal society, and, in line with his
postmodern theorising, "that the culture of such a society should aim at curing us of our
'deep metaphysical need".46
Rorty recognises, however, that the ironist's power of redescription can hurt people, and
that accordingly, could be considered illiberal:
There is no way in which philosophy, or any other theoretical discipline,
will ever let us [hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human
solidarity, in a single vision]. The closest we will ever come to joining these
two quests is to see the aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens be
as privatistic, 'irrationalistic', and aestheticist as they please so long as they
do it on their own time - causing no harm to others and using no resources
needed by those less advantaged. There are practical measures to be taken to
accomplish this goal. But there is no way to bring self-creation together
with justice at the level of theory.47
Beware this disclaimer. It appears as if Rorty has already considered the possible criticisms
of liberal ironist politics, and can therefore deflect any attack on the grounds that he has
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already noted the problems of such a politics in theory. However, Rorty's next step is not
to take practical measures to achieve this goal by, for example, becoming a politician or a
policy-maker. Rather, he goes on to discuss, at the theoretical level, how self-creation and
justice could be brought together in the postmodern liberal polity by limiting irony to the
private sphere, while the public sphere remains liberal:
we need to distinguish between redescription for private and public
purposes. For my private purposes, I may redescribe you and everyone else
in terms which have nothing to do with my attitude toward your actual and
possible suffering. My private purposes, and the part of my final
vocabulary which is not relevant to any public actions, are none of your
business. But as I am a liberal, the part of my final vocabulary which is
relevant to such actions requires me to become aware of the\'arious ways in
which other human beings whom I might act upon can be humiliated.48
In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty finally comes to see ironism restricted to the
private domain as a way of ensuring individual 'self-invention' and freedom, while
liberalism is restricted to the public domain to ensure justice. This would require, however,
the kind of 'ego-splitting' described in the above discussion on the self. Why, or how,
would an individual restrict his or her self descriptions to the private sphere? It is not
simply the case that, as Guignon and Hiley put it, "An individual's self-descriptions are
realised in his or her agency in the public world, and public practices and institutions
impact on the individual's capacities for self-fulfilment"49 ; nor, as Nancy Frazer expresses
it, "Final vocabularies do not neatly divide into public and private sectors; nor do actions
neatly divide into public or private" 50, and "In particular, it is not possible to distinguish
redescriptions that effect actions with consequences for others and those that do not" 5 1•
Rather, we should be asking 'from where do these private desires for self-invention
originate'? Rorty cannot say that they come from the society in which the individual lives,
for this begs the question. That is, it is on the basis of his description of human nature as
ironist that he (supposedly) develops his notion of an ironist liberal society. As was
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demonstrated earlier, the difficulty with the Rortian notion of being aware of one's
contingency rests on the fact that, in order to do so, one must take a transcendental stance
in relation to oneself, and that such an act makes the kind of mind-bending that Rorty
requires of us quite irrelevant because it makes impossible the idea of a thorough-going
contingency.
So, on a superficial level, we can make the point that Rorty's concept of contingency
precludes the separation of the public and the private because it does not allow that the
contingent factors which make up the individual could come froth social norms, values,
education, laws, or anything which exists in the public space. The more important
criticism, however, is that once it is established that reference to the transcendental will
always get in the way of an awareness of one's contingency, there is no reason why a
society should be structured in order to allow for private irony except to the extent that the
very desire for self-invention emanates from shared social and political values. As
mentioned above, this then destroys Rorty's argument regarding the reasons for the
desirability of such a society.
In an attempt to counter some of the more obvious criticisms of the separation of the public
and the private spheres, Rorty implies that irony might belong to an intellectual minority52.
As Bhaskar points out, this gives Rorty's political stance an air of elitism, "No wonder that
Rorty has been hailed as an ideologue of and for 'the chattering classes'53"54. He goes on
to ask why a project of self-invention should be restricted to a privileged elite. This
criticism is particularly pertinent when we bear in mind that intellectuals are no less a
product of their society than anyone else, and that if we are to take Rorty's views on the
contingency of the self seriously, then the desire for self-invention must emanate from our
social and political values rather than from any description of the self which is based on the
attempt to capture our 'true nature'.
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At a more practical level, whether or not private irony belongs to a minority, Rorty's hope
that the private sphere would consist of highly individual poets and eccentrics makes it
difficult to imagine how this could coexist with a homogenised public space, as Nancy
Frar notes:
U
In reaction against the extreme egotism and individualism of his conception
of theory . . . politics assumes an overly communitarian and solidary
character. . . Rorty assumes that there are no deep social cleavages capable
of generating conflicting solidarities and opposing 'we's' . . . Social
engineering can replace political struggle. . . Moreover with no deep rifts or
pervasive axes of domination, practice can float free of theory . . . Thus
politics can be detheorized. . . as theory becomes pure poiesis.. . politics
approaches pure techne.55
From this, we could see how such an idealised liberal polity would have no need for
democracy. Any desire to change the status quo would, by Rorty's definition, belong to the
realm of private opinion, and should not, therefore, be able to effect anything in the public
realm. So democracy, which acts as medium between the private and the public, would be
both unnecessary and undesirable if it did anything other than confirm the political status
quo. In other words, any radical, emancipatory or transformative tendencies exposed
through the democratic process would be considered illiberal - and therefore undemocratic.
Before considering the implications of these problems for Rorty's political stance, and
indeed liberalism as a whole, we should assess the validity of another of Rorty's
disclaimers, and the degree to which this clause in his political thesis could make it
invulnerable to critique.
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C: Rortys Circular Justification and the Redundancy of
Enlightenment Rationality.
Rorty would say of many of his critics that they fail to make an impact because they are
evaluating his thesis according to a rationality which he has shown to be flawed, that is,
according to Enlightenment standards. Rorty's argument is that we no longer need this
rationality, that it is redundant:_"I shall try to show that the vocabulary of Enlightenment
rationalism, although it was essential to the beginnings of liberal democracy, has become
an impediment to the preservation and progress of democratic socities." 56 Instead, Rorty
believes that he can reformulate the hopes of liberal society in a nonrationalist and
nonuniversalist way. He refers to Dewey, Oakeshott, and Rawis as helping to undermine
the idea of a transhistorical 'absolutely valid' set of concepts which would serve as
'philosophical foundations' of liberalism, and as seeing this undermining as a way of
actually strengthening liberal institutions.
Rorty states that he would like to replace both religious and philosophical accounts of a
suprahistorical grounding of liberal democracy with a historical narrative about the rise of
liberal institutions and customs. Such a culture, Rorty argues, would instead agree with
Dewey that,
imagination is the chief instrument of the good... art is more moral than
moralities. For the latter either are, or tend to become, consecrations of the
status quo... The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets even
though they spoke in free verse or by parable.57
In Rorty's words, this means that:
Although the idea of a central and universal human component called
'reason', a faculty which is the source of moral obligations, was very useful
in creating modern democratic societies, it can now be dispensed with - and
should be dispensed with, in order to help bring the liberal utopia into
existence. I have been urging that the democracies are now in a position to
throw away some of the ladders used in their own construction.5
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Having attempted to rid liberal democracy of its traditionally Enlightenment justification,
Rorty does not say that it now has no justification, but instead argues:
A circular justification of our practices, a justification which makes one
feature of our culture look good by still citing another, or comparing our
culture invidiously with others by reference to our own standards, is the
only sort of justification we are going to get.59
Thus Rorty believes that liberal society can be convinced that loyalty to itselis morality
enough, and that such loyalty no longer needs an ahistorical backup - "it need be
responsible only to its own traditions, and not to the moral law as well"60. He argues that
we should see allegiance to social institutions as no more matters for justification by
reference to familiar, commonly accepted premises - but also as no more arbitrary - than
choices of friends or heroes. Such choices, he believes, are not made by reference to
criteria, and cannot be preceded by presuppositionless critical reflection, outside of
historical context.
There are four main criticisms which can be made of Rorty's attempt to extrapolate, for the
purposes of political analysis, his insights into correspondence theory. Firstly, his
concession that Enlightenment rationality was 'essential to the beginnings of liberal
democracy' confuses reasons with causes. The Enlightenment was not a tool or a method
used for the construction of liberal democracy, it was the reason for its existence. In
Rorty's confusion of the 'how' with the 'why' he loses sight of the fact that Enlightenment
rationality was not discarded as soon as liberal democratic institutions were in place, but
continues to be referred to as justification for their continued existence. This touches on a
major problem with Rorty's thesis - it is based on the critique of our practice of mirroring
reality, but simultaneously develops as if we are no longer in the grip of correspondence
theory. The wider implications of this will be discussed later.
The second criticism rests on the fact that Rorty's romantic notion of the poet replacing the
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metaphysician is unconvincing. The poet is no more free of references to transcendental
ideals than the metaphysician, and they have about an equal chance of influencing the world
at large. What is more, the poet would seem less likely than the philosopher to be in the
position to produce the kind of historical narrative Rorty hopes for. 'Imagination and art',
although still the products of their time and place, are no doubt less constrained by the non-
conflictual mainstream values that Rorty attributes to the public space in his liberal polity.
Thirdly, while Rorty is correct in his assertion that a circular justification of our cultural
practices is all that we are going to get, he falls to recognise that this is all we ever have
had, and he is therefore wrong to draw a distinction in this way between circular
justification and traditional Enlightenment justification. This confusion is the result of his
conflation of ontological and epistemological transcendentalism, as was pointed out earlier.
The point is that 'a justification which makes one feature of our culture look good by still
citing another' is no more free from an appeal to transcendental truths than the
Enlightenment rationality which Rorty criticises. His picture of liberal democracy appears
to be one in which we have reached the end of history, "that it is translucently clear what
we mean by liberalism" 61
 and that there is no potential for conflict. Yet political issues are
continually raised such that it is necessary for us to 'touch base' and justify our political
position. This is not to be taken as evidence that transcendental ideals exist at all, but
simply that we cannot but help operating with notions which presuppose that they do.
Finally, and perhaps underpinning most of the above criticisms, is the fact that Rorty
radically undertheorises liberalism. The kind of circular justification that Rorty is after
would require a high degree of internal coherency and consensus. In his writing, he
achieves this idealised picture of liberalism by calling anything that is non-liberal, non-
political, and therefore as belonging to the private realm - he practically defines the liberal
utopia into existence. Thus he presents it as a clear, simple political theory and practice
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which takes no account of internal contradictions and overlooks "the fact that we are
confronted with conflicting and incompatible interpretations and practices in 'liberal
democracy'"62.
D: Privileging Freedom: The Problem with Liberalism.
Rorty states that "Nothing is more important than the preservation of liberal institutions"63.
His discussion of Rawis indicates, more specifically, his belief that the preservation of
liberal institutions is necessary for freedom, and freedom is antecedent to justice:
Rawls argument against fanaticism is not that it threatens truth about the
characteristics of an antecedent metaphysical and moral order by threatening
free discussion, but simply that it threatens freedom, and thus threatens
justice.64
Despite Rorty's attempts to separate freedom and justice from any 'antecedent and moral
order', it can be demonstrated that, in privileging freedom, he presupposes 'a natural order
of topics and arguments' in a way that is antithetical to his thesis, thus undermining his
arguments in favour of a postmetaphysical liberal utopia. More than this, in the course of
the discussion, it becomes clear that arguments for a liberal society cannot but fail to make
metaphysical assumptions. This means that if Rorty's critique of truth mirroring nature is
valid, liberal democracy, on Rorty's own terms, is unjustifiable.
Rorty focuses his attention on the distinction between persuasion and force as the key to
liberalism:
It is central to the idea of a liberal society that, in respect to words as
opposed to deeds, persuasion as opposed to force, anything goes. This
openmindedness... should be fostered for its own sake. A liberal society is
one which is content to call 'true' whatever the upshot of such encounters
turns out to be. That is why a liberal society is badly served by an attempt to
supply it with 'philosophical foundations'. For the attempt to supply such
foundations presupposes a natural order of topics and arguments which is
prior to, and overrides the results of, encounters between old and new
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vocabularies.65
There are two main criticisms which can be made of this position. Firstly, Rorty is quite
specific about the necessary conditions for discovering such truths. It has to be the result of
'free discussion', and this, for Rorty, is the sort which goes on when thç press, the
judiciary, the elections, and the universities are free, social mobility is frequent and rapid,
literacy is universal, higher education is common, and peace and wealth have made
possible the leisure necessary to listen to 'lots of different people and think about what they
say'66. This is problematic in two ways. For a start, it 'presuppses a natural order of
topics and arguments' which are not agreed upon in America, let alone in the rest of the
world. Rorty is stating this list as a method of achieving truth, and as such, steps outside of
the sort of circular justification that he prescribes. There is no room in this argument for the
separation of method and ideals: the method he proposes will determine what sort of truths
arise. As Cleveland points out, this might not advance equality or diminish suffering:
This is because the universal and higher education which people share in
this 'free' society may simply be the indoctrination of standards that allow
the masses to be manipulated by the propaganda of the press, the
universities, and the politicians in such a way that voting does not represent
the autonomous will of the people.67
If, however, we were to allow that Rorty's private world of self-inventing ironists were
able to influence the public space with their individually, poetically discovered values, and
that this list of criteria for discovering truths was as neutral a vehicle as he hopes, there is
no reason to suppose that a liberal polity would be long-lived: "Rorty's ironist philosophy
is more at home in the world of George Orwell's 1984 than in a liberal society concerned
with human equality and liberal freedoms"68.
The second criticism follows on from this, but involves, more specifically, Rorty's
distinction between persuasion and force. The only way that Rorty can escape the criticism
that, for the ironist, such a distinction must be arbitrary or biased, is by distinguishing
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reasons from causes:
Within a language game, within a set of agreements about what is
important, we can usefully distinguish reasons for belief from causes for
belief which are not reasons. We do this by starting with such obvious
differences as that between Socratic dialogue and hypnotic suggestion. We
then try to firm up the distinction by dealing with the messier cases:
brainwashing, media hype, and what the Marxists call 'false
consciousness'. There is, to be sure, no neat way to draw the line between
persuasion and force, and therefore no neat way to draw the line between a
cause of a changed belief which was also a reason and one which was a
'mere' cause. But the distinction is no fuzzier than most.69
There are two problems here. Rorty seems to start his distinction with clear cases which
must rely either upon intuition or a set of antecedent values, neither of which are available
to the ironist. To get around this, Rorty puts the distinction 'within a language game', but
this language game might very well be non-liberal. Again, analysis shows that a liberal
society would not serve the needs of the ironist.
As Bernstein points out, 'liberalism' itself is a vague term that embraces many diverse and
even incompatible positions. At times, however, Rorty writes as if 'we' all have common
intuitions about what liberal democracy means or should mean. It is ironical that he falls
into an essentialist way of talking when he speaks of 'liberal democracy' or 'political
freedom', despite his own arguments against 'essentialism'. He is also contradictory in his
belief that there can exist consensus about conceptions of justice, when he explicitly argues
that we can (and should) be 'edifying' and aware of the contingency of all our values.
Cleveland argues that from this we can conclude that 'liberalism limits concessions to
contingency'. But surely the converse is true. Is it not rather the case that unless we can
disprove Rorty's critique of the correspondence theory of truth, it is the validity of the
liberal position that is questionable?
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E: Conclusion: An Apologia for the Status Quo.
Rorty's starting point is the critique of the fact that both philosophical and common
conceptions of truth are based on attempts to 'mirror nature'. Instead, he argues, both
human nature and conceptions of truth are contingent upon cultural and historical factors.
In this he is correct. But from this accurate description of the way things are, he tries to
turn it into evidence for the prescription that things should be different. Therein lies his
fundamental philosophical error. My argument is that his entire philosophical thesis comes
not from any insights into the truth about truth, but from his desire to justify the liberal
status quo: his argument is reductive and designed to deceive.
Rorty bases his idea of circular justification on his view that liberalism is the natural upshot
of his description of the self. The problem is that he is criticising the way in which we
attempt to rriirror nature. Yet if what we do is attempt to mirror nature, then we are not
ironists, and his politics is unfounded. His thesis comes from two opposing directions: i)
we do mirror nature; and ii) we do not mirror nature. Because he wishes to make it appear
as though his liberal politics is the natural upshot of his philosophical stance as based on
ii), it continually comes up against problems. The main problem is that Rorty's work only
makes sense if he is prescribing that we stop doing i) and recognise ii), but this kind of
prescriptivity does not fall within the parameters of circular justification, is antithetical to
his philosophical outlook, and necessitates that he is offering a 'truer' view of the world: a
philosophy which corresponds to the way things really are.
Rorty's defence is that his work is 'poetic', that in an ironical way he is simply trying to
stretch our imaginations, but quite apart from the fact that this is hard to believe, this
position is self-defeating:
[Eveni if he does not intend all his talk of the liberal ironist to be taken
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seriously as advocating a new philosophical position but only as a 'poetic'
attempt to change our lives and our actions, then ironically this view will be
achieved only as long as his readers take him seriously: the ironist effect
only results if one fails to understand that it is all irony.70
Finally, this brings us to the question of what this means for liberalism. Rorty tends to
downplay what has become a major problem for any internal or external"uritique of
liberalism - the disparity between the 'ideals' of liberty and equality that liberals profess,
and the actual state of affairs in so-called liberal societies. This, it can be argued, is the
result of the internal contradictions in liberal theory itself. Many of Rorty's critics focus on
the incompatibility of irony and liberalism, concluding, as Cleveland does, that liberalism
cannot consistently tolerate Rorty's ironist. But this conception of the self is not new to
liberalism, rather, it is a description of human nature that, in all its relevant points
concerning agency, is embraced by liberalism. The schism in liberalism arises from its
claim to neutrality, and Rorty's thesis provides an unwitting exposé of this rather than an
indication that the postmodern critique of correspondence theories of truth should be
dropped. Rorty does not explore these problems or attempt to defend his case, he simply
asserts it. As Richard Bernstein points out,
Rorty's thesis of the priority of democracy over philosophy, his celebration
of a new tolerant jouissance of multiple language games and vocabularies is
little more than an ideological apologia for an old-fashioned version of cold-
war liberalism dressed up in fashionable 'postmodern' discourse. This is
surely one step forward, two steps back. 7 1
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CHAPTER 4.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE.
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PART I - RATIONALITY.
A: Introduction: The Contemporary Moral Crisis.
Maclntyre's After Virtue (1981), marks a major change in his thought, arising from his
reflections on the inadequacies of his previous work, and "from a growing dissatisfaction
with the conception of 'moral philosophy' as an independent and isolable area of inquiry"!.
Although he still agrees with the central theme in his earlier works (A Short History of
Ethics, 1966; Secularisation and Moral Change, 1967; Against the Self-Images of the Age,
1971), that the moral philosopher must take an historical approach as opposed to studying
concepts of morality by mere reflection, he now states: "...it was as clear to others as it
ought to have been to me that my historical and sociological accounts were, and could not
fail but be, informed by a distinctive evaluative standpoint." 2 In other words, he had
previously reached the conclusion, common to many contemporary postmodern thinkers,
that it is no longer possible, as a method of enquiry, to appeal to moral criteria; and for
Maclntyre this meant that moral justification in modern society is groundless, and the result
is a moral calamity. The epistemological difficulty with such a position, he now realises, is
that he must have been employing criteria of some kind in order to reach such a conclusion:
"But to what could I be appealing, if my own analysis was correct?"3
Already we can see how Maclntyre's work acts as a direct critique of Foucault, Derrida and
Rorty. For a start, Maclntyre believes that the failure of Enlightenment rationality to
provide us with universal truths which in turn could tell us how to live, has had disastrous
effects for society. The other thinkers have a different approach. They believe that by
pointing out the ways in which the Enlightenment must inevitably fail to produce that kind
of certainty, we can be emancipated from the hierarchies which result from such a concept
152
of truth. Maclntyre would argue that these thinkers fail to be aware of the values which
they must invoke when they express this desire for emancipation.
Maclntyre's conclusion in After Virtue is that the moral defects and failures of both
Marxism and liberal individualism embody the ethos of the modern world, an that only a
rejection of that ethos in favour of Aristotelianism will provide us with a rationally justified
standpoint from which to judge and to act. In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,
published as a sequel in 1988, Aristotle is replaced by Aquinas, who Maclntyre feels
manages to synthesize the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions in such a way as to
provide a rational basis for what Maclntyre calls 'tradition-based enquiry'. This proposed
method, also expanded in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990), describes
Maclntyre's hopes for a practical rationality which both takes account of the historicity of
moral traditions, while providing "the kind of debate from which one party can emerge as
undoubtedly rationally superior"4
Thus we are introduced immediately to the problem which Maclntyre faces; he at once
wishes to take account of the historical contingency which is the essential nature of our
morality, whilst avoiding what he believes to be the horrors of relativism, and provide us
with a universal, timeless body of criteria with which we can judge our tradition-based
values. These difficulties become more explicit when we look at Maclntyre's political
analysis. On the one hand, his description and critique of liberal societies as 'emotivist'
means that it is difficult to see how a Thomist revival could be implemented in practice,
while on the other, his acknowledgement of the fact that contemporary societies covertly
embody a hierarchy of values means that once they are described as forming a tradition, he
is unable to find a standpoint from which to provide a critique. In the end, this means that
Maclntyre's position is, inadvertently, compatible with liberal practices.
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First, however, we must take a look at why Maclntyre believes that morality is in a state of
grave disorder. It is because, he says, contemporary moral debates are conceptually
incommensurable, by which he means that although each is internally logically valid, they
follow from different premises and cannot, therefore, provide critiques of each other. Yet
despite the private arbitrariness upon which these premises rest, they each purport to be
impersonal, thus presupposing the existence of a set of objective criteria. Maclntyre
stresses that this does not amount to saying that we live in a pluralist society, which would
imply that we have 'an ordered dialogue of intersecting viewpoints', but rather that
contemporary moral theory contains 'an unharmonious melange of Ill-assorted fragments'.
The reason for this chaos, he believes, is due to our inheritance of a variety of moral
concepts which were originally at home within larger, coherent traditions of morality, and
no longer make sense without the rational framework which is necessary to support them.
Thus, for Maclntyre, differing concepts of morality relate directly to differing concepts of
rationality - there exists a causal relationship between the two, and because of the lack of an
overall rationality by which incommensurable concepts can be considered, the result is
mere assertion and counterassertion of alternative and incompatible sets of premises. So
Maclntyre sees the outstanding task of philosophy today to be to understand the sources of
the epistemological and moral crisis of contemporary culture and of the incommensurable
values that it involves.
What compounds (and is indeed part of) the problem, argues Maclntyre, is that this grave
disorder has gone unnoticed, that the appearance of morality persists. That is, people still
talk in terms of 'true' and 'false', although it is no longer clear in virtue of what a moral
judgement can be true or false. For this Maclntyre lays the blame with the failure of the
Enlightenment project, which, while claiming the existence of a teleological-free, neutral
and universal structure of rationality and morality to which all philosophical problems could
be addressed, was unable to agree upon what form that rationality should take. However,
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what remains, Maclntyre states, is a confidence found in the use of moral language which
presupposes the existence of a neutral set of moral rules, the consequence of which is
emotivism. Thus moral judgements continue to be expressed with an assumed authority,
yet without the teleological or categorical character which is needed to support this
authority:
If such rules cannot be found a new status which will make appeal to them
rational, appeal to them will indeed appear as a mere instrument of desire
and will. Hence there is a pressure to vindicate them either by devising
some new teleology or by finding some new categorical status for them.5
So Maclntyre is criticising what he believes to be central to the emotivist argument:"...that
there are and can be no valid rational justification for any claims that objective and
impersonal moral standards exist and hence that there are no such standards."6 What needs
to be clarified, then, is how Maclntyre feels it is possible to disagree with this emotivist
stance, whilst simultaneously criticising the Enlightenment project, which he believes was
doomed to failure from the outset.
Maclntyre characterises the Enlightenment project's central aspiration as the attempt to
provide standards and methods of rational justification by which every course of action
could be judged to be rational or irrational, just or unjust. In this way, it was hoped that
rationality would replace the arbitrary authority of tradition, convention, and superstition:
Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by any rational
person and therefore independent of all those social and cultural
particularities which the Enlightenment thinkers took to be the mere
accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places.7
Maclntyre makes two main criticisms of this project. Firstly, along with many
contemporary theorists, he argues that the attempt to discover a neutral, independent set of
standards or modes of characterising data has proved to be a chimera. For evidence, he
points to the lack of a set of universal values which would be acceptable to all rational
persons and able to determine the truth on matters which, for example, two traditions are at
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variance. He also notes that in even in liberal individualist society, where rationality is seen
to have priority over justice, the claimed neutrality does not exist. Instead, he rightly points
out that liberalism embodies certain values, liberal values, which necessarily impose a
particular conception of the good life, and ensures through its procedures and terms of
debate the exclusion of rival theories. Even the debates within liberalisi:n as to the
fundamental principles of liberal justice imply that liberalism has not discovered a
fundamental rationality independent of tradition, but rather that liberalism is itself part of a
developed and developing tradition. Maclntyre realises that liberalism's failure at this
project does not necessarily mean that there is no neutral stance or universal standpoint, and
indeed, there can be no a priori argument that one could not exist, yet:
What is equally clear, however, is that liberalism is by far the strongest
claimant to provide such a ground which has so far appeared in human
history or is likely to appear in the foreseeable future. That liberalism fails in
this respect, therefore, provides the strongest reason that we can actually
have for asserting that there is no such neutral ground, that there is no place
for appeals to a practical-rationality-as-such or a practical-justice-as-such to
which all rational persons would by their very rationality be compelled to
give their allegiance.8
Maclntyr&s second criticism of the Enlightenment project is based less upon its
epistemological difficulties, and is directed more towards the specific course that it took.
This in itself is something which should be noted; that is, any supplement to the
epistemological criticism above should surely be redundant, and in fact can only detract
from the force of the argument. This second point made by Maclntyre relates to what he
believes to be an incorrect view of human nature shared by the Enlightenment thinkers. He
argues that the secular rejection of Protestant and Catholic theology, combined with the
philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism, resulted in the elimination of any notion of 'man-
as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos'. Yet the whole point of morality, says Maclntyre,
was to provide a scheme by which human nature could be corrected, improved, and
educated; not to be deduced from 'true' statements about human nature or justified in some
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other way by appealing to its characteristics, which was what the Enlightenment thinkers
were trying to do:
Hence the eighteenth-century moral philosophers engaged in what was an
inevitably unsuccessful project; for they did indeed attempt to find a rational
basis for their moral beliefs in a particular understanding of human nature,
while inheriting a set of moral injunctions on the one hand and a conception
of human nature on the other which had been expressly designed to be
discrepant with each other.9
These two criticisms seem to directly contradict each other. The first implies that Maclntyre
must take a relativist stance, that he is above all opposed to any foundational principles
from which explanations and prescriptions regarding rationality and morality can be
deduced. His second criticism, however, implies that he merely believes that the specific
assumptions made by Enlightenment thinkers regarding human nature were incorrect.
These confusions become more explicit in Maclntyre's proposed solutions to this
contemporary 'crisis'.
B: Maclntyre's Solution Part 1: Restating Aristotle.
Maclntyre draws a sharp dichotomy between Aristotelian teleology and Nietzschean
nihilism, arguing that ever since the belief in Aristotelian teleology was discredited, various
attempts to provide rational grounds for morality have failed, and that this failure was
perceived clearly by Nietzsche. Nietzsche's response to such an insight was to 'raze to the
ground' the structure and very foundation of our inherited moral beliefs and rationality in a
negative philosophy which, as Maclntyre notes, possessed a certain plausibility.
.unless of course the initial rejection of the moral tradition to which
Aristotle's teaching about the virtues is central turned out to have been
misconceived and mistaken. Unless that tradition could be rationally
vindicated, Nietzsche's stance would have a terrible plausibility. 10
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Thus Maclntyre believes that there can be only two choices: either one must follow through
the aspirations and inevitable collapse of the Enlightenment project until there is nothing left
but Nietzschean nihilism, or one must hold that the entire project, including its rejection of
the teleological view of man, was mistaken from the outset - there is no third alternative. It
is here that one of the central issues in the work of Maclntyre and other contemporary
theorists raises its head; that is, the question of the relevance of this philosophical
discussion to our everyday lives. For Maclntyre, the Nietzschean stance is not an escape
from the structures imposed by the Enlightenment, but is rather a symptom of
contemporary liberal democracy, itself a product of those structures.' "It is therefore after all
the case that the crucial moral opposition is between liberal individualism in some version
or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some version or other." 11
Maclntyre goes on to support his case with the argument that the Nietzschean critique,
made so convincingly of the foundational rules of morality in the modern tradition, does
not actually extend to the Aristotelian tradition. The reason for this, he argues, stems from
the fact that for Aristotle, it was the virtues, and not rules, which formed the central part of
the moral system, yet the Nietzschean critique was aimed at discrediting rule-based moral
theory. This argument is weak for several reasons. Firstly, Maclntyre's dichotomy
between rules and virtues is not uncontentious; it could be argued that a virtue-based
morality necessarily produces a set of ethical rules, and conversely, that a rule-based
morality necessarily makes assumptions regarding what it is to be virtuous. This would
mean that the Nietzschean critique does extend to the Aristotelian tradition. Secondly, if we
are to allow that Nietzsche's critique does not apply to Aristotle, it is difficult to see in what
sense they can be opposed, and this will have implications for Maclntyre's argument that
we must choose between liberal individualism and Aristotelianism.
This second criticism has been taken up by Sabina Lovibond 12 , who suggests that
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Nietzsche and Aristotle do not differ in the way required by Maclntyre's argument. In
relation to this, she makes three interrelated points. Firstly, she notes that Maclntyre's
"analysis is strikingly idealist in character - 'idealist' in the sense of seeking to explain
social phenomena by reference to ideas, or intellectual tendencies, rather than by reference
to material forces" 13. Nietzsche, on the other hand, has no intention of extrapolating
prescriptions for a 'Nietzschean man' from the use of rational argument. Secondly, she
argues that
Nietzsche's philosophy is, precisely, the outcome of a self-conscious
attempt. . . to adopt the pre-Christian idea of an 'aesthetics of character' to
the needs of the post-Christian world. Certainly he believed that we could
take some important first steps towards an appreciation of our own
collective spiritual ugliness simply be attending with due humility to the
merits of Greek culture. Like Hegel, however, he recognised the
inadequacy of any merely nostalgic Hellenism, that is, of any notion of
literally imitating what was of value in antiquity without regard for
intervening historical change. 14
In this way, we can see that while Nietzsche and Aristotle have in common some concept
of an 'aesthetics of character', Maclntyre's non-contextualised application of this differs
wildly from Nietzsche's. This application emanates, ultimately, from the way in which
Maclntyre unconsciously follows Aristotle's spatio-temporal generalisations about man and
society. Thirdly, then, Lovibond points to where Nietzsche and Aristotle differ, and this
centres on the conception of the human good as having "a claim to universal acceptance
based on the strength of its rational superiority to rival conceptions" 15 At the point where
Nietzsche and Aristotle part, Maclntyre follows Aristotle, and has to, in order to maintain
the opposition between the two positions. But the important point to note is that Maclntyre
should be closer to Nietzsche if he wishes to maintain his historicist account.
In any case, Maclntyre feels that the Aristotelian tradition of virtues can be restated in such
a way as to restore intelligibility to our moral commitments. To this end, he describes two
interrelated advantages of the Aristotelian conceptual scheme which he believes have
something to offer to the contemporary situation. Firstly, he points to the Greek concept of
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dike, justice, meaning to conduct one's affairs in accordance with the grand scheme of
things, and Aristotle's application of this concept with regard to one's membership in the
polis:
Without such a membership.. . one is bound to lack essential elements of
the education into the virtues and of the experience of the life of the virtues
which is necessary for such apprehension. But more than this, one is bound
also to lack the capacity to reason practically. 16
Aristotle, then, according to Maclntyre, was offering a relativistic view of justice and
rationality, determined as it was within the polis, and not by appeal to some neutral set of
standards which could equally apply to all. This aspect of Aristotelianism is intended, by
Maclntyre, to overcome the foundational and universalistic element of Enlightenment
thought which has been criticised so widely.
The second advantage of seeing things the Aristotelian way, is one intended to overcome
Nietzschean nihilism. Maclntyre takes on the naturalistic fallacy, disagreeing with Hume's
argument that an 'is' premise can never produce an 'ought' without invoking a moral
judgement. There are, he argues 'functional concepts', for example 'watch' and 'farmer',
which contain an idea of what a good watch and farmer are. This is also true, he says, of
the concept of 'man' in the classical Aristotelian tradition, where justice was related to
man's role, and human nature was perceived to have a teleological essence: "It is only
when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases
to be a functional concept." 17
Here again, the question of the link between theory and practice is raised, because
Maclntyre has not in fact produced a convincing critique of the naturalistic fallacy. It is
precisely this kind of moral supplement, at which the criticism made by the naturalistic
fallacy, is aimed. He cannot say that man, in the times of Ancient Greece, had a teleological
essence which he no longer has. If the naturalistic fallacy is true now, then it was true then.
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So firstly, he has failed to show that contemporary man's self-perception does not involve
a telos; secondly, he does not tell us what the virtues should be; and, thirdly, he does not
explain how the Aristotelian tradition can be reinstated in practice. As Frankena points out:
A conception of the good which is man's telos is required, and it must be
drawn from the very considerations that led Maclntyre to transcend the
'limited' conception of the virtues in terms of practices. I do not, however,
find any clear conception of the good or telos in Maclntyre.i8
C: Maclntyre's Solution Part 2: Tradition-Based Enquiry.
At the end of After Virtue Maclntyre states that we still need to find a systematic way to
establish rational procedures for settling moral disputes, and it is this task at which his
concept of tradition-based enquiry is aimed in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. He
begins with a criticism of what he believes to be a central characteristic of modernity: "...
the confident belief that all cultural phenomena must be potentially translucent to
understanding, that all texts must be capable of being translated into the language which the
adherents of modernity speak to each other." 19 This belief, he argues, is manifested in a
variety of activities including the teaching of foreign and historical texts, the conducting of
international negotiations, and in the form of philosophical theses about universal
translatability.
More specifically, Maclntyre directs his critique towards contemporary philosophers who
take themselves to be representing a timeless form of practical thinking, when in fact, their
rationality is peculiar to their own culture. This means, effectively, that often the voices of
tradition outside of liberalism are precluded from being heard, as they are evaluated with a
rationality which is already predisposed towards a particular judgement. So what Maclntyre
is looking for is a mode of understanding which can enable us to reunite our convictions on
161
matters concerning morality and justice, with rational justification, yet without inadvertently
continuing to accept the standards of the Enlightenment. This, he argues, can be found in a
conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition. In Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry this theme is continued and set within his description of the debate between the
'Encyclopaedic' (or what he generally previously referred to as the Enlightnment); the
Genealogical (referring to his interpretation of Nietzscheenealogy of Morals); and the
Thomist tradition as what he sees as the only viable alternative to the other two, remaining,
for the purposes of his argument, substantially the same as his revival of Aristotelianism.
In this most recent book, however, Maclntyre's understanding of a 'tradition' is both
confused and confusing. He uses 'tradition' and 'Thomism' interchangeably, rather than
citing Thomism as an example of a tradition, and the other two versions are sometimes
posed in opposition to tradition, and sometimes as examples of tradition. The reasons for
this confusion may well arise from some fundamental difficulties with Maclntyre's own
position, which we will come to later, but for now we have to return to Whose Justice?
Which Rationality in order to find a clear definition of what he means by a 'tradition' when
he discusses the need for tradition-based enquiry:
A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain
fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of
conifict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all
or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal,
interpretive debates through which the meaning and rationale of the
fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a
tradition is constituted.2°
He goes on to say that a tradition of enquiry is more than a coherent movement of thought:
it is such a movement in the course of which those engaging in that movement become
aware of it and its direction, and in a self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and
carry its enquiries forward. So the concept of rational justification which is at home in that
form of enquiry is essentially historical. This may produce, Maclntyre explains, theses
which appear to have the status of first principles, with other claims being justified by
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derivation from these first principles.
Unlike Enlightenment methodology, however, what justifies the first principles is ". . . the
rational superiority of that particular structure to all previous attempts within that particular
tradition to formulate such theories and principles" 21 . Thus whereas the Enlightenment
project attempted to illustrate whether doctrines were true or false independent of their
historical origin, Maclntyre is arguing that doctrines, theses and arguments all have to be
understood in terms of historical contexts. The radical aspect of this approach is
Maclntyre's claim that this
• . does not entail that the differences between rival and incompatible
traditions cannot be rationally resolved. How and under what conditions
they can be so resolved is something only to be understood after a prior
understanding of the nature of such traditions has been achieved. From the
standpoint of traditions of rational enquiry the problem of diversity is not
abolished, but is transformed in a way that renders it amenable of
solution.22
Thus Maclntyre is explicitly arguing that there is a method by which traditions of enquiry
can be judged. He says, for example, that traditions inevitably recognize their own
problematics and inadequacies, and often overcome these difficulties through employing
the concepts and resources provided by alien traditions. To Maclntyre, this ability of
traditions of thought to take a 'supra-traditional' view and to sit in judgement of themselves
in this way, is evidence that" . . . the Platonic distinction between 'is true' and 'seems true
to such and such person" is correct.23
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Maclntyre describes the two-stage method by which
rival intellectual traditions can make this distinction. They start, he says, by characterising
the contentions of the rival tradition in their own terms, making explicit the grounds for
rejecting what is incompatible with their own central theses. The second stage is reached
when the protagonists of each tradition have considered the areas which, by their own
internal standards, are problematic, and are unable to develop their enquiries beyond a
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certain point using only the concepts which have hitherto been available. At this point in the
controversy, intellectual traditions may discover that their rivals can provide concepts
which are able to characterise and to explain the failings and defects of their own tradition.
Maclntyre strongly implies that these concepts do not simply 'seem true to such and such
persons', they are, in virtue of their universality, true.
The method of tradition-based enquiry is thus aimed at discovering truths in a way which
takes account of the contingently historical nature of rationality and yet can provide us with
a set of criteria by which we can judge all traditions of thought. Theie are several problems
with this project, problems which serve to characterise, to a certain degree, the
contemporary dilemma in political philosophy. The first relates to how we define a
tradition. Maclntyre himself seems to have a rather simplistic view of traditions of thought,
seeing them as few in number, large in terms of members, long-lasting, and coherent;
participating in a general squabble over a long period of time, to see who will reign
supreme.
However, considering the problem of moral chaos and incommensurability at which
Maclntyre aims his method of tradition-based enquiry as a solution, his description of
traditions does not seem to be realistic or useful. While it is most certainly the case that
controversies and incommensurability exists between alternative schemes of thought, it is
surely also true that sub-cultures, economic classes, and even individuals have their 'own
body of canonical texts' and their 'own exemplary images'. To a certain extent this
highlights the somewhat idealistic nature of Maclntyre's tradition-based enquiry. Is it really
possible to identify and characterise 'traditions of thought' in a way that renders them
susceptible to analysis of this sort? If not, one wonders if what Maclntyre believes to be
contemporary moral anarchy is, in fact, a timeless and inevitable feature of rationality.
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This idealistic aspect of Maclntyr&s thought is further illustrated by the empathetic
expectations he has of intellectual traditions. He has placed himself in an awkward position:
on the one hand he wishes to attribute the current chaotic incommensurability to our
inability and lack of desire to understand rival rationalities, whilst on the other he sees
knowledge and understanding of alternative traditions of thought as the solution to the
problem. What he fails to provide is the necessary motivation for such acts of empathy; a
new motivation, what is more, which would be capable of producing empathy where none
existed before.
Related to this is a further difficulty: even if there existed a will to understand rival
traditions in order to make use of their concepts and conceptual schemes for solving
problematics, Maclntyre's own insights have suggested that this would be an impossible
task. What characterises his work above all else is its thorough-going historicity - the view
that all standpoints on rationality and justice are necessarily tradition-constituted and
historically contingent. How then, can we expect an intellectual tradition, with its
interwoven conceptual structure and belief systems, to be able to abstract a concept from
another tradition, and to employ it in the way intended by that rival tradition? We must bear
in mind that Maclntyre heavily criticises liberal individualism for abstracting theses for
analysis from the traditions in which they developed, thus predetermining the judgements
to be reached on them. Yet if a tradition is truly able to adopt a problem-solving concept or
conceptual scheme, seeing it through the eyes of the tradition in which it was originally at
home, then we are surely not talking about two fundamentally incompatible traditions. In
other words, the very definition of traditions of thought which are fundamentally
incompatible relies upon the fact that they could not possibly adopt concepts from each
other in the way which Maclntyre requires. If, however, he is in fact saying that there is a
sense in which intellectual traditions are not fundamentally incompatible (and this is also
implied by his desire to discover concepts by which all traditions of thought can be
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judged), then this detracts, in a major way, from his historicity.
Related to all of these points, and perhaps underlying them, is the difficulty of placing
Maclntyre's own position in relation to traditions per Se. it seems that MacIntyre, like
Foucault's relation to his own archaeological and genealogical enquiries, must be taking an
external, ahistorical stance in order to delineate traditions, in fact, to describe them at all.
This is especially the case for MacIntyre's teleological view, as Gordon Graham points out:
For precisely how we tell the normative story - as one of progress, decline,
purification or deviation - will depend on what we identify as the tradition's
normatively necessary elements. If we are to avoid arbitrar,' stipulation on
this point (which is what the 'ready-made thought' criticism comes to) and
at the same time preserve the normative character, we have no alternative but
ahistorical argument of the kind Maclntyre aims to escape.24
D: Maclntyre and Relativism.
Before venturing into this minefield of a subject, it is necessary to be quite clear about what
relativism is. Roger Scruton provides an excellent definition: "The view that ideals and
values do not have universal validity, but are valid only in relation to particular social and
historical conditions.. . The relativist might think that moral judgements are objective while
denying that they are universal" 25 . Firstly, it can be shown that Maclntyre either
deliberately or unintentionally misinterprets and misrepresents relativism. Secondly, it can
be illustrated that despite his criticism of relativism, Maclntyre's historicity is relativistic,
and without this element, his theses must rely upon the kind of ahistorical argument
indicated by Graham above.
MacIntyre makes two main points in his characterisation of relativism; points which he
believes convincingly undermine the relativist's position. In each case, however, he
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inadvertently invokes universalistic assumptions, thus unwittingly strengthening the
relativist stance while providing support for the argument that he is himself a relativist
because he cannot criticise relativism without using means which, as an historicist, are
unavailable to hi .. e begins his polemic with the criticism that relativism is self-
referential:
by denying to all doctrines whatsoever the predicates 'is true' and 'is
false', unless these are radically reinterpreted to mean no more than 'seems
true to such and such persons', turns the interesting assertion that relativism
is true into the uninteresting assertion that relativism seems true to
relativists.26
While this criticism, superficially at least, has an air of immediate 'a1idity, it does nothing
to damage the relativist case. It only becomes problematic if relativists feel the need to
'prove' their claims to the rest of the world and/or see relativist thought as a prescriptive
way forward for politics and world peace, for example. However, this is not true
relativism, but remains very much within the Enlightenment project of searching for
universal answers. For relativism to be true to itself, it might be, as Maclntyre says,
uninteresting, in that it can say little more than 'relativism seems true to relativists', but
anything more would be antithetical to a coherent relativist theory.
Maclntyre attempts to reinforce his position by arguing that relativism can be transcended,
that it is contingent, and not a necessary social condition. The relativist's standpoint, he
states, amounts to the view that the superiority of rival intellectual traditions is decided by
arbitrary differentials in the power they have to be persuasive, and not by the degree to
which they reflect the truth. Yet, says Maclntyre, this is not always the case because a
tradition of rationality, although historically constituted, will be able to recognise the truth
of certain concepts (from alien traditions) which are able to solve their own problematics:
• the key concepts embodied in rational theory and practice within any
tradition that has a developed problematic, including the concepts of truth
and rational justification, cannot be defined exclusively in terms of or
collapsed into those conceptions of them that are presently at home within
the modes of theory and of practice of the particular conceptual scheme of
167
that tradition or even some idealized version of those conceptions: the
Platonic distinction between 'is true' and 'seems true to such and such
persons' turns out within such traditions to survive the recognition of the
truth in relativism.27
Thus Maclntyre is attempting, it seems, to find a 'half-way house' between universalism
and relativism, claiming that there exist certain concepts the truth of which will be
recognised by traditions of thought in times of epistemological crisis. However, the fact
that certain intellectual traditions are capable of adopting new concepts from an alien
tradition in order to solve their own 'problematics' does not undermine the relativist's
argument. For a start, the 'problematic' to which Maclntyre refers is the product of a
certain conception of rationality which has developed within a tradition. If a new concept is
adopted to overcome the perceived problem, it is interpreted using the epistemological
ontology of the adopting tradition. Thus it is conceivable that two differing traditions of
thought will adopt a concept from a third tradition in order to solve their specific, and
differing, perceived 'problematics', yet still remain distinct in their rationalities. Maclntyre
argues that the adoption of concepts from alien traditions is not simply an interpretation of
those new concepts by the adopting tradition. Yet it is difficult to see what else it could be.
Whatever terminology is used for the perception of the new problem-solving concept;
recognition, understanding, interpretation and so on, it still remains the case that a method
of cognition is in use, and as Maclntyre and others have pointed out elsewhere, this
method, or the criteria applied to the use of this method, is the result of specific temporal
and spatial influences, and can be nothing but.
Some may argue that if this is the central thesis of the relativists' argument, they are not
saying very much - perhaps stating the obvious to the point of being tautologous. Yet what
must be borne in mind is the alternative to the relativist's position; that is, that above and
beyond 'seems true to such and such persons' exists an 'is true'. Now, while the
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prevailing political thought of a tradition may rationalise in a way which presupposes a
belief in the 'is true', it does not follow that there is anything above and beyond the 'seems
true to such and such persons'. Maclntyre, however, seems to be implying that the
willingness of intellectual traditions to adopt concepts from alien traditions in order to solve
their own epistemological problems, means that not only do certain traditions telieve in the
'is true', but that there is an 'is true'. Yet relativists are surely not disputing that people
believe in the 'is true', but simply the 'is true'.
Is Maclntyre a relativist? Should he be? His position needs to be cl'arified. Throughout his
analysis of relativism he has assumed the existence of universal truths, from the stand he
takes on relativism, to actually telling us how universal truths are discovered. All of his
criticisms of relativism, however, fail without exception. Why is this? It is because he is
unwilling to provide us with a conception of the good; he will not tell us what the 'truth' is.
So although he clearly states that there are some concepts which are true for all rational
traditions of thought; that is, those traditions which properly understand their own
problematics, he will not describe these concepts to us except to say that they are not
contingent upon historical factors. However, his very thesis rests upon the historically
contingent nature of rationality, the belief that while truths can be objectively valid within
the epistemological structure of a particular tradition of thought, they cannot be universal -
he even describes relativism itself as a contingent social condition. His attempt to combine
these two logically opposed assertions is thus misconceived and often results in direct
contradictions, ultimately because his historicity, his 'tradition-based enquiry', does not sit
well with his desire to produce a solution to what he sees as the contemporary chaos caused
by the moral incommensurability of rival traditions.
It is the historicity which is the most convincing aspect of Maclntyre's philosophy, based,
it seems, on true insight; rather than his argument for the existence of an 'is true', which
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appears to be the result of his desire to find an 'is true', and not due to any perception of
the actual existence of an 'is true'. Historicism, however, tends to be relativistic in nature,
especially bearing in mind Scruton's definition above, and Maclntyre's stated reasons for
the necessity of tradition-based enquiry. So if Maclntyre were to remain true to his
historicity, on one level, at least, he could be labelled a thorough-going relativit; we might
even say that this is the only way for his thought to maintain a degree of consistency.
There is a further difficulty with this analysis, however, which can be expressed as
follows:
i) If Maclntyre's view of traditions is a tradition-based view, then this cannot exist with an
awareness of its own contingency, that is, he must think that he is telling the truth. In doing
so, he is assuming an independent conceptual grasp of what a tradition is, as discussed
above;
ii) If, however, he does recognise the contingency of such a view, then he must be a
relativist;
iii) In recognizing the contingency of such a view, he must be standing outside of the
tradition-based view from which he forms his view of traditions. This means that he must
be relying upon a-historical assumptions.
This kind of critique is akin to that made of the problems faced by Derrida in Cinders, and
to Rorty's emotivism. For Maclntyre, it seems even more damning because his starting-
point seems to contain a self-awareness missing in the other thinkers discussed. What it
means, in his case, is that, as Graham points out, "the fusion of history and philosophy to
which Maclntyre aspires must be abandoned"28.
In Maclntyre's own view, however, there are very good reasons for going to such lengths
to denounce relativism. He believes that relativist theory will inevitably result in moral
anarchy, emotivism, incommensurability and nihilism: to him it is the bête noire of political
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philosophy. In this he is mistaken.
E: Conclusion: Theory and Practice.
Maclntyre's fear of relativism results from two interrelated mistaken assumptins. The first
is the belief that moral philosophy should be determined by its application; and the second,
that theory and practice are causally linked. Although these assumptions are implicit
throughout his work, they are rarely specifically expressed, and at no point does Maclntyre
seem aware of their contentious nature. It is absolutely essential, however, to make explicit
how these assumptions relate to the wider context of his thesis, for they are at the very
heart of the problematic stance that he, along with many other contemporary thinkers,
takes. It can be demonstrated, what is more, that the separation of theory and practice could
be the solution to these problems.
Firstly, then, at the beginning of After Virtue, Maclntyre alludes to his beliefs regarding the
relation between theory and its application:
A moral philosophy - and emotivism is no exception - characteristically
presupposes a sociology. . . [B]ut at least since Moore the dominant narrow
conception of moral philosophy has ensured that moral philosophers could
ignore this task; as notably do the proponents of emotivism. We therefore
must perform it for them.29
In the first sentence, Maclntyre seems to be implying that philosophy is necessarily
determined by a description of, and a prescription for, society. However, his use of the
word 'task' implies a belief that it is the duty of philosophers to shape their rational J
investigations according to the effect they will have on society; in other words,
pragmatism. These two elements are contradictory; the implication of the former being that
practical considerations influence any philosophy whether the theoretician is aware or not;
and the latter being that philosophers have managed to produce theories which have ignored
this necessary part of their work. This constant juxtaposition of the 'is' and the 'should be'
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is not just a frustrating distraction, but is instead a central part of the confusion at the 
J
foundation of Maclntyre's thesis.
Secondly, regarding the causal link between theory and practice, Maclntyre begins by
making the fairly uncontentious claim that our social history and the history ofphi1osophy
are in part determined by the same historical influences: tI] am now suggesting that the roots
of some of the problems which now engage the specialised attention of academic
philosophers and the roots of some of the problems central to our everyday social and
practical lives are one and the same" 30. But more specifically, he ontinua11y implies that
there is a one-way causal relationship between philosophical assumptions and societal
actualities. This means, for Maclntyre, that what he believes to be the current moral chaos
is the result of the Nietzschean criticism of Aristotle. That is, combined with his argument
that philosophy should be determined by its practical application, he is concluding that
contemporary 'emotivism' is the result of Nietzschean nihilism.
In Three Rival Versions Maclntyre explains this causal link through a description of how
tradition fuses historical understanding and normative judgement, that is, how rationality
causes people to act in one way rather than another:
[B]ecause at any particular moment the rationality of a craft is justified by its
history so far, which has made it what it is in that specific time, place, and
set of historical circumstances, such rationality is inseparable from the
tradition through which it was achieved. To share in the rationality of a craft
requires sharing in the contingencies of its history, understanding its story
as one's own, and finding a place for oneself as a character in the enacted
dramatic narrative which is that story so far.3'
The difficulties in this quote seem to capture the theory/practice confusion. Firstly, we must
note that Maclntyre has deviated from the more straightforward assertion that philosophical
problems and societal problems have the same causes. Rather, he is describing the causal
relation between rationality (in terms of a tradition of enquiry) and our everyday practices.
The link is provided by a consciousness, in the individual, of that rationality. Now, not
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only does the requirement of consciousness of one's contingency have problems, as we
saw in Rorty and as will be discussed with reference to Maclntyre in the next section, but
more importantly, this further requires that the individual cannot act without the kind of
historical knowledge described by Maclntyre. It also implies there is one description of
history and tradition; there is no room in this analysis for conflicting interpretations of
history and rationality.
Similarly, Maclntyre sees relativism as raising questions for 'ordinary agents', and as
having the characteristic structure of philosophical problems. He illustrates his belief in the
causal nature of theory in his argument that it is by readjusting our academic assumptions
that the contemporary societal moral chaos can be resolved. In other words, his attempt at
discrediting relativism and emotivism, and restating an Aristotelian teleology, will result, he
hopes, in ridding society of what he believes to be a destructive moral anarchy.
Evidence can be found within Maclntyre's own work to support the view that philosophical
theory does not inform cultural practice in the way he has suggested. For a start, his
thoughts on this matter seem to be clouded by the same nostalgic historicity which
produces his overly coherent view of traditions. That is, that the causal links between
theory and practice appear far stronger in retrospect - it might be the case, for example, that
in a couple of hundred years time contemporary theory will be attributed a homogeneity
which has never existed. So while Maclntyre uses examples from the past to support his
argument that a specific moral philosophy produces a specific moral culture, he has
difficulty in describing exactly how Nietzschean analysis has produced an emotivist
society.
While Maclntyre clearly states that it is the failure of the Enlightenment philosophical
project (exemplified in existentialism) which has produced the moral problems of the
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modern world, he notices that everyone continues to speak as if this project has succeeded.
Thus he is in the difficult position of attempting to maintain his thesis that current moral
experience is caused by recent postmodern moral theory, while explaining why people act
and talk as if the foundational truths of the Enlightenment are still valid. He tries to do this
by separating the 'meaning' of a word from its 'use':
• . . almost everyone, philosopher and non-philosopher alike continues to
write and to speak as if one of these projects had succeeded. And hence
derives one of the features of contemporary moral discourse which I noticed
at the outset, the gap between the meaning of moral expressions and the
ways in which they are put to use. For the meaning is and remains such as
would have been warranted only if at least one of the philosophical projects
had been successful; but the use, the emotivist use, is preéisely what one
would expect if the philosophical projects had all failed.32
This separation of the meaning of a word from its use entails some incorrect assumptions.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it entails that a word does have a meaning separate from
and prior to any use which it might have. Where, then, do words come from? Do they fall,
ready formed, from the sky, waiting to be discovered and put to their correct use?
Maclntyre would reply that of course they do not, they are constituted historically. But
surely it is the case that the meaning of a word is determined solely by its use. Thus when
Maclntyre states that the meaning of words remains such as if the Enlightenment project
had been successful, this can only be if people are using them as such; the 'meaning' can
have no other role to play. And if Enlightenment terminology is still in use, then perhaps
'emotivism' only exists as a concept in the academic circles of contemporary philosophy.
It is not, however, simply the case that emotivist theory has not yet filtered through to a
mainstream cultural ontology. Rather, it can be shown that current incommensurability is
not due to any Nietzschean revelation, but is instead part of the liberal democratic tradition,
and as such, very much within the Enlightenment framework. Furthermore, it is the case
that this is necessarily true, and relies upon the fact that at both the societal and the
174
individual level, the recognition of the truth in Nietzsche's nihilism by the academic world
cannot be incorporated into a practical ontology.
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PART II- THE SELF
A: Introduction.
Maclntyre describes the nature of the self in historically contingent terms, arguing that since
secularisation, human nature has lost its teleology. Taken together with the individualistic
notion of the self, he argues, this has produced emotivism. The problem with such an
outlook in practical terms, he goes on, is that it means that people are alienated, that they
have no allegiance to any particular tradition which could provide them with reasons for
thinking and acting in one way rather than another.
Maclntyre believes that a revival of Thomist Aristotelianism can restore a telos to human
nature through practice-based virtues. There are three main difficulties with this thesis.
Firstly, it contains a certain circularity; a human telos is to be discovered through practices,
but for practices to be meaningful in the way Maclntyre describes, they must already be
teleologically defined. Secondly, Maclntyr&s general confusion of theory and practice
means that he has to accept (if he is to remain consistent) that an emotivist, non-Aristotelian
self can, and does, exist. This, however, makes it difficult to see how we could produce
teleological beliefs where none existed before. Finally, it can be shown not only that the
purely emotivist self cannot exist, but that Maclntyr&s causal link between the failure of
Enlightenment rationality and the supposed existence of emotivist human nature, is
unfounded.
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B: The Emotivist Self.
Maclntyre believes that the history of philosophy has paved the way for the emotivist self:
What I am now going to suggest is that the key episodes in the social
history which transformed, fragmented, and if my extreme view is correct,
largely displaced morality - and so created the possibility of the emotivist
self with its characteristic form of relationships and modes of utteranCe -
were episodes in the history of philosophy, that it is only in the light of that
history that we can now understand how the idiosyncrasies of everyday
contemporary moral discourse came to be and thus how the emotivist self
was able to find a means of expression.33
Maclntyre begins his historical analysis with Aristotle, pointing to the fundamental contrast
between man-as-he-happens-to-be, and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-essential-
nature. Ethics, he argues, is the science which enables man to make the transition from the
former to the latter. In this way ethics must contain some account of the essence of man,
and above all some account of the human telos. This distinction remained, Maclntyre points
out, in the theistic period, whereby 'man's essential nature' was understood in religious
terms. So in this period, to say what someone ought to do is to say what course of action
will lead toward a man's true end, "and to say what the law, ordained by God, and
comprehended by reason, enjoins." However, the secular rejection of Protestant and
Catholic theology, and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotle, had the joint
effect of eliminating any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos.
The eighteenth-century moral philosophers replaced the teleological view of man with a
description of human nature as it is (rather than as it should or could be), and from this
attempted to deduce the moral injunctions which were originally at home in the ancient and
medieval teleological view. This, says Maclntyre, was inevitably doomed from the start,
for without the teleological view of man, morality became foundationless. At the same
time, 'the individual' became the most fundamental category of social thought and practice,
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separate and prior to membership in any particular social and political order. The
combination of these two developments, argues Macintyre, produced the emotivist self.
Maclntyre describes emotivism as the argument that any moral statement simply reflects the
approval of an action or thought; that people view their own principled commitments as
contingent choices: "One way of framing my contention that morality is not what it once
was is just to say that to a large degree people now think, talk, and act as femotivism were
true, no matter what their avowed theoretical stand-point may be. Emotivism has become
embedded in our culture."34 So, for Maclntyre, emotivism is nof simply the theoretical
position which resulted from the Nietzschean critique; it has a contemporary manifestation
in everyday ontologies whereby the individual conceives of himself as sovereign in his
moral authority.
The emotivist 'post-Enlightenment person' responds to the failure of the Enlightenment to
provide neutral, impersonal tradition-independent standards of rational judgement by
concluding, states Maclntyre, that no set of beliefs proposed for acceptance is therefore
justifiable. The everyday world is to be treated as one of pragmatic necessities. Every
scheme of overall belief which extends beyond the realm of pragmatic necessity is equally
unjustified. There is no such scheme of belief within which such an individual is able to
find him or herself at home, and the imaginative assumption of beliefs not actually held is
not, and cannot be, for the purpose of investigating the rationality of that scheme, for it has
already been concluded that all such schemes fail.
Such an individual therefore views the social and cultural order, the order of
traditions, as a series of falsifying masquerades. He or she can belong to no
community of discourse, for the ties of language which he or she speaks to
any presupposed scheme of belief are as loose as it is possible to make
them. So the natural languages of persons thus alienated are the
internationalised languages of modernity, the languages of everywhere and
of nowhere.35
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There are some people, argues Maclntyre, who are able to inhabit a tradition despite the
recognition of themselves as imprisoned by a set of beliefs which lack justification. Such a
transformation would require this alienated self to find a 'language-in-use', a kind of
working hypothesis, which would enable it to enter into dialogue with some tradition of
enquiry. This kind of self can then express standards of rational enquiry as sonething other
than expressions of will and preference. However, as Maclntyre points out, this latter type
of self is equally estranged from and uninformed by any such set of dispositions,
sentiments, thoughts, or language-in-use, and simply sees such a facade as a pragmatic
necessity.
Maclntyre states that most people do not live at or even near such points of extremity, but
neither are they able to give their allegiance to a particular tradition.
Instead they tend to live betwixt and between, accepting usually
unquestioningly the assumptions of the dominant liberal-individualist forms
of public life, but drawing in different areas of their lives upon a variety of
tradition-generated resources of thought and action, transmitted from a
variety of familial, religious, educational, and other social and cultural
sources. 3 6
This results, says Maclntyre, in a self which has too many half-convictions, with no means
by which to evaluate them systematically, so that it brings to encounters with rival
traditions "a fundamental incoherence which is too disturbing to be admitted to self-
conscious awareness except on the rarest of occasions."37
C: Maclntyr&s Solution.
The answer to the problem, then, is to restate Aristotle through a Thomist approach. By
this, Maclntyre means that we need a virtue-centred theory of ethics, and necessary for this
is a concept of the human telos.
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• . . unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices
by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life
conceived as a unity, it will both be the case that a certain arbitrariness will
invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the context of
certain virtues adequately.38
The difficulty, however, is that Maclntyre does not tell us what the virtues re, or even
how we could construct a teleology from which we could derive a set of virtues. He
mentions the need for man to have a 'narrative unityt to his life, and implies that it would
be possible to deduce the virtues from this. But as Schneewind points out, if every act done
for a reason is part of a unified narrative, then every human life already has a unity; if it
does not, then we are left still looking for a telos from which to write the narrative. Again,
Maclntyre's thought seems to be faced either with circularity or a choice between
Enlightenment foundationalism and the relativistic approach which he is so determined to
avoid.
The reason is that the notion of the good here, like the notion of narrative
unity, is too weak to provide any distinctive ground for the virtues. We may
agree with Maclntyre that we seek a good we do not fully understand and
learn more about it as we go. But this does not distinguish his view from
that of every good bourgeois moralist from Butler to Rawls.39
Frankena, too, says that he cannot find any clear conception of the good or telos in
Maclntytre, and notices that this is more than just an omission on Maclntyre's part. Rather,
Maclntyre's statement that" . . . the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the
good life of man"4° implies that human life is a kind of indefinite pursuit of a grail not
definable in advance. It seems that Maclntyre wants to give human nature a teleology
without losing the sense of agency that it has found since ancient times. So even though
Maclntyre sees the individual's moral starting point as constituted by her tradition and
socialization, the problem arises because he is not prepared to insist that the individual must
sustain and continue every inherited communal feature of her identity. The result, as
Schneewind notices, is that
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• . . [it is difficult to see how this view of the selfj provides an account of
the virtues which an emotivist self could not accept or how it enables
Maclntyre to show that the virtues are prior to moral rules.. . Once again,
Maclntyre's position collapses into that which he repudiates as being at the
core of modernity.4!
That Maclntyre's prescription for the self should end up resembling emotivism is not a
coincidence; it is a reflection of the tensions inherent in contemporary philosophy. Through
Nietzsche and the existentialist critique, philosophy has burned its bridges. We can no
more reinstate Aristotle, or God, than we can regain our childhood belief in Father
Christmas. We have lost our innocence, we are having an existential crisis, and we are
suffering the necessary angst which goes with it. But this is not the same as emotivism.
D: The Impossibility of the Emotivist Self.
The recognition of the failure of the Enlightenment attempt to provide philosophy with
foundational truths from which to derive moral rules, does not translate to an emotivist
psychology or societal outlook. Evidence that an emotivist self is impossible can be found,
firstly, in Maclntyre's own work: "Up to the present in everyday discourse the habit of
speaking of moral judgements as true or false persists; but the question of what it is in
virtue of which a particular moral judgement is true or false has come to lack any clear
answer."42 'Lack any clear answer', that is, in the academic world of philosophy. The fact
that people still talk in terms of true and false (and they can but do so) is an indication that
the world at large remains unaffected by the failure of the Enlightenment philosophical
project. In other words, individual psychology is such that it is necessary to assume the
existence of objective and external truths, and not simply in terms of some kind of
'working hypothesis', in the way Maclntyre ascribes to the emotivist self, but as an
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inescapable and absolute inability to suspend belief.
Maclntyre himself provides further support for this argument in his discussion regarding
the fact that human desires always presuppose a hierarchy of norms, and can never be
taken to represent a neutral, value-free standpoint. In every culture, he says, emotions and
desires are norm governed, and thus to exhibit a particular pattern of emotions and desires
is always to reveal a commitment to one distinctive and moral position rather than another.
This is because the justifying norms which govern both emotions and desires embody a
rank ordering of goods and evils.
Hence at any particular stage in the historical development of any particular
culture the established patterns of emotion, desire, satisfaction, and
preference will only be adequately understood if they are understood as
giving expression to some distinctive moral and evaluative position.
Psychologies thus understood express and presuppose moralities.43
What Maclntyre seems to fail to realise is that this has always been the case and always will
be, irrespective of whether the philosophical tradition of the time believes itself to have
discovered some truths with which to support the 'truths' which are presupposed in a
moral and evaluative position. To put it another way, the contemporary philosophical view
that we have nothing, no fundamental truths, to support our belief systems, and what is
more we never have had, bears no causal relation to the necessary practice of assuming that
absolute truths exist.
E: Conclusion.
The confusions inherent in Maclntyre's thesis on the self arise from the degree to which he
believes theory and practice are interlinked. Thus he feels the need to respond to
Nietzsche's conclusions (which he sees as producing the emotivist self) with a remedy for
the contemporary alienated individual. At the same time, he convincingly describes
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individual psychology as necessarily constituted by a presupposition that absolute truths
and a hierarchical ordering of goods, exists. Instead of taking this latter insight and using it
against those contemporary philosophers such as Rorty who take Nietzsche's conclusions
as a starting point for the prescription for an emotivist self, he begins with the assumption
that the emotivist self widely exists and needs a cure.
These criticisms are summed up very well by Charles Taylor:
If one thinks that the Aristotelian meta-ethic in fact offers the inescapable
categories for anyone's moral thought, then one will see the rival package of
views - say disengaged freedom, plus the meta-ethics of the factivalue
dichotomy - as an unviable basis for an alternative life-form. In fact, people
who aspire to live by this alternative will be deluding themselves.. . They
will always be in truth more 'Aristotelian' than they believe, surreptitiously
relying on notions like 'virtue' and 'the good life', even when they
repudiate them on the level of theory. On the other hand, the more one
thinks that the Aristotelian forms can be escaped, the more one will think
that the modem package offers the basis for a coherent viable alternative.44
As Taylor points out, Maclntyre leans toward the second view, that 'Aristotelian forms can
be escaped', and this is why he interprets contemporary societies in terms set by emotivist
theories. This means that Maclntyre's conception of the self is susceptible to the same
criticisms as that of Rorty. It also makes it difficult to see how we could suddenly conjure
up teleological beliefs where none existed before. Taylor's position, however, is the more
convincing one, that we are far more 'Aristotelian' than we allow, although he notes that if
we do perceive ourselves in emotivistic, atomistic terms, that would no doubt effect our
practices, but even so, "our way of life never sinks to the full horror that would attend it (I
believe) if we could be truly consistent Benthamites, for instance"45.
To this I would add that while our self-perception does, no doubt, make a practical
difference to society, this self-perception comes from society, and not from anything
Taylor or Maclntyre have to say. So the important point is that the failure of Enlightenment
rationality does not (and cannot) produce an emotivist society. Not only is it irrelevant in
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practical terms, it is logically inconsistent to say that the inability of the Enlightenment to
provide us with a meta-ethics (or meta-theory of any kind) then leads to a specific
description (or prescription) regarding human nature. What Maclntyre fails to do then, is to
embrace the apparent contradiction between contemporary emotivist theory and
contemporary non-emotivist practice. One of the reasons that he is unable to dR this results
from his belief that contemporary liberal democracy embodies an emotivist culture.
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PART III- POLITICS AND SOCIETY
A: Introduction.
Maclntyre switches between a sociological analysis of what he believes to be contemporary
moral chaos, and a theoretical discussion and critique of emotivism. This in turn means that
he confuses liberal theory with liberal practice, a confusion which necessarily has
implications for his prescriptions for modern society. His solution, to revive a notion of
practice-based justice, fails to remain coherent without invoking ahistorical assumptions
which are unavailable to him. In fact, Aristotle and Aquinas did not have the kind of
historical concept of justice which Maclntyre attributes to them, making their moral and
political theses unsuitable for performing the tasks for which he uses them.
More generally, it can be shown that criteria external to practices are necessary for any
concept of justice, and in particular, for a concept of justice as desert. This means that
liberalism too contains substantive moral elements, and cannot coherently rest on a merely
procedural notion of justice. Once we have performed this kind of 'levelling' of liberalism
with other traditions in regard to procedurallsubstantive notions of ethics, we can compare
the specific substantive elements of liberalism with those of Thomism. The result of this
comparison indicates that liberalism is better suited than Thomism to Maclntyre's desire for
justice as desert.
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B: Emotivist Culture.
The failure of the Enlightenment to provide independent standards of debate in the public
realm, states Maclntyre, has produced an emotivist culture, by which he means that moral
debates are unsettlable and consensus is impossible. Modern liberal indivic4ualism and
emotivist culture are one and the same, and we still, argues Maclntyre, "lack any coherent
rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view." 46 The result of this
is that society is rent by controversies.
For Maclntyre, moral philosophy is historically embodied in society, and this means that in
his discussion of contemporary moral debate, he is advancing both a philosophical
narrative and a historical sociology of modernity. The public moral discourse of modem
societies, he argues, is characterised by interminable political debate. With regards to
abortion, for example, the debate has become polarized, with no possibility of rational
determination of the issues. This lack of a priori criteria means, he argues, that protests on
major issues results in rival parties addressing only those who share similar opinions
because there are no 'objective' standards to which rival groups can appeal for arbitration
and judgement.47
Maclntyre argues that such incommensurability arises in liberal societies because people act
as if emotivism were true. He describes liberalism as aiming to prioritise authentic choice
and autonomy by justifying certain absolute rights or principles which will promote these
values. Yet these values, he states, cannot be rationally grounded, and therefore the concept
of rights is merely a means to these ends. It is due to this lack of justification for emotivist
values that incommensurability is the inevitable outcome.
Despite what appears to be a sociological explanation of 'moral chaos', Maclntyre is
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relying upon a theoretical analysis and critique of emotivism. He criticises Rawis and
Nozick, for example, because neither of them understand justice in terms of deserts; that is,
they both ignore the constructs of social norms; "Individuals are thus in both accounts
primary and society secondary, and the identification of individual interests is prior to, and
independent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them." 48 It is
necessary to note that Maclntyre is criticising this account of justice as though it were
mistaken, yet he still attempts to make use of it as though it were evidence that we live in an
emotivist society. However, we must begin by assuming that his view of contemporary
society is correct in order to assess the solutions he proposes to the problems he perceives.
C: Maclntyre's Solutions.
What we need then, says Maclntyre, are impersonal standards of judgement which can be
appealed to in order to remove arbitrary exercises of power - "tyrannical power within
communities and imperialist power between communities". These can be found, he
believes, through two things: Firstly, through a revival of Thomist Aristotelianism which
will enable a discovery of new teleologies from practice-based virtues; and secondly,
through a method of 'tradition-based enquiry', whereby rival traditions can adopt concepts
from each other to solve their own problematics. Both of these approaches have
difficulties. The problems with the first centre on the need for Maclntyre to avoid invoking
ahistorical, transcendental assumptions in his prescription for teleological virtues. This
leads him to misinterpret Aristotle and Aquinas, and results in a failure to distinguish
between good and evil practices without resorting to the use of substantive argument. The
difficulties with the second set of prescriptions arise mainly from practical difficulties,
especially in light of Maclntyre's description of the moral chaos suffered by contemporary
society.
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Janet Coleman rightly points out that Maclntyre distorts "Aristotle and Aquinas in order to
address what he sees as certain liberal dilemmas"49. In general terms, she argues that,
rather than combining Aristotelian philosophy with Augustinian theology in a satisfying
way (which is Maclntyre's interpretation), Aquinas held an incoherent position which,
although it attempted to subsume the then current Platonism of Augustine's theology within
Aristotelianism, resulted in a position which was actually incompatible with Platonism. The
result of Maclntyre's glossing over these details is that he gives an overly unified view of
Thomism as an answer to liberal problems.
More specifically, Coleman points out that both Aristotle and Aquinas saw definitions as
mirroring nature, and that for them, these were timeless and universal. Aquinas, for
example, clearly states that "if one lives in a society whose customs and traditions are not in
accord with what a reasonable nature would consider appropriate, then by deliberating a
person who is accustomed to do something can, indeed should, act against custom and
tradition"50. This directly contradicts Maclntyre's interpretation of virtues and the human
good being determined solely within and through practices, as Coleman notes:
Traditions for a Thomist or an Aristotelian do not constitute practices as
definitions; traditions are subordinate to definitions, because traditions or
cultures are bad or good realizers in practice of the definition, which is itself
a universal, is timeless and stands as a conventionally uttered representation
of human universal conceptions concerning peculiarly human behaviour.5 1
To a certain extent, perhaps we can disregard the number of debates surrounding
Maclntyre's interpretation, or misinterpretation, of Aristotle and Aquinas. What is
important is whether Maclntyre himself can use the concept of practice-based virtues as a
way of solving what he perceives to be the problems in liberal society. Elizabeth Frazer and
Nicola Lacey argue that without some kind of external, substantive criteria [of the sort,
perhaps, that Coleman says we find in a correct interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas]
188
Maclntyre has no way of distinguishing evil practices:
Maclntyre.. . defines virtue as the exercise of what is necessary to attain
goods internal to practices. Truth, courage and justice are necessary if we
are genuinely to enter into a relationship with past and present practitioners
[After Virtue p194]. The integrity of a practice requires the exercise of the
virtues [After Virtue p195]. Conversely, the exercise of virtue is bound up
with the existence and moral value of practices. This analysis obviously
makes practices, as such, by definition good.52
This would mean that in Maclntyr&s own terms, torture, for example, must count as a
practice, and as long as it is carried out well, causing maximum amount of pain while
keeping the victim alive, then it is a good practice. The only way Maclntyre could escape
this conclusion, as Frazer and Lacey point out, is by appeal t6 either substantive or
procedural criteria. Maclntyre himself has already ruled out the use of the substantive,
however, in his insistence of practices and traditions as the sole source of virtues. They
argue that he is more likely to rely upon procedural rules, especially in light of "his
scepticism about whether apparently evil practices really are practices". The problem with
this, they argue, is that there exist regimes which embrace procedural rules but nevertheless
engage in what would be considered evil practices. To this I would add the more
fundamental critique of procedural criteria, which Maclntyre notices himself in relation to
the covert hierarchy of values in liberalism, and that is that the procedural inevitably
collapses into the substantive as soon as we question the source or outcome of application
of the procedure concerned.
Maclntyre has recently tried to counter some of these criticisms. In reply to Frazer and
Lacey, he simply states that the "conception of justice and of other virtues . . . can be
invoked against deformation and prejudice" in order to define evil practices S3 . This is
based on his accompanying statement that there are goods external to practices, but that
these goods are themselves determined by practices. His point is that the virtues confirmed
within practices can be extrapolated for judging between practices, and people do this when
they critically reflect upon whether a practice is a good one: "Nothing can claim exemption
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from reflective critique, but well-founded reflective critique can never be disengaged from
those contexts of practice from within which it acquires its point and purpose"54 (italics
added). This defence is problematic. The distinction between 'well-founded' reflective
critique and unfounded reflective critique rests upon assumptions which should be
unavailable to Maclntyre. Let us assume, for example, that people must inevitably make
references to external, transcendental criteria in order to judge and criticise practices.
Maclntyre would argue that this kind of reflective critique is not well-founded, and would
therefore exclude it from his description of practices and traditions and how they develop.
But, as with Derrida's problems in Cinders, Maclntyre can only thaintain the distinction
between well-founded reflective critique and unfounded reflective critique by insisting on a
distinction between the real and people's perception of the real. And this in turn implies that
there is a truth, and a corresponding good, outside of, and pre-existing, Maclntyre's
'practice-based virtues'.
Maclntyre does, however, allude very briefly to a couple of practical proposals aimed at
removing the lack of consensus in society. At the end of After Virtue, he states:
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community
within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained
through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition
of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are
not entirely without hope.55
Taken together with Maclntyre's emphasis on tradition, the implication of the above
statement seems to be a prescription for small based societies which possess a coherent set
of beliefs which have developed historically, and a set of laws which reflect the belief
systems in place. Without interruption from traditions which possess rival ontologies and
rationalities, these 'local forms of community' could then maintain their norms and
conceptual structures in accordance with some kind of epistemological purity. A similar
suggestion is made at the end of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, where Maclntyre
briefly discusses the idea of a 'postliberal university' system in which universities are
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organised according to traditions of enquiry, kept pure by exclusive membership. These
universities would be able to enter into debate with each other in order to solve internal
epistemological problematics and to attempt to work out controversial issues between them,
in a way akin to the method of 'tradition-based enquiry' he previously described.
Apart from the practical difficulties of putting such a system into place (Maclntyre,
remember, believes that we are now living in an emotivist society), the effect of achieving
this goal would be very much at odds with his desire to rid society of controversy. These
small communities would be constantly at war with each other, and there would certainly
be no basis for communication or understanding between them. Thus it seems that these
vague proposals directly contradict the goal of the tradition-based method Maclntyre puts
forward for arriving at impersonal standards of judgement in order to remove the arbitrary
use of power. As Horton and Mendus point out,
[O]ne of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the
very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the
possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the
Aristotelianism which Maclntyre advocates. His reference to 'the
construction of local forms of community' and the need 'for another -
doubtless very different St. Benedict' seem little more than whistling in the
dark to keep the spirits up when set against his coruscating critique of
modernity.56
These criticisms assume, however, that Maclntyre's own description of the state of
contemporary society is accurate. If his description of modernity as emotivist is in fact
exaggerated and mistaken, it could be that his prescriptions are rather closer to the liberal
status quo than he would dare to imagine.
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D: The Problem With Maclntyre.
The difficulties raised by Maclntyre's view that there exists a direct causal relation between
theory and practice permeate all aspects of his thought. Regarding politics and society, it
appears that he hopes for a kind of 'supra-traditional' set of standards w1iich can be
appealed to in order to resolve internal and external conflicts. Without such a set of
standards, he argues, the superiority of rival traditions is decided by their power relations,
and not by any real ability to provide concepts which could solve what he calls
'problematics'. However, his historicism, his recognition of the inevitably contingent
nature of all value systems, implies that the foundationalism which he recommends is
perceived not as a search for ultimate truth, but as a pragmatic necessity. Yet if we (as
academics) believe that there are no neutral and universal truths, then even if a tradition
believes that it has a superior rationality, its success or failure at convincing others cannot
be due to any possession of 'the truth'. In other words, while Maclntyre himself sees
values as contingent, he wants society at large to accept them as absolute. The two
suggestions he makes for achieving this end - tradition-based enquiry and the construction
of local forms of community - are idealistic and aimed at rectifying a problem which does
not exist.
A society, or a culture, cannot be emotivist in the same way that an individual cannot be
emotivist. An individual is socialised, his desires are norm-governed, and every thought or
communication with his fellow man expresses a hierarchy of goods which necessarily
presuppose a belief in some fundamental truths. This 'inevitability' can be understood in
socio-political terms. Societies are not born, they have a tradition. They could not become
emotivist unless they become anarchic, and then they are no longer societies. Laws have to
be made, and these necessarily reflect values of some kind, and these in turn inevitably
presuppose truths. Decisions cannot be made without reference to something, some list of
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priorities.
While the main thrust of Maclntyre's argument centres on his claim that contemporary
liberal individualist society suffers from moral chaos and incommensurability due to a lack
of justifiable values, he inadvertently provides evidence that this is not the case. In Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? he criticises liberal society for its claims to neutrality when in
fact, as he correctly points out, it embodies a specific set of well-defined values.
The principles which inform such practical reasoning and the theory and
practice of justice within such a polity are not neutral with respect to rival
and conflicting theories of the human good. Where they aie in force they
impose a particular conception of the good life of practical reasoning, and of
justice upon those who willingly or unwillingly accept the liberal procedures
and the liberal terms of debate. The overriding good of liberalism is no more
and no less than the continued sustenance of the liberal social and political
order.57
Maclntyre's point is that the values inherent in liberal society are covert, that they hide
behind a declaration of neutrality. The liberal claim, he says, is that all questions regarding
the human good have an equal right to be expressed, that hierarchies are not established,
and that liberalism itself stands outside of traditions. This, he argues, is a fraudulent claim:
Like other traditions, liberalism has internal to it its own standards of
rational justification. Like other traditions, liberalism has its own set of
authoritative texts and its disputes over their interpretation. Like other
traditions, liberalism expresses itself socially through a particular kind of
hierarchy.58
The sense, then, in which liberal society is emotivist, he argues, is the common belief that
it is not a tradition in the way that other societies are, that values and hierarchies are
constantly open to question, resulting in incommensurability.
There are two criticisms which can be made of Maclntyre's analysis. Firstly, the fact that
contemporary liberal society does have a specific set of values, whether its members are
aware of them or not, means that it cannot be emotivist in the way that Maclntyre describes
emotivism. That is, in the public realm there exists hierarchically ordered standards which
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can be appealed to in debate, for making laws, upholding justice, making policy decisions
and so on. Secondly, that a Thomist revival would be closer to liberalism than Maclntyre
realises; and more than this, liberalism might suit Maclntyre's purposes better than
Thomism.
The first problem arises from Maclntyre's separation of the meaning of a word from its
use, for he relies upon this distinction in his argument that we use foundational
Enlightenment words and concepts in an emotivist way, and that this means that we fail to
perceive the incommensurability in the contemporary culture 59: As was noted earlier,
Maclntyre fails to coherently maintain this dichotomy; there is no way in which meaning
and use can be radically discrepant in the way his diagnosis presupposes. As Stephen
Muihall points out, "In short, the claim to rationality in morals which Maclntyre allowed to
be part of the meaning in moral terms is one which the practice of making moral
judgements does in fact meet"60. In other words, without the separation of the meaning of
a word from its use, we have to take societal references to Enlightenment morality to mean
what they say. This then means that Maclntyre's criticism of liberal societies as emotivist is
undermined, and his argument in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? that liberalism
contains a covert hierarchy of goods should be replaced with a recognition of liberalism as
a genuine moral tradition. Mulhall rightly notes that
Maclntyre's objection to liberalism ought not to be the methodological claim
that it is conceptually incoherent, because that claim does not stand up to
scrutiny; it should rather be that liberalism is a substantial and powerful
moral tradition which we have substantive and powerful reasons for
rejecting as undesirable or objectionable.6'
If we look, for example, at Maclntyre's proposal for a postliberal university system, we
find a pluralism in his recognition of the legitimacy of rival traditions, and if the above
criticism is taken into account, we can see how liberalism must be included among them if
he is to remain coherent.
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More than this, however, the very nature of Maclntyre's prescriptions bring his suggested
structure close to liberalism itself. This can be demonstrated with a three-part argument. In
the first place, it can be shown that Thomism is procedural in the same way that Maclntyre
critically describes liberalism as being procedural. Next, it can be shown that despite this,
both Thomism and liberalism ultimately rely upon substantive elements. Finally, a
comparison of the two indicates that the substantive elements of liberalism are closer to
Maclntyrean ideals than those of Thomism.
In After Virtue, a revival of Aristotle is proposed in order to reinstate a notion of practice-
based virtues to counter what Maclntyre sees as the moral chaos of contemporary society.
When Maclntyre replaces Aristotle with Aquinas in the following two books, however, he
glosses over their differences, and in particular, the fact that in Aquinas practices no longer
occupy a central place. Rather, he falls to notice that with Aquinas, justice is procedural and
is achieved through conformity to natural and human law. As David Miller notes, this then
means that "the Thomist account to which Maclntyre eventually gives his blessing is in
several respects closer than the Aristotelian account to the liberal view of justice that he
rejects, especially in its Lockean and Kantian incarnations"62.
Now to the second part of the argument: both liberalism and Thomism ultimately rely on
the substantive rather than the merely procedural. Charles Taylor correctly states that
procedural notions of ethics are incoherent, and that "to be made coherent they require
restatement in substantive form"63 . This becomes obvious, he argues, when we ask why
we should obey the procedures, according to what criteria are the procedures 'good'. The
answer will necessarily embody some conception of human nature and the good. In
liberalism, we can find this in the hierarchy of values pointed to by Macintyre himself in
Whose Justice?, and in Thomism in God's eternal law, embodied in the whole universe.
With this conflation of the procedural with the substantive, we can again see a levelling
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between Maclntyre's description of liberalism and alternative traditions of enquiry,
meaning that a critique which places them in opposition loses its force.
Central to Maclntyre's conception of justice is his notion of desert. He argues that virtues,
and their corresponding deserts, can be discovered internally within practices tc which they
relate. As is demonstrated above and throughout this chapter, however, there must be an
external set of criteria by which practices (and therefore deserts) can be judged just. That is,
desert is a principle of substantive justice which cannot be properly defined internally to
practices, and this applies as much to liberalism as to Thomism As Miller points out,
"Maclntyre's decline-and-fall-of-the-practices thesis is at best a gross exaggeration, and it
follows that there are many contemporary forms of human activity within which different
form of criteria apply"64. In particular, liberal societies maintain a meritocratic system of
deserts based on market principles. Of course, it is a contentious issue whether liberal
societies are as meritocratic as they like to think they are, but the point here is that the
concept of desert has flourished in modern market societies.
This brings us to the final stage of the argument. In Aquinas, we find the notion of justice
as desert displaced by a hierarchy of natural inequality, an organic conception of society in
which every well-defined part, or class, serves the whole. There is no need for the
Maclntyrean notion of discovering justice, and corresponding desert, through practices,
because Aquinas believed that the natural law will generate human laws which specify what
is just. Aquinas does, with Aristotle, recognise that differing social or political
arrangements exist, but these determine only the means to achieve justice, and justice itself
is determined universally by the natural law.
There are two reasons, then, why liberalism is better suited to Maclntyre's purposes than
Thomism. Firstly, we can see how the a priori concept of justice and deserts in Thomism
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makes it unsuitable for the task Maclntyre gives it, while the free-market principles in
modern liberal societies apportion desert irrespective of the social standing of the recipient:
a dollar is a dollar, whoever's pocket it is in. Secondly, it is difficult to see how Thomism
could be revived in modern society, where the necessary social structures and values no
longer exist: "[Maclntyre] is committing himself to the revival of a form of I4fe which is
categorically, and not merely contingently, excluded by the structures of the modern
world" 65 . Once these misdescriptions of contemporary liberalism and Thomism have been
taken into account, along with the criticism that justice can only be described in terms
which are external to practices, one can begin to see how the typ of society Maclntyre
wants is not so far from the one he has got.
E: Conclusion.
Maclntyre's work is full of contradictions. Ernest Gellner hits the nail on the head when he
says "what distinguishes Professor Maclntyre is not the number of beliefs he has doubted,
but the number of beliefs he has embraced. His capacity for doubt we share or surpass; it is
his capacity for faith which is distinctive and perhaps unrivalled" 66. Maclntyre's starting
point, it will be remembered, is that the Enlightenment had to fail because there is no
neutral ground, "no place for appeals to a practical-rationality-as-such or a practical-justice-
as-such to which all rational persons would by their very rationality be compelled to give
their allegiance" 67. Nevertheless, he still wishes to find impersonal standards of judgement
which can be appealed to in order to remove arbitrary exercises of power - 'tyrannical
power within communities and imperialist power between communities'. To this end, he
believes that tradition-based enquiry is capable of providing "the kind of debate from which
one party can emerge as undoubtedly rationally superior"68.
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Maclntyr&s attempt to bridge what seems an infinite logical gap rests upon his thesis that a
revival of practice-based virtues can provide human nature with a teleology. As has been
demonstrated, however, such practices necessarily already presuppose a concept of justice-
as-such and rationality-as-such. There is also the more general problem of the endless
confusion of theory and practice which underlies all of Maclntyre's thought. kie seems to
think that by readjusting our academic assumptions about the nature of the self we can
bring about a real change in the way people think and the way societies operate. One can
imagine the headlines now: "Philosophers discover that we have a teleology after all"! But
does Maclntyre believe that human nature does have a teleologyi His entire critique is
based upon the assumption that we do not. Politically, however, he thinks that it would be
useful if people were to have a teleological view of themselves, or at least to presuppose
that they do through references to a priori truths to which they appeal for moral and
practical guidance.
However, as Maclntyre himself has noted, and as has been shown to be an inevitable
human practice, people do make references to such 'truths'. And Maclntyre is in no
position to make a distinction between references to truth which are well-founded and those
which are unfounded, for this would both contradict his critique of the Enlightenment, and
make his desire for practice-based justice redundant because its reliability at discovering
what is just would be questionable.
With this in mind, it is difficult to see how Maclntyre could be in a position to criticise
liberal societies. Regarding his idea of the postliberal university system, for example,
Horton and Mendus point out the following:
On the one hand, his recognition that there is a variety of traditions in the
modern world, each with legitimate claims to serious investigation,
intimates a pluralism which, if not straightforwardly liberal, is at least an
embodiment of mutual toleration between proponents of different traditions.
On the other hand, his insistence on the role of authority within traditions
and his apparent acceptance of the idea that the guardians of a tradition can,
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for example, legitimately exclude from their own universities those who do
not share the basic assumptions of their tradition seem potentially more
authoritarian and socially divisive.69
I would add to this that even the idea of exclusion is not incompatible with liberal societies.
Once it has been recognised that liberal societies are not, and cannot be, emotivist, but
instead embody a hierarchy of values, their laws and social policies can be seen to protect
such values and exclude those which threaten them. More than this, 'tradition-based
enquiry' requires a liberal base; it necessitates a type of outlook which is hard to conceive
of existing in a non-liberal society.
Ultimately, Maclntyre's understanding of traditions must itself be a tradition-based view,
and the likelihood is that the specific tradition within which this view of traditions
developed was a liberal one. For evidence, we do not simply have to rely on some
biographical description of Maclntyre; we can look to the pluralist notions of tolerance and
empathy as an indication of the liberal nature of his tradition-based enquiry. The difficulty
is, however, how such a concept could exist and operate outside of liberal societies. From
this, the 'rationally superior' standpoint for which Maclntyre is searching would inevitably
be the liberal one.
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CONCLUSION.
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The central argument which has been proposed here, as set out in the introduction, has
centred on the inevitability of invoking transcendental assumptions in postmodern
discourse, and how this necessarily produces difficulties for any political stance which
presents itself as an extrapolation of such philosophical insights. This now needs to be
looked at in more detail, and in particular, leads us to the question of what this means for
the future of contemporary political philosophy. These conclusions emerged from the
themes and problematics analysed, so firstly, it would be useful to provide a comparative
summary of these.
What characterises these thinkers is their anti-Enlightenment starting point. As was noted in
the introduction, however, this is an almost symbolic representation of the Enlightenment,
and is applied more generally to encompass the Western philosophical tradition. This is less
vague if we note that at many points the Enlightenment appears to be presented as the
offspring of the Western tradition, with Plato as the father. This symbolism arises,
therefore, because the postmodern debate tends to characterise the Enlightenment in terms
of its fundamental, underlying ethos of objectivity and transcendentalism, rather than of its
specific manifestations.
In Foucault's early work, this critique contains two main elements. Firstly, he criticises
humanist values as repressive because truth and rationality have been taken to be
transcendental categories and then arbitrarily installed through institutions. Secondly, he
rejects the holism inherent in Enlightenment rationality; the fact that it imposed unity and
universalism, thereby excluding all 'others' in order to maintain a progressive, teleological
view of history. His argument is that once the notion of transcendental, ideal forms has
been removed, there exists no goal to work towards, nothing by which truths and concepts
can be measured, and that therefore the authority of such repression is thwarted.
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Derrida recognises that such an insight has broader implications, and therefore directs his
critique at the Western tradition in general. He points to the fundamental error in the history
of Western philosophy, the belief that there is something present behind the concept, and
that this can be reached. Contrary to this, Derrida demonstrates how the point of arrival at
'reality' will always be deferred by another sign, and that this means that the essence
behind the idea can never be appropriated. Through his analysis of, in particular, Saussure
and Heidegger, Derrida also notes how the Western tradition's search for certitude and
timeless truths has necessarily excluded specific 'others'. What he notices, however, is that
these thinkers - and Foucault too - replicate this project by taking a position which is
necessarily external to reason itself.
Rorty's critique is similar. He argues that, ever since Plato, philosophy's central concern
has been to provide a general theory of representation, and that this has been based on the
fundamental confusion that language can mirror nature. In opposition to these
correspondence theories of truth, he argues that since truth is a property of sentences, and
since sentences are made by human beings, so are truths. Furthermore, whereas
epistemology assumes that all contributions to a given discourse are commensurable, Rorty
insists that the contingent nature of starting-points means that incommensurability is
inevitable and that therefore to search for accurate representations of 'reality' is a waste of
time.
Maclntyre begins with a similar critique to that of the others. Although he realises that there
can be no a priori argument that a neutral stance or universal standpoint cannot exist, the
Enlightenment's failure, and in particular that of liberalism, to provide a neutral,
independent set of criteria by which to judge, is 'the strongest reason we can actually have
for asserting that there is no such neutral ground'. Secondly, like Foucault, Maclntyre
criticises the Enlightenment's humanist values. The idea that morality could be deduced
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from 'true' statements about human nature eliminated, he argues, the Aristotelian notion of
'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos'. This is where Maclntyre differs from the
other thinkers under analysis. In general terms, they argue that the effect of the
Enlightenment, and the Western tradition in general, has been one of repression, and that
now that we can show how so-called 'objective' truths are unfounded, we can be free of
the foundationalist, exclusionist practices that this entails. Maclntyre, on the other hand,
believes that because the Enlightenment project failed so miserably, society is now
suffering from the subsequent incommensurability which follows from this.
Difficulties begin to emerge with these thinkers when they turn to proposing solutions.
Foucault puts forward archaeology as highlighting discontinuity over continuity, and
thereby enabling a project of pure description of discursive events in their specificity. Once
the discursive field is freed from the constraints of metanarratives, he argues, one can
distinguish rules of discursive formation which gain their authority from the status of those
who offer it, rather than from any pre-ordained truths representing a progressive,
teleological rationality.
The criticisms which can be made of Foucault's on olution to his critique of the
Enlightenment demonstrate his inability to provide a method which escapes the
transcendental/relativistic dichotomy. The very project of a 'pure description of discursive
events', for example, has a transcendental ring to it, and fails to recognise that archaeology
must necessarily have limits, and therefore exclude and categorise. His 'rules of discursive
formation' have also been criticised for their fatalistic and tautologous implications. That is,
with such rules as the sole origin of discursive events, and changes in discursive
formations applying, it seems, only to a singular historical event, the notion of a rule is
emptied of all content. Along with this Foucault makes truth relative to an episteme in order
to be able to describe meaning in its specificity. The incoherency of this relativistic
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position, it was demonstrated, arises not from problems with relativism itself, but rather
due to the transcendentalism inherent both in the archaeological method, and Foucault's
argument in favour of resistance.
Foucault's introduction of genealogy, and a concept of power as a more positive
phenomenon underlying all social relations, enables him to explain changes in the history
of discourse that are merely described by archaeology. However, the fundamental
criticisms remain the same: the very projects of archaeology and genealogy, that is, to
analyse, categorise and explain, are at odds with his anti-Enlightenment stance. In
particular, Foucault wishes to provide us with a reason to resist, and it his desire to present
the reasons for doing so as the natural upshot of his critique of the Enlightenment which
produces the fundamental tensions within his work.
Derrida proposes his concept of dfferance as a description of how a sign comes to occupy
a certain position in a system of signifiers. Unlike traditional semiology, which
understands the sign as constituted by its relation to the signified, Derrida argues that its
significance is derived through its position in a referential structure of other signs - its
difference to other signs. Again, we find that Derrida too is unable to maintain a position
which avoids contradicting his original critique, and is forced into the
transcendental/nihilistic dichotomy. More interestingly, however, the level at which
Derridean analysis operates allows us to make a further observation, and that is that even
this dichotomy itself relies upon transcendental assumptions. Once this point has been fully
taken on board, the critique of the postmodern position as nihilistic immediately crumbles.
More specifically, there are a couple of criticisms of differance, and a couple of criticisms
of deconstruction, which lead to the above observation, as was summarised in the
discussion of Derrida's Cinders. Firstly, it was shown that Derrida's 'system of differance'
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has a transcendental quality - it does not interact with any ontological or cultural influences.
This is because he is unable to describe the non-linguistic aspects of the process in more
explicit terms without the danger of citing a non-linguistic 'origin' of differance. Secondly,
it was noted that Derrida insists upon the binary nature of differance; for every sign there is
one excluded 'other'. This is what gives Derrida's description of differance its critical edge.
He implies that by temporarily reversing the privilege of the binary pair, we will achieve
some kind of equalisation or naturalisation. However, the chapter pointed out that there
must be an infinite number of excluded others for every sign which makes its way into our
conceptual vocabulary. If from this, we then recognise that such exclusion is a function of
meaning, the critical aspect of differance becomes groundless.
Derrida's project of deconstruction, then, initially gives precedence to the 'other' in order to
overturn (but not reverse) hierarchies and thereby liberate all concepts from the dominant
force which has organised the logocentric hierarchy. The problems with the deconstructive
task emanate from the confusions inherent in Derrida's concept of differance. Firstly, by
speaking of the one excluded other, he is unwittingly drawn into the predominant logic of
existing hierarchies, and is therefore assuming a transcendental standpoint because he
always already has a preconceived notion of what the 'other' is. Alternatively, if we were
to re-write differance and deconstruction in a way which recognised the infinite possibility
of heterogeneous others, and therefore avoided this transcendentalism, deconstruction
would be nihilistic as it would expose the absolute arbitrariness of all concepts and
hierarchies. This adds further weight to the argument that there exists no 'middle way'
between some kind of transcendentalism on the one hand, and nihilism on the other.
However, as was demonstrated in the discussion of Derrida's Cinders, there is an
inevitable reliance on transcendental notions. If he maintains the distinction between
signifier and signified, he starts to appear as if he has an idealised view of signifieds as
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some kind of unreachable Platonic Forms. If, however, he is asserting that the totality of
meaning and reality is to be found in the signifier, then the transcendental significance
previously attached to the signified in traditional Western thought is simply transferred to
the sign.
Rorty has the same problems as Derrida. Further analysis of Rorty's argument that truth is
a human creation showed that he too is trapped within either a correspondence theory of
truth or linguistic idealism. Rorty wants to maintain a distinction between 'the world being
out there' and 'truth being out there'. It was demonstrated, however, that he can only do
this by maintaining the distinction between signifier and signified, and thus lands himself in
the same difficulties as Derrida.
The answer is to recognise the inevitable act of relying upon transcendental truths. It is
because Rorty confuses ontological transcendentals with epistemological transcendentals
that he feels the need to place these two in opposition to an anti-transcendental position
which inevitably collapses into relativism and. nihilism. Therefore, it can be illustrated that
the critique of the Enlightenment and the Western philosophical tradition in general, will be
forced into the transcendental/nihilistic dichotomy, but that this dichotomy is itself
dependent upon transcendental assumptions of some kind, as was seen most clearly with
Derridean semiotics.
In Maclntyre, the contradictions are more immediately observable. Despite his critique of
Enlightenment rationality, he believes that we can reinstate an Aristotelian teleology and a
form of tradition-based enquiry which will provide a superior universal rationality by
which traditions can be judged. His difficulties arise, therefore, from his argument, contra
Enlightenment, that there are no neutral, independent criteria, and his desire to overcome
what he perceives to be the moral incommensurability which emanates from this. His
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proposal is that through tradition-based enquiry we can discover a universal rationality and
truth based on a thorough-going historicity as opposed to the kind of objective truths for
which the Enlightenment project searched. Yet again, however, it was found that he fails to
escape the dichotomy between transcendentalism on the one hand, and relativism and
nihilism on the other.
In particular, this was demonstrated with a discussion of Maclntyre's own standpoint in
relation to tradition-based analysis. Firstly, if his view of traditions is itself a tradition-
based view, then this cannot coherently exist with an awareness f its own historicity or
contingency, that is, it is already constituted by specific, spatio-temporal criteria of which
Maclntyre seems unaware. This lack of awareness means that he is assuming an
independent, transcendental conceptual grasp of what a tradition is. Alternatively, if he
does recognise the contingency of his own view of traditions, then he must be a relativist.
Yet in recognising the contingency of his own view of traditions, he must nevertheless be
standing outside of the tradition based view from which he forms his view of traditions.
This means that, either way, he must be relying upon transcendental, a-historical
assumptions.
The result of these observations is that while the critique of Enlightenment rationality and
the Western tradition in general is convincing - there is no access to transcendental truths -
there nevertheless remains the inevitable dependency upon transcendental assumptions.
This is clarified in the analyses of the extrapolations of the postmodern critique for the self
and politics.
Foucault's initial concept of the self emerges from his argument that madness is culturally
constituted through the labelling of behaviour which cannot be subsumed within the
dominant conception of rationality. It was demonstrated, however, that in seeing madness
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as containing a transgressive and emancipatory force, he presents an essentialist view of the
self. There is a permanent tension in Foucault's work, and with regard to human nature this
is manifested through his need for a constituted view of the self as part and parcel of his
critique of the Enlightenment on the one hand, and an essentialist notion of the self to
support and make possible his project of resistance and emancipation, on the other.
In his genealogical work, Foucault uses the concept of biopower to replace the subject with
the body, thereby avoiding essentialism, but consequently excluding the sense of agency
which he requires for resistance. In response to these criticisms f his earlier work, his
later books describe an 'ethics of the self, in which liberty is achieved through the act of
creating oneself and resisting the individualising effects of 'governmentality'. However, it
was argued that Foucault cannot distinguish between a strong, powerful, but invisible code
of normalisation (which he says exists in contemporary Western societies), and a society in
which individuals feel that they form themselves unaffected by an invisible moral code. To
do so, he would have to either state that individuals are constituted by external forces in
both types of society (thereby losing any sense of agency), or that in one of the societies,
individuals are suffering from a form of 'false-consciousness'. Both alternatives, however,
invoke essentialist assumptions about an 'authentic' self which are unavailable to him.
Derrida's starting point is that the subject has been defined and redefined, and that these
definitions depend upon external influences rather than any formal identity of the subject.
He argues that differance is a condition of self-consciousness such that reflection involves a
signification which permanently defers contact with a signified self. By redescribing
subjectivity as an effect of differance, Derrida aims to erase the prescriptivity which
accompanies the notion of formal identity and therefore emancipate the self. However, the
separation of the speaking subject (constituted through a system of signifiers) from the
signified being, ultimately idealises being, giving it the same transcendental quality
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observed in the Derridean semiology of Cinders. That is, Derrida's critique of the
transcendental signified (in this case 'being') must ultimately rely upon the transcendental
notion of a lost origin. However, the project of deconstruction would lose its emancipatory
force if it were not for this covert assumption that human nature is somehow being
distorted and repressed by the prevailing hierarchies.
Derrida implies that readjusting our academic assumptions regarding what it is to be human
can have a desirable, emancipatory effect upon our everyday practices. At the semiological
level, it has been shown that we cannot rid ourselves of the transèendentalism of which
Derrida is so critical. But neither is this possible at the practical level, for as soon as we try
to take on board Derrida's concept of the subject, we instantly refute it by thinking it. In
other words, self-reflection necessarily involves a form of objectivisation of the self which,
unfortunately for Derrida's idealised notion of emancipation, inevitably carries a
prescriptivity.
Rorty's critique means that he sees the self as in some sense determined by specific
temporal and spatial influences, but his prescription for embracing this type of contingency
means that he takes an existentialist view of the possibility of human nature as self-
constituting, or 'edifying'. Rorty describes the 'ironist' as someone who recognises her
contingency and is therefore aware that the terms in which she describes herself are subject
to change. The opposite of irony, he states, is common sense, or the metaphysician's
viewpoint that the terms in his own vocabulary refer to something which has a real essence.
The difficulties with this position are akin to those with Derrida's. Rorty assumes that an
awareness of our contingency means that we are able to fully describe ourselves and the
elements which constitute us. However, this would necessitate the ability to transcend
oneself, and also implies that there is a non-contingent 'core' of which to be aware.
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Maclntyre's description of the self is couched in historically contingent terms, arguing that
the contemporary self is an emotivist one. However, far from seeing this as inevitable, he
believes that reinstating an Aristotelian teleology will help to cure the ills of modern society.
Maclntyre's concept of the self is open to many of the criticisms aimed at the previous
thinkers, but in particular, it was demonstrated that his description of the conter1porary self
as escaping Aristotelian forms makes it difficult for him to explain why or how teleological
beliefs can suddenly be embraced where none existed before. Ultimately, however, his
incoherency arises from a confusion of theory and practice, and the fact that the
contemporary view that we have no transcendental truths with whih to support our belief
systems (and never have had) bears no causal relation to the timeless and inevitable practice
of assuming that absolute truths exist.
In all four cases, then, two main arguments were put forward. Firstly, it was demonstrated
that any emancipatory prescriptions for the self necessarily rely upon transcendental notions
of the good, and upon essentialist notions of human nature. Secondly, it was argued that
not only would this 'emancipation' from a priori notions of truth be undesirable for
individuals, it would be impossible. This was shown, in particular, with reference to
Derrida's parallel of the self and semiology, and Rorty's ironist and his description of The
Pragmatist's Progress. For Maclntyre, this meant that his starting point - that we live in an
emotivist society, rent by controversies due to the Enlightenment's inability to provide us
with some transcendental truths - was misconceived from the start; the solution he was
looking for was based on a misconception of the problem. That is not to say that such
transcendental truths exist, of course, but simply that both at the philosophical and the
everyday level, we talk and think in such a way that they do. Similar tensions, arising from
the extrapolation of practical applications from the postmodern insights into truth, pervade
their descriptions of, and prescriptions for, politics and society.
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Foucault's early work on exclusion and domination relies upon the structuralist methods of
archaeology and genealogy. Despite his attempts to reinterpret domination as normalisation,
he himself later recognised that this stage of his work still tended to rely upon a
unidirectional concept of power which is unable to explain or prescribe resistance and
social change. His later work introduces the notion of 'governmentality', by which he
means the tendency of Western societies to 'totalise' and 'individualise' in their aim to
govern 'all and each'. That is, the concept of the individual has become totalistic through
large-scale normalisation, resulting in the predominant notion of liberty which in fact re-
subjects people as they conform to it.
Although this later work describes power as subjectivising as well as objectivising,
constituted through an 'agonistic struggle' between individuals rather than pure
domination, there nevertheless remains epistemological difficulties regarding both his
descriptive analysis and his prescriptions for change. As Habermas and others have
argued, Foucault's comparative analysis of power relations requires a transcendental
viewpoint which is unavailable to him, and this also accounts for his failure to provide a
coherent reason to resist. Finally, it was shown that he implicitly draws on the specifically
liberal forms of normative judgement at which his initial critique was aimed. A close
analysis of his work indicates a disenchantment with the gap between liberal ideals and
liberal democratic practice, such that his project can be understood as an attempt to perfect
and overcome the incoherencies inherent in liberal democracy.
As with Foucault and the others, Derrida is not in any position to extrapolate any political
implications from his philosophical insights if he is to remain at all consistent. His concept
of differance implies that any political stance which believes itself to be based on a 'truer'
understanding of man and society is always mistaken. Deconstruction aims to disrupt the
concept of the concept and the prescriptivity that goes with it. This is because the concept
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as such implies the existence of an origin, a signified, always already defining 'truth' and
therefore prescribing that this truth be represented as closely as possible. However,
Derrida's insistence on the binary nature of differance covertly introduces an emancipatory
critique whereby the restoration of balance to the previously downgraded 'other' is
presented as natural.
On the political front, this celebration of the marginal translates to a deconstruction of
liberal democracy and a reinterpretation of Marx. Derrida abstracts from Marxism what he
calls its 'spirit', by which he means the hope for emancipation through permanent critique.
His application of this critique, however, centres on the gap between liberal democratic
ideals and liberal democratic practice, and his notion of the 'spirit of Marxism' (which can
be used interchangeably with 'deconstruction') aims to bring the practice closer to the ideal.
Nowhere, however, does Derrida question the legitimacy or desirability of this ideal, and
this results in a replication of the transcendentalism at which his critique was aimed.
Rorty's politics contains similar contradictory elements to the other thinkers. On the one
hand, he wants to make his prescriptions for society the outcome of his attack on traditional
philosophy, while on the other, he feels the need to privilege certain concepts such as
freedom and democracy. The failure of Rorty's separation of public consensus and private
contingency to overcome this basic contradiction indicates that the validity of the liberal
position is questionable unless we can disprove his critique of the correspondence theory of
truth. In other words, the fundamental incompatibility of this critique and his prescriptions
for a liberal society demonstrates not only an incoherency in postmodern attempts to
extrapolate political implications from philosophical insights, but also indicates that if we
take the postmodem critique of traditional philosophy seriously, we will have a hard time
justifying the basis for liberal democracy.
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Maclntyre somewhat reverses the position of the other thinkers under analysis,
nevertheless exhibiting similar contradictions. He believes that the inevitable failure of the
Enlightenment to provide transcendental truths has been manifested as moral
incommensurability in contemporary society. He is, however, critical of this failure, and
argues that we need impersonal standards of judgement to appeal to in order to remove
arbitrary exercises of power. The difficulty, then, is if we are to take his postmodern stance
seriously, any so-called 'impersonal standards' must also be arbitrary.
These problems were made explicit in the analysis of how Maclntyre thinks these
impersonal standards can be discovered. His proposed solutions - practice-based virtues
and tradition-based enquiry - therefore exhibit a necessity to resort to substantive or
procedural criteria, both of which he has explicitly rejected. Finally, it was shown that
while Maclntyre rightly points out that liberalism contains a covert hierarchy of goods
which undermines its claimed neutrality, it is impossible to differentiate liberal democracy
from the kind of society he prescribes unless he contradicts his notion of tradition-based
values, thus invoking transcendental assumptions.
Mark Lilla distinguishes between French and Anglo-American political philosophies,
arguing that
compared to Anglo-American political philosophy, which takes
liberalism to be a natural fact or a historical given, rarely asking questions
about its social and historical preconditions, French investigations into their
own political past have the advantage of raising general questions about the
circumstances in which all liberal societies flourish or decline.'
While I agree that the French philosophers I have chosen are perceptive about the a priori
nature of American political and philosophical assumptions (as indeed is Maclntyre), they
still fail to be perceptive about their own. In all of the thinkers under analysis there seems to
be a sense in which liberal assumptions are inescapable, especially in their later works.
This could be because, in comparison to the postmodern critique of the Western
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philosophical tradition, the differences between liberal values and, say, Marxist values, are
minor. It could also be because, more specifically, the differences between Anglo-
American liberal values and society, and the pluralistic, albeit conflictual, liberal actuality of
post-war France, is minimal. It might even be that the failure of the French Revolution and
the events of 1968 to achieve certain ideals has produced a disappointment in French
intellectuals that can only be expressed, in the current political climate, as a desire to
appropriate liberal ideals more closely. For whatever reason, there appears to be an almost
inevitable magnetism between my French thinkers and the liberal ideal which is more than
an absence of political values brought about by their critique of the Enlightenment.
In all of the themes discussed - Rationality, The Self, Politics and Society - it was
demonstrated how transcendental assumptions of some kind are necessarily invoked. This
meant that the postmodern critique cannot be translated to a prescription for the self or
politics. However, as we saw with Derridean semiology, it also has implications for the
postmodern critique of Western rationality. In relation to this, I would like to consider two
questions. Firstly, how does the fact that we necessarily presuppose some transcendental
assumptions affect the postmodern critique of correspondence theories of truth? Secondly,
does my position on this reduce to tautology or triviality?
The first question centres on the fact that exclusion is a function of meaning. While the
postmodern stance rightly points out that foundational, neutral, transcendental, objectivist,
essentialist (these terms are often used interchangeably in relation to the critique of Western
rationality) truths are inevitably exclusionist, they fail to recognise that the notion of
contingency is equally exciusionist. So while they can rightly expose specific truths and
goods as arbitrary, they can only do this by maintaining a notion of that which truths are
arbitrary in relation to. This then replicates the outlook which they aim to criticise.
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Now, we could say that despite this, they do not necessarily have to have a notion of those
signified truths in any specific sense. That is, they could say, like me, that although we
necessarily invoke transcendental assumptions, these assumptions do not rely upon the
existence of any actual transcendental truths of the kind that Plato believed in. But this is
not what they in fact do. Instead, they use their understanding of the arbitrary nature of
truths to point to specific 'others' that they feel have been ignored or downgradd. And, as
we observed, these others tended to be such that would bring liberal practice closer to the
liberal ideal. The significance of this rests on the fact that the postmodern stance is itself a
contingent one, emanating from concerns of equality and freedom. My position, on the
contrary, is that there are an infinite number of heterogenous excluded others, existing, in
the main, beyond our thoughts and comprehension.
The problem with my position is that it is one of indifference. It cannot provide any reason
to criticise or overturn traditional notions of truth. The knowledge that the truths with
which we operate are arbitrary, cannot translate to a prescription for changing them. This
brings us to the second question, for nor can that knowledge provide us with a reason for
not changing them. This seems to imply that my own critique must be self-refuting, and
removes the possibility of criticising the postmodern viewpoint in the same way that
Derrida's concept of differance lost its critical edge once it was realised that its binary
nature should be replaced with an acknowledgement of infinite heterogenous others.
However, my contention that transcendental truths are necessarily invoked or relied upon,
both at the level of theory and in everyday life, also provides the ammunition which is
needed to criticise theses that fail to take account of this. This failure, demonstrated in all of
the thinkers in question, manifests itself in the prescriptions they make for the self and
politics. Even with Maclntyre it was shown that he fails to recognise that such assumptions
must exist prior to the practices through which he thinks virtues can be discovered, and
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prior to the tradition-based enquiiy by which he thinks a superior rationality can be found.
Following this, my two main arguments - i) that there is no access to transcendental truths,
if, indeed, any such truths exist, and ii) that we nevertheless inadvertently rely upon the
assumption that there are - raise questions for the relationship between theory and practice,
and for the role of the political philosopher. All four thinkers exhibited the belief in a one-
way causal relationship between philosophical enquiry and contemporary society, a belief
which my analysis demonstrated to be both improbable and logically inconsistent. This also
indicates that a certain idealism still exists in political philisophy, that is, these
philosophers think that if we theorise rationality carefully and 'correctly' we will be
provided with insights that can be used for practical improvements for the self, politics and
society.
Bearing in mind the transcendental assumptions which are inevitably invoked in the
postmodern critique of traditional Western philosophy, perhaps the search for emancipation
can only continue if that critique is disregarded. Or, perhaps like the atom bomb, we cannot
simply un-invent this weapon. Either way, a bit of humility would not go amiss, for surely
one day postmodernism will be consigned a place amongst the other past and future 'isms'
of political philosophy.
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The Emperor's New Clothes:
"In the old days we weren't afraid to shout out, 'You're naked you silly
arse. You're stark-bollock naked.' Today you only have to fart in the
presence of a dark-haired girl from the Sunday Times, whose father is either
a sacked politician or a minor poet like myself, and you'll be puffed and
profiled as the new Thackeray."
(Stephen Fry, The Hippopotamus, Quality Paperbacks Direct, London, 1994.)
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